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2 May 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2747

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

PAPER SAYS ARMENIANS EXPECT 'CORRECTION OF HISTORIC ERROR'

Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 30 Mar 83 p 1

[Editorial: "Correcting the Historic Error"]

[Text] The Turkish government, beset by its inability to defeat the flag-bearing fighters of the Armenian liberation struggle and to drown the loud protests expressed by their acts, has these days embarked upon a campaign of tracking down "Armenian armed organizations that are members of international terrorism." After leveling unfounded accusations against the Armenians on every occasion, Turkey will in the future start thinking about using "peaceful means", continuing a policy used by the leaders of Ottoman Turkey whenever they were unable to subdue Armenians by violent means and the force of arms.

Responding to "peaceful" Turkey's proposal, some friendly governments will perhaps in the future agree to act as mediators with the purpose of "reconciling" the two adversaries while proposing to the vanguards of the Armenian struggle to end their armed struggle, to pursue the solution of problem through political means and to conform to the reality of the situation.

Such friendly "mediators" could come on stage when they see that events are taking place beyond their control hurting their big power interests, even though the perpetrators of those events yearn for their just rights and want to uncover the real criminal.

But the Armenian nation expects other things from friendly governments. The Armenian nation expects that the historic mistake of indifference not be repeated --a mistake which was committed in the days when the Turkish yataghan was swinging over the heads of thousands of Armenians and when many thousands of Armenians were being forcefully uprooted from their homes and traditional homeland and were being massacred with unprecedented ferocity before the eyes of the civilized world. In particular, the Armenian nation demands that the effort to correct that historic mistake start today with the international recognition of Armenian rights.

Today, the Turk is asking governments who have provided haven to chunks of the Armenian nation "to pursue the Armenian terrorists" on the basis of the false accusations it has leveled and the distorted information it has been disseminating. In bilateral discussions, Turkey is even able to ask for the extradition of Armenian fighters to Turkish "justice." Those talking to the Turk, however, know

the Armenian nation well, they are aware of its just cause and, most importantly, they know the Turk very well for its evil mentality and barbaric nature.

In any case, it must not be forgotten that the Armenian nation, as a united entity, knows how to rise and lend a hand to the handful of heroes who are waging a struggle of life and death and to defend its rights.

It is a pity that martyrs fall on this path of struggle and prison cells often become the reward of these freedom-loving standard bearers.

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN TERRORISTS' ATTORNEY INTERVIEWED BY TURKISH WEEKLY

Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 26, 28 Mar 83

[Interview with French-Armenian lawyer Patrick Devejian by Istanbul weekly NOKTA; date and place not specified]

[26 Mar 83 p 5]

[Text] [Editor's note] The Istanbul weekly, NOKTA, featured the Armenian question and Armenian terrorist movements in two consecutive issues in March.

The weekly also issued a call addressed to "sensible and peaceloving" Armenians. This was followed by an extensive interview with Patrick Devejian, the attorney of the Armenian terrorists.

In today's issue we give the first part of that interview.

Who Is Patrick Devejian?

Patrick Devejian is a French lawyer of Armenian origin who handles the legal defense of Armenian terrorists who have been arrested in Europe.

Devejian, 38, is married and has four children. He is a graduate of the Institute of Jurisdiction and Political Science of Paris. He actively participates in the French political life.

NOKTA: What is your evaluation of ten years of Armenian terrorism?

Devejian: Although terrorism is really not a good thing, I can say that in this case it has been extremely successful. Its chief goal was the rejuvenation of Armenian society. That goal was achieved; the Armenians were saved from assimilation and they regained their national identity. Terrorism shook them into their senses, showed them the peril of assimilation and, finally, proved that what the Armenians want is not so horrible.

The second goal of terrorism was to see Turkey's position with regard to the Armenian question. Today, Turkish government leaders know that an Armenian question exists. The same situation cannot be said to apply to the Turkish public, since, I believe, the press in your country is not as free as it should be. Furthermore, as an extremely nationalist press it gives a distorted view of the Armenian question to the public. In view of this situation it is impossible to talk about any mode of solution.

However, the Turkish leaders are now familiar with the Armenian question.

The third goal of terrorism was to familiarize the international public with the existence of the Armenian question. For 70 years, the Armenians tried to gain recognition for the genocide committed against them through various diplomatic means, but they failed to win anything. But, with terrorism, the international public became familiar with the Armenian genocide and heard about the injustices the Armenians suffered.

Some countries officially recognized the genocide; others expressed willingness to recognize it.

For instance, let us take France. The government published in the Official Gazette the explanation given by Minister of External Relations Cheysson in the National Assembly and thus officially recognized the 1915 genocide committed against the Armenians. Furthermore, high-level French officials expressed grief to Turkish officials about Turkey's denial of its responsibility in the genocide.

NOKTA: Is France the only government in the world supporting the Armenian question?

Devejian: No. Among the countries that support the Armenian cause, France has taken the strongest stance. In particular, Greece, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya and Cyprus support the Armenian cause. The stance of the Soviet Union on this issue is also very interesting despite its differences with the stance of the others.

NOKTA: You said that Armenian society has gained self-awareness as a result of terrorism. Do the majority of Armenians support terrorist movements or do they wish to see an end to terroristic and diplomatic activities?

Devejian: The Armenians have taken differing stances with regard to terrorism. Terrorism has caused uneasiness among Armenians, who are generally a peaceful and quiet people. The Armenians see terrorism from two perspectives. On the one hand they see terrorism aimed against Turkish targets and on the other they see terrorism committed against non-Turkish targets. The Armenians are generally opposed to this second kind of terrorism. We must be realistic. Most Armenians support terrorist movements working against Turks, in particular, those terrorist acts aimed against diplomats actively involved in Turkish foreign policy.

NOKTA: ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] issued a statement in Athens on 25 December to the effect that all Turkish institutions are considered ASALA targets. It appears that a change of strategy is at issue. Can you elaborate on the reasons for this change?

Devejian: ASALA has so far attacked numerous targets without discriminating among them. In other words, it considered as targets the institutions of countries that have arrested its members and that do not appreciate the importance of the Armenian cause.

But it was found out that such acts do not have the unanimous approval of the Armenian public and that they were rejected.

Thus, following the example of the Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide [JCAG], ASALA increasingly focused its attacks on solely Turkish targets. The general Armenian public opinion played a major role in this change of tactics. I believe that attacks against Turkish targets will intensify in the future.

NOKTA: What developments do you foresee in the future?

Devejian: The developments that will come will have been prepared more scrupulously and more carefully.

NOKTA: What you mean is not very clear. Could you elaborate a little further on this issue?

Devejian: Armenian terrorism has so far displayed a picture of anger and resentment. These terrorist acts were generally directed against the representatives of Turkish policy in foreign countries and against diplomats and ambassadors who denied the Armenian genocide in countries where Armenians live. The Armenians were generally very angry that the Turks were trying to spread their "policy of denying the genocide" in other countries. So, the Armenians began choosing as their targets officials who were pursuing this policy. This was something different from terrorism. More correctly, the "terrorism of anger" achieved its third goal, namely awakening the Armenian and international public and raising the awareness of Turkey about the existence of an Armenian question.

Currently, what the Armenians have to do is to draft a plan of pressure directed against Turkey and to implement it. That is the only way to change Turkey's policy of refusing any type of dialog.

Turkey refuses to have any debates about the Armenian question and presents that stance as an unchangeable principle. Two ways can be contemplated to change this stance of Turkey's.

Firstly, international diplomatic pressure can be exerted on Turkey. This course of action must be strengthened. Such efforts will develop particularly in those countries where a lack of awareness about Armenian movements is seen.

The United States is in a very important position in the framework of these efforts because there is a sizeable and significant Armenian community living there. Also, Armenians occupy very important positions in the U.S. government structure. For example, the new governor of California is an Armenian.

But what is more important is that the United States is Turkey's most important ally. It is as a result of the security stemming from the assistance provided by the United States that Turkey continues to refuse all proposals for a dialog.

[28 Mar 83 p 5]

[Text] [Editor's note] In today's issue we give the second and final part of Patrick Devejian's interview with the weekly, NOKTA.

On this occasion, we would like to remind our readers that Devejian's views naturally remain within the borders of his personal convictions.

Thus, it is inadmissible that the Armenian question can be resolved by the recognition of the Armenian genocide alone and that the demand for the return of occupied Armenian lands will be forgotten because we will suffice with the recognition of the genocide. The statement that "no French-Armenian will go to live in those lands" if, by some miracle, an Armenia is established remains an absurdity. The need to recover the Armenian lands and to gather Armenians to live in those lands cannot stop being the most pressing issue of the day. The Armenian cause is an indivisible entity that cannot be delayed.

Although Armenians living in different communities are affected by their immediate environment and consequently have adopted different shades of approach, they cannot fail to stand up for all Armenian demands--historical, territorial and political. It is wrong to think, for example, that if the Turk recognizes the genocide, "the Western Armenians will be satisfied and will abandon their kinsmen in the east." It must be clear to everybody that at least on that issue there are no "western" or "eastern" Armenians and that the Armenian nation is united behind its demands, from [Soviet] Armenia to the furthest corners of the diaspora.

Devejian [continued]: If the United States changes its stance and exerts the diplomatic pressure essential for the recognition of the genocide, Turkey may change its position. It is essential that the American public as a whole take an interest on this issue. Thus the realization of various displays has become absolutely necessary. Armenian terrorism, described as "terrorism of anger", must intensify and develop in the United States.

It must not be forgotten that this terrorism began in the United States in 1973 and must develop there from now on.

It is of course very difficult to pull the whole American society in our direction, since that society is made up of many diverse elements, but success is still possible.

The Armenian community living in the United States is well aware of the difference between the justness of its cause and the destructive actions taken against Turkey, a NATO member. Turkey has taken a crafty stance toward Armenian terrorism by saying that the goal of that movement is to destabilize Turkey.

NOKTA: So you mean that the goal of Armenian terrorism is not to upset Turkey's geopolitical position and to create instability.

Devejian: Yes. That is not the issue in any case.

NOKTA: Then, is not Armenian terrorism exploited by certain foreign powers?

Devejian: That is possible. Anything can be exploited.

NOKTA: Is it not obvious who supports whom and who is being used by whom in Beirut where there are hundreds of political factions? It is very easy for your "terrorism of anger"--which I would like to call "exhibition terrorism"--to become a tool of a foreign power. What do you think about this issue?

Devejian: If the Soviet Union supports Armenian terrorism, naturally it has its own expectations. The Soviets provide covert assistance to our struggle. But that assistance is no reason to make our cause unjust.

Although the Soviets have a totalitarian form of government and oppress human rights, they help struggles for human rights in other countries if they have strategic and political expectations. But a cause cannot be regarded as unjust and harmful because the Soviets helped it.

When the Soviet Union opposes racist policies in southern Africa, it is of course impossible to support that genocidal policy simply in order to stand up against the Soviets. Racist policies must be condemned. On that issue, the Soviets are supporting the just side for their own interests.

As for the Armenian question, it must be noted that there are very few communists among the Armenians. Ninety percent of the Armenians support the terrorist campaign morally and often financially. But that does not mean that 90 percent of the Armenian society are Soviet operatives.

Turkey wants to craftily exploit this situation as well and says: "The goal of Armenian terrorism is to cause unrest and crisis in Turkey which is an important NATO ally."

This stance of Turkey's is having a considerable effect on American public opinion. But France does not give so much importance to such propaganda. As I said, the situation in the United States is different, and the Armenians in the United States must work to justify their cause before the American public and show to them that Turkey is not a good ally for the United States and that it is a weak link in the chain because it is ruled by a government that is devoid of democratic principles.

NOKTA: You said that there are two paths that can be taken against Turkey. What is the second path?

Devejian: The first path involved exerting pressure on Turkey through the United States. The second path involves direct pressure against Turkey. If we carefully review the terrorists' publications and follow what they are saying, we see that the time has come to try this second path. Attacks against Turkish diplomats is not a method of exerting direct pressure on Turkey.

There is only one way to exert direct pressure on Turkey: attacking economic targets in Turkey and damaging them. The terrorists will try this sooner or later. It is easy to hurt Turkey economically in view of the fact that Turkey has very extensive economic relations at the international level.

NOKTA: What do you mean by the term "economic target"?

Devejian: Turkey is an exporting and importing country, so that it can easily be hurt.

NOKTA: This is the first time that something like this is being heard. It is interesting. What economic targets do you think will be at issue?

Devejian: I am not a terrorist. I do not know where the bombs should be placed. Furthermore, I am not at all interested about where those bombs are placed. I am only an observer. Judging from ASALA's statements, it appears that it is this strategy that is going to be implemented in the future. ASALA has already announced that it will attack Turkish airlines. Here, the goal is to paralyze the Turkish air services by damaging them rather than killing people and to create the impression that those air services are unsafe.

NOKTA: In other words, ASALA wants to implement the strategy of the Palestinians for a while.

Devejian: That same strategy will be used with regard to the airlines. The Palestinians launched many successful operations despite the fact that Israel took extraordinary international measures to protect its national airline, El-Al. The Turkish airline will also be an insecure organization for its passengers because it will be dangerous to travel on its aircraft. That, of course, will hurt the Turkish economy.

Of course, this is not a good method, but it will cause economic damage. Many other ways of attacking economic targets can be contemplated.

NOKTA: Why do you defend the terrorists?

Devejian: I have only one reason to defend the terrorists. My parents, like all other Armenian families, were exiled, saw the massacres and were subjected to great suffering. I have known all this since my childhood. Like all Armenian children, I grew up in that atmosphere of suffering. Even today, when I am 38 years old, it is impossible to tolerate statements to the effect that "no genocide took place." It was the Turks who created the Armenian terrorists. Armenians are a hard-working and peaceful people who like commerce. They do not have any terroristic and militaristic lines in their character. All Armenian children grow up with the awareness of the tragedies their families have suffered, and they are of course outraged when they hear statements to the effect that "no genocide took place." It is for this reason that I defend these young men.

NOKTA: Until last year, the chief goal of Armenian terrorism was advertised as the "recognition of the genocide." But today it is seen that "territorial demands" have found great acceptance among the Armenian public. In other words the territorial issue has become the foremost demand. Can it not be concluded from this situation that the Armenian movement is at an impasse?

Devejian: My personal opinion is as follows. France has welcomed me and my father to this country. I have a fairly good life in France. My culturing is more French than Armenian. But I cannot tolerate the denial of the genocide. Eighty percent of the Armenians living in Western countries share this feeling.

The eastern Armenian youth combined their territorial demands with their demand for the recognition of the genocide. But it cannot be said that there is an identity of views in the Armenian society concerning territorial demands. For example, if by some miracle an Armenia is set up within Turkey's borders tomorrow, none of the Armenians in France would go and live on those lands. But for the Armenians of the Middle East the issue is very different. Armenian communities in the east, such

as the Lebanese-Armenian community, have not been able to assimilate in the societies on the lands they are living in and thus they have been alienated from those societies. Consequently, a territorial demand is being put forth. In my opinion, Turkey is committing a grave mistake by refusing to recognize the genocide. It is for that reason that various Armenian communities no longer differentiate among the different struggles they are waging. Thus, Armenian political workers are combining territorial demands with the issue of the recognition of the genocide. The current situation gives the appearance that the struggle is being waged for those two major goals.

However, if Turkey says, "Yes, an Armenian genocide did take place, but we were not the ones who did it, we are also grieved about it, we also condemn it and we ask for moral forgiveness," tries to heal the wounds and moderates its policy, most Armenians are prepared to say: "These events have become part of history; we also want to forget."

Naturally, everyone understands Turkey's determination to preserve its territorial integrity. Turkey would naturally not want to turn over any part of its territory to the Armenians. But if a society is denied the right to claim ownership to its culture and history, that may lead to moral revolt and set the stage for terrorism. The most effective means of preventing terrorism is the rectification of the reasons that have led to it. Humiliating a man, offending his pride and depriving him of basic human respect may drive that man to rebellion.

I believe that the Turks must help the Armenians to regain their human pride and respectworthiness.

NOKTA: But, as you know, it is the small minority of terrorists living in Lebanon who created among the Armenians living in various parts of the world the idea of an "Armenian question." Although initially the majority of these Armenians were opposed to terror acts, we see now that they all give at least moral support to the terrorists. Thus, even if there is a change in Turkey's attitude it is not certain that terrorism will come to an end. The terrorists, who are already a minority, will continue their activity as "vanguards", this time along a track of "territorial demands." What do you think about this?

Devejian: One of two paths must be chosen. Either Turkey will accept that the Lebanese-Armenians become the leading elements of all Armenians spread all over the world and that these active individuals enjoy the support and protection of the Armenian communities of the Western world, or Turkey will try to keep that faction away from the bulk of the Armenians. If Turkey adopts this policy, that is if it can display the aforementioned moral attitude, then the active elements in Lebanon can be kept away from the bulk of the Armenian society. Turkey must prepare very careful plans to that end. Otherwise, there will be no option left other than the unification of the active Armenian elements and the Armenians of the Western world.

NOKTA: Do you believe that a Turkish-Armenian dialog could be useful?

Devejian: The current situation is that Turkey refuses such a dialog. Even so I believe that the problems can only be solved through a dialog. If that does not happen and if people remain silent, then the guns will talk.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

DASHNAK PARTY REFUTES CHARGES AGAINST LEBANESE ARMENIANS

Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 29 Mar 83 p 1

["Communique" by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Central Committee in Lebanon]

[Text] In press conferences and televised appearances during his visit to Lebanon (17 March 1983) and on his return to Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen leveled several charges against Lebanon and the Lebanese-Armenian community.

According to those charges, "Lebanon is one of the centers of international terrorism and the Lebanese-Armenians, as participants and collaborators, form a link in the international terrorist network."

We hereby state that these charges are completely unfounded. We strongly condemn this policy of the Turkish government, which, by reversing roles, shows the victim as the executioner.

In the past 8 years, Lebanon, a peaceful country, has itself been the victim of innumerable terrorist acts organized and committed predominantly by foreigners on its own soil. Today, a renascent Lebanon is determined to end all such acts and all forms of foreign intervention. We are certain that Lebanese government officials conveyed this decisive stance to the Turkish foreign minister.

The Lebanese-Armenians, a peaceful community, have also been the victim of the incidents of the past 8 years, which also included Turkish government-sponsored terrorism. The most prominent example of this government-sponsored terrorism was the kidnaping of comrade Apo Ashjian.

These unfounded charges against the Lebanese-Armenian community, which is strongly committed to the peace, unity, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, are aimed at staining the reputation of the Lebanese-Armenians and sowing seeds of hatred against them. At a more immediate level, these charges are aimed at preventing the functions that will be held to mark the 68th anniversary of 24 April [Armenian Martyrs' Day], a date that symbolizes the criminal act of genocide perpetrated by the Turkish government against the Armenian people.

The Turkish foreign minister is wrong if he thinks that the Armenians can be made to forget the past through foreign intervention and under pressure while justice remains trampled upon.

The Turkish diplomatic campaign not only does not contribute to the establishment of peace and justice among peoples, but also serves to drive a few disappointed young men and women to react against Turkey through acts of violence.

Neither Lebanon nor the Lebanese-Armenian community is responsible for these acts of violence. The real responsibility lies with the Turkish government which continues to deny its act of genocide in 1915 and to disregard the just demands of the Armenian nation.

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DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALGERIAN SAHARA REVIEWED

Paris MAGHREB-MACHREK in French No 99, Jan-Feb-Mar 83 pp 5-29

[Article by Jean Bisson: "Industry, Towns, Palm Groves in the Desert; A Quarter of a Century of Evolution in the Algerian Sahara"]

[Text] We are publishing below the first two parts of this paper; the third part, "Saharan Towns Between a Voluntarist Policy and Regional Particularisms," will appear in MAGHREB-MACHREK No 100.

After the decline of Transsaharan trade¹ had been sealed for good by the completion of colonial penetration and the reorganization of exchange currents, the Saharans' life, or survival, could only be ensured by their agricultural production, which was strictly adapted to the water resources, by livestock breeding, which was narrowly dependent on the whims of the climate, or by the cash influx brought by a temporary emigration that had become unavoidable considering the rate of demographic growth and the destructuring of traditional societies. Moreover, in such a context, Saharan regions could be defined by the irrigation methods that governed life in the palm groves--from the types of culture to the social, even ethnic cleavages--and by the privileged relations which nomadic livestock breeders were maintaining with certain groups of oases. Over this regional diversity, which asserted itself all the more strongly as distances are great in the Sahara and water potentialities very uneven, the colonial power had superimposed an administrative network whose mission it was to control this huge space, and a technical infrastructure in charge of improving the water supply; this was a prerequisite for any agricultural development, the only development considered at the time, it being understood that oil and gas exploitation--which had begun only a few years before Independence (1956)--was to benefit only mainland France.

What is the situation now, 20 years after Independence, in an essentially different political and economic context? There have been spectacular changes: statistical tables drawn up following the 1977 census underline the scope of mutations, and they also reveal regional disparities more diversified than could have been imagined in view of the mixing that tends to homogenize Algerian society as a whole. Certainly, the high rate of industrial employment (43.3 percent) in Northeast Sahara (Table I) is not a surprise, since the first oil fields to be exploited are located in this region. Along the major penetration road, the Laghouat governorate owes

Table 1. Economic Activity in Saharan Governorates

| ACTIVE POPULATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------|------------------|--------|-------------|--------|----------|--------|---------------------------|--------|----------|---|
| Geographic Distribution | | Resident Population | | Economic Sectors | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Total | | Agriculture | | Industry | | Building/ Public Works | | Services | |
| | | | | | | Total | % | Total | % | Total | % | Total | % |
| North and Northeast Sahara | Laghouat | 243,251 | 20.88 | 36,978 | 5,639 | 15.24 | 5,649 | 15.27 | 6,120 | 16.55 | 19,570 | 52.92 | |
| | Ouargla | 171,281 | 14.70 | 35,677 | 4,495 | 12.59 | 15,456 | 43.38 | 5,331 | 14.94 | 10,395 | 29.13 | |
| | Biskra | 456,854 | 39.23 | 53,378 | 16,367 | 30.66 | 6,817 | 12.77 | 11,208 | 20.99 | 18,986 | 35.56 | |
| West and Central-West Sahara | Bechar | 123,453 | 10.60 | 21,494 | 1,600 | 7.44 | 2,353 | 10.94 | 6,681 | 31.08 | 10,860 | 50.52 | |
| | Adrar | 132,522 | 11.38 | 22,788 | 13,434 | 58.95 | 1,135 | 4.98 | 2,339 | 10.26 | 5,880 | 25.80 | |
| Touareg Country | Taman- rasset | 37,147 | 3.18 | 6,549 | 881 | 13.45 | 1,749 | 26.70 | 1,446 | 22.07 | 2,473 | 37.76 | |
| TOTAL | Sahara | 1,164,508 | 100 | 176,864 | 42,416 | 23.98 | 33,159 | 18,74 | 33,125 | 18.72 | 68,164 | 38.54 | |
| Algeria | | -- | -- | -- | -- | 50.22 | -- | 10.63 | -- | 15.80 | -- | 23.35 | |

Sources: Second General Population and Housing Census of 12 February 1977. Summary of data by governorate. Secretariat to the Plan. Directorate of Statistics and National Accounting. October 1978

its high rate of employment in the "service" sector (52.92 percent) to the presence of an especially strong (57.7 percent) private sector (Table II), which provides a measure of the place the Mzabite have managed to retain in trade and, more generally, in free enterprise: but when we see that, west of the El Golea meridian, farmers still represent over half of the working population (58.95 percent), we are justified in contrasting East Sahara, dominated by oil and gas, with North Sahara, the province of traders, and West Sahara, which has remained quite rural, and therefore in reconsidering the bases for the regional structuring of Algerian Sahara. For that reason, it is in three of these regions--that of oil and administration which has Ouargla for its capital, that of the Mzab with its stronghold of free entrepreneurs, that of the Gourara with its strong "private" farmer communities (Adrar governorate, private sector: 70.2 percent)--that we shall pick the examples analyzed below; we like to view them as illustrations for a tentative balance--purposefully limited to a few of the most significant changes--that should make it possible to better assess the uniqueness and importance of the Sahara in the construction of today's Algeria.

Table II. Distribution of the Active Population by Legal Sector

| Geographic Distribution | | Legal Sector (%) | | | | | Total |
|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------|
| | | Admin- istra- tion | Other Public Sector | Self- Manager Sector | Cooper- ative Sector | Private Sector | |
| Region | Governorate | | | | | | |
| East and Northeast Sahara | Laghouat | 17.0 | 21.2 | 0.4 | 3.7 | 57.7 | 100% |
| | Ouargla | 13.7 | 57.1 | 1.3 | 3.5 | 24.4 | " |
| | Biskra | 15.2 | 23.5 | 1.5 | 7.6 | 52.2 | " |
| West and Central-West Sahara | Bechar | 34.0 | 40.7 | 1.0 | 3.6 | 20.7 | 100% |
| | Adrar | 11.8 | 12.3 | 0.4 | 5.3 | 70.2 | " |
| Touareg Country | Tamanrasset | 21.9 | 47.2 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 28.3 | 100% |
| Algeria | | 18.0 | 30.0 | 8.0 | 4.0 | 40.0 | 100% |

Source: 1977 Census, Table 358, published March 1979.

Work Sites, Towns, Regions in Sahara

In Algeria, this gigantic work site, Sahara seems to have assumed a privileged position, not since 1956--when oil was exploited for the first time--but since 1966, i.e. since that first Cabinet meeting symbolically held out of Algiers, the capital, which was intended to mark in Ouargla itself the start of the plan designed to develop this huge and coveted space. Moreover, considerable and radical changes have taken place in 15 years and, today, life in the desert is no longer centered around the palm grove, but around the

town, with its employment offices, its administrative, school and medical infrastructures, the result of a voluntarist policy, as well as its commercial activities which benefit from the influx of cash and a prodigious rate of growth. (Figure 1).

All the same, the creation of the Hassi Messaoud base from scratch, the multiplication of production wells and exploratory drillings as the oil layers become exhausted, the intensification of operations around Hassi Rmel (one of the world's largest gas reserves, between Laghouat and Ghardaia), the fast pace at which oil and gas pipelines are laid, all this has affected primarily Northeast Sahara, creating there forms of spatial organization which had been unknown until then: therefore, this is also the best place to study them. Quite possibly, they may soon appear in other regions of the Sahara, since the rise in oil prices has given a new start to prospection in other regions--such as Touat-Gourara--which one would have thought had been ruled out for good.

The Sahara of Oil and Gas or the Industrial Employment Basin: A Novelty in the Desert

Certainly, "oil workers" are distributed over the whole immense desert; but they are all bound to a few large bases, the best known of which being Hassi Messaoud and Hassi Rmel; indeed, these two oil and gas basins have provided a basis for a spatial organization which can be observed at two stages: the mature stage at Hassi Messaoud, the implantation stage at Hassi Rmel.

Hassi Messaoud is a quarter of a century old; it is a base with an active population of 17,000, a large figure comparable to that of the seashore complex of Arzew-Bethioua, a base to which an uninterrupted flow of workers is converging by road and by plane, and from which they go on to work sites that are sometimes very far away. Indeed, work on the oil fields is organized according to the "recovery" system: continued work for three weeks (or two months) followed by one (or three) weeks off at home, the return trip being paid for by the employer. This form of labor organization is the cause of constant commuting between the bases and North Algeria where many cadres and technicians trained in specialized schools to replace foreigners have their homes.

In the case of the Hassi Rmel gas field, which is still just a huge work site where foreign companies are actively working, but which offers the advantage of being located near several urban centers, the labor force (working three 8-hour shifts) is bussed three times a day, whereas foreigners and North Algerians work under the "recovery" system. From Berriane, Laghouat and Ghardaia, respectively 70, 120 and 126 km away, busses carry the workers; this labor organization is not without consequences for the men and drawbacks for the rolling stock, although the roads are excellent and allow for surprising speed averages. But we should also point out that this commuting is temporary: as soon as a company has completed its engineering contract--as was precisely the case for a Japanese enterprise which had hired its labor force in Berriane--employment drops and this is bitterly felt by the populations involved.

Figure 1
EXPLOITATION DES HYDROCARBURES ET DES BASSINS D'EMPLOI
DANS LE NORD-EST SAHARIEN
(Wilayate de Ouargla et Laghouat).




Figure 1. Oil and Gas Operations and Employment Basins in Northeast Sahara (Ouargla and Laghouat Governorates)

[Key on following page]

Key to Figure 1:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 1. High plains | 10. Labor influx |
| 2. Ouled Nail Mountains | 11. Daily commuting (distance: 32 km) |
| 3. Active population | 12. Long-term movements with "recovery" or rotation |
| 4. Governorate borders | 13. Major hiring areas for new districts |
| 5. Employment centers | 14. Labor basin (Saharan labor exclusively) |
| 6. Oil and gas production center | |
| 7. Industrial zone | |
| 8. Urban center | |
| 9. Predominant secondary employment | |

And this gives a glimpse of one aspect of the problem of job instability in the Sahara. The people in the oases cannot expect much more than to form a pool of little-skilled labor: this is the consequence of adolescent years spent helping their fathers in the gardens or following the herds from pasture to pasture and, when all is said and done, the price they must pay for the inadequate schooling which prevailed in the Sahara for a long time. Also, the Saharans are hired temporarily, usually for three months: curiously, this method of recruiting, which was commonly used by French authorities when the first large work sites were started--because it was a profitable alternative to the traditional seasonal emigration and still allowed a strict control of the circulation of persons--is carried on today for reasons that have to do with labor laws; indeed, the companies are obliged to hire local labor first--which is not an ill in itself; however, since work sites, especially prospecting and infrastructure work sites, are mobile by definition, the most flexible system in the long run remains that of temporary employment, as the unskilled labor force can then be dismissed and another one easily hired elsewhere when the work site leaves the region--in that case, the governorate. This, of course, penalizes the Saharans who provide most of the unskilled labor, which is a cause of concern for labor officials since, according to some estimates, only 20 out of 100 people employed in the Sahara hold permanent jobs.²

Finally, it is remarkable that the Sahara of oil has now become a zone of attraction for technicians and experts from the North,³ which, in addition to the considerable contribution made by oil and natural gas to the Algerian economy, has the effect of considerably strengthening the integration of the Sahara in the national territory, making it a privileged work location for the Algerian labor force--because salaries there are high. Regionally, it is equally important to note that the constant renewal of the labor force which results from the rotation of work sites (since four workers will hold the same job in one year), results in a "scattering" of wages on the population as a whole--which, as we shall see, has unexpected consequences, such as the revival of nomadism and a slowing down in the decline of agriculture--while strengthening a form of regional structure based on the operation of labor basins. This structure cannot claim to be as deeply rooted as employment basins in countries with an older industrial tradition; nevertheless, it is guaranteed to last for a long time: is not oil, and especially gas exploita-

tion looking forward to a bright future? Another 20 years at the present rate for oil, over a century and probably even two for gas!

However, "oil" is not the only source of employment in the Sahara, as towns have now become privileged hiring centers: as a result, they are playing an increasing part in the polarization of space.

Reinforced Urban Framework and Broadened Immigration Area

It is now a well-known fact that, from 1966 to 1977, Saharan governorates have experienced rates of growth above the country's average, which means that their migration balance showed a large surplus: a total of 27,000 people, including 20,000 for the Ouargla governorate alone (for a total population of 1.2 million in 1977). The urbanization of the Sahara has indeed been one of the most remarkable results of the evolution that has been taking place in the past few years, and it is emphasized by the importance of the tertiary service sector which provides 38.54 percent of all Saharan jobs, a figure greater than the Algerian average (23.25 percent; Table III): the induced tertiary sector is related to the influx of highly paid if not full-time workers into the towns, and to the redeployment of former oil workers in the trade sector; it is a tertiary sector where decisions are made and which provides "services to the community," and its development has been especially favored by the Algerian socialism and decentralization policy.

Certainly, contrary to what we can see in the rest of Algeria, the administrative network has taken up, down to the details, many of the boundaries inherited from colonial times, so that most Saharan administrative centers are the heirs of former prefectures, subprefectures and Saharan Administration Centers that had been created by the decree of 3 December 1960, i.e. just before independence. Yet, the promotion of six towns to governorate-seat rank--whereas there had been only two prefectures--has had considerable impact: for a town, becoming a governorate seat is an envied privileged because it is accompanied by the installation of higher-level equipment and activities; since Algeria does not have any intermediate administrative structure between the state and the governorate. A similar development of services is taking place at the district seats, whose equipment is now being carried out at a fast pace, while community centers are in turn provided with basic services so that citizens living in the most remote areas will receive the benefits which Tell inhabitants are now taking for granted: this voluntarist policy reflects an effort to give equal opportunities to all, which is the best indication of authentic decentralization and will be better appreciated in the light of a few examples taken at each of these administrative levels.

Table III. Distribution of the Active Population by Economic Sector (In Percent). Comparison of Whole Algeria and Sahara.

| <u>1977</u> | <u>Agriculture</u> | <u>Industry</u> | <u>Building/ Public Works</u> | <u>Services</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Sahara | 23.98 | 18.74 | 18.72 | 38.54 | 100% |
| Algeria | 50.22 | 10.63 | 15.80 | 23.35 | 100% |

Saharan towns have become a privileged place of employment; besides, their growth has been spectacular, especially for the largest of them: thus, Ouargla's population grew from 19,551 inhabitants in 1966 to 42,098 in 1977, and Ghardaia's, which was lower at the start (12,947) is now exceeding it (43,798); together, these two towns account for 82.9 percent of the demographic growth of their governorate, i.e. over 4/5! Such a growth can be accounted for only by a considerable population influx, which can no longer be supplied exclusively by the Saharan population. This phenomenon is quite new. The direction of definitive or temporary migrations has been inverted: the Sahara is no longer "exporting" its men, but North Algerians are coming there to settle, which results in a large migration surplus. Actually, for a long time, the people coming to swell the numbers of town populations were coming mostly from neighboring areas; for instance, they were the nomads of the Ouargla area who, in 1966, still accounted for 40.6 percent of the governorate population; in 1977, they accounted for only 10.4 percent. A similar and still more marked evolution took place in the Mزاب: excluded from ancient urban centers, "aggregated Arabs"* who, for a long time, had been in the service of Ibadite communities**—providing transport by caravans, then turning truckers—built entire districts for themselves under the walls of the forbidden towns; the process, which had hardly started at the time of Independence, took such an extent that it became necessary to build new mosks, of the malekite rite as in the rest of Algeria. Actually, its general observance of the malekite rite conceals the heterogeneousness of a population that has come from many horizons, as towns saw their immigration areas expand singularly; the nomads were soon engulfed in an influx of people from walled communities in distant oases and livestock breeders from the neighboring steppe, or again of Tell natives attracted by urban work sites (18.72 percent of all jobs in the building/public works sector, more than in Algeria as a whole), the possibility of finding a job in plants and factories (Laghouat, Ghardaia, etc.) or on the oil fields (since jobs are reserved for governorate residents, becoming a resident is essential), or again by the many administrative jobs offered to graduates (in this respect, we should note that for a long time schooling and vocational training remained a prerogative of Tell towns).

In short, the expansion of their immigration areas is costing Saharan towns some of their uniqueness, but it is also a powerful national integration factor as, from now on, the mixing of populations in the new peripheral districts is countering the segregation of ancient urban centers. With one reservation, however, namely that too many young civil servants or teachers from the Tell still perceive a transfer to the Sahara as a semi-exile which they will accept for a limited time and which is accompanied by a rate of absenteeism that is probably unavoidable: in fact, many young wives refuse to settle in the South where, indeed, particularisms are still strong and make it difficult, at least for women, to gain access to the oasis society; as for men, they get a chance to make friends on the work sites or in the offices...

* "Aggregated" Arabs: a term used by the French administration to refer to tribes that acted as mercenaries in the service of the Mزابites and would transport grain, for their own or for the Mزابites' account.

** Ibadism, the last vestige of the Kharedjite movement, is practiced in Oman, Zanzibar, Djerba and Mزاب communities.

Farmers and Nomads: Residual Activities or New Types of Relations?

Quite obviously, the progression of secondary and tertiary activities has taken place at the expense of the agricultural sector, and much more so than in the rest of Algeria; figures are there to prove it: only 23.98 percent of all jobs are in the agricultural sector, compared with 50.22 percent for Algeria as a whole--i.e., in relative value, there are twice as few farmers in the Sahara. This is not surprising considering that rural exodus has been a recurring subject of conversations... and administrators' reports for decades; how could wages paid on work sites not blatantly contrast with the low purchasing power of the Saharan gardener?

Yet, there are still genuine farmers and true nomads in the Sahara, probably less than 50,000, but that is more than are employed in the industry or on building and public works sites (Table II). Besides, what do these figures mean in daily life when, after many inquiries in the palm groves, one discovers that each farmer's family always has one relative employed on a work site and that his wages have paid for the motor pump or the cement used for the seguias; or that solidarity in the extended family is still strongly rooted in tradition: assuming one of the brothers is a teacher, the other a truck-driver for the oil company, the third one an office worker... then a fourth brother will make it a point to tend a vegetable garden that will supply the family (several tens of people...) with quality vegetables all the year round: this form of production is not reflected in statistics--no more than the "informal sector" in the towns--and yet it yields an abundant food supply!

Therefore, rather than restricting ourselves to general considerations, we should take a close look at a few concrete examples, both among the nomads and among walled-community inhabitants.

A Relic of Nomadism or Speculative Livestock Breeding?

In today's Algerian Sahara, there is not much talk of nomads anymore: rejected by an administration into whose schemes they do not fit, they remain, it is true, discreetly at a distance from the major roads, and the only indication of the presence of a nearby camp is the adolescent who had been lying on the sand and stands up suddenly, holding a plastic jerrycan to the passing driver, thus trying to dodge his water chores... and get to smoke a cigarette; or else, they can be seen huddled together outside the towns, in poor tents that have been made into a shanty-town by dint of recycled plastic... unless, as at Hassi Messaoud, they get closer to the workers' canteens, hoping to glean some food, hoping too to be hired some day; in the meanwhile, they must make do with the milk of these goats, perched on piles of refuse, and minuscule gardens irrigated with waste waters: people thus living on the fringe of society, however, are the exception for, truly, there are very few shanty-towns in the Sahara.

All the same, genuine encampments are becoming rare: in fact, statistics suggest that three fourths of the nomads in the Ouargla country (Mekhadma, Beni Thour, Chaamba, etc.) have become sedentary; that at least one fourth

of the Larbaa from the Daïas Plateau have settled in Laghouat where they have built the new district called Ksar el Farroudj; or again that the Sait Atba of N'Goussa (whose nomad roads, except for a short time-lag, coincide with those used by the Larbaa for the summer crossing of the High Plains) have only 70 nomad tents left, i.e. 500 people out of the 4,000 who form the group. Although they represent hardly more than one tenth of the global Sait Atba population, their case is highly significant: it shows what part nomadism can still play in today's Sahara, and how adaptable these people are; hastily classified as not belonging to modern circuits, they actually manage to reconcile perfectly a centuries' old tradition based on the utilization of complementary physical environments and socioeconomic conditions that are less than a quarter of a century old (Figure 2).

Here are livestock breeders who have been nomads in the Ouargla area and in the Sersou for centuries, and whose base is the N'Goussa palm grove, where all the tribe meets for the date harvest, in October. It is also in this community, which is experiencing a rapid growth, and in a district built north of Ouargla, that most Sait Atba have settled: indeed, there were so many jobs offered in the area that many were tempted by the regular income of a salaried job. Let us point out that, in this case, there have been no administrative pressures to hasten this process: at most, we can say that the availability of schools has been a non-negligible factor; above all, the conversion to irrigated agriculture (a family can no longer make do with the sole and meagre yield of "bour" palm trees--these palm trees that require no care--when it no longer has any livestock to provide food) is now preventing any attempted return to nomad life; the time is gone when it was easy to hire a "khammes" (sharecropper) or an "oukil" (warden) to keep an eye on the palm grove while the master was only too happy to pack his tent and go "to the Sahara" to take advantage of exceptionally rich pastures! For all that, has the destructuring of traditional ties with the palm grove reduced the standard of living of those who are still nomads, and are the last of the nomads the rejects of the industrial world? Fortunately, this is not the case at all.

Actually, nomad migrations still follow the ancestral rite. The nomads leave in groups of 4-5 tents, each with at least three camels; their departures are staggered from mid-February to mid-April to enable them to take advantage of the excellent pastures of the Nsa, Mzab and, above all, Zergoune and Mehaiguene wadis⁴; in June, they cross the Djebel Amour and stay for a while on the High Plains after which they must wait on the right bank of the Nahr Ouassel--this is the most difficult period as pastures are soon grazed over--until they are allowed to cross over to the foothills of the Ouarsenis where the cattle can graze the stubble fields. The men then ply their traditional trade with farmers whom they have always considered as friends (friends who never exact any pasture rights), as they are related by old "soff"* alliances: dates and camel hair (which will be used to make excellent burnouses) are bartered for wheat. The women and children go gleaning (an average of 200 kg of wheat per tent, at the rate of 20 kg per

* Soff: league within a group.

Figure 2
LA NOMADISATION DES SAÏT ATBA DU PAYS DE OUARGLA




Figure 2. Migration Routes of the Sait Atba from the Ouargla Country

Note: Route 5 is followed by latecomers; route 4 is not used on the way back.
(Source: A. Romey).

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Key: 1. August to mid-September | 9. October to mid-February |
| 2. Tell Atlas | 10. Summer migration route |
| 3. High plains | 11. Encampment schedule |
| 4. Ouled Nail Mountains | 12. Geographic region |
| 5. 25 June | 13. Sait Atba's sedentary settlement |
| 6. June | 14. physical environment boundary |
| 7. Early May | |
| 8. Ouargla country | |

hectare), the men get paid to help harvesting lentils, they buy cereals--they are allowed to buy up to 18 quintals per tent--and finally, as early as mid-September, they head back toward N'Goussa where they meet at the start of the date harvest. All this is codified, regulated by a commission which, in each of the districts covered by the nomads during their "achaba"* months, determines where they can graze their cattle, find jobs, glean, etc. Certainly, sources of substantial income have dried up--e.g. leasing camels in the Tell has become obsolete now that agriculture is mechanized--but others are making up for these losses: the nomad has become a livestock entrepreneur. Indeed, as herdsmen disappeared, tent heads accepted to add to their own herds--seldom less than 100 heads--the livestock of those who had become sedentary, so that herds have never been so large: one herd out of four consists of more than 200 heads (mostly sheep, for goats are not covered by the herding agreement). The additional income derived from this herding by the nomads is not negligible: it consists of a fee, which is certainly relatively low--5 Algerian dinars per sheep, 15 per camel (1977 figures)--but also the whole butter and milk production (milk is made into a cheese which is much appreciated in the towns, where many people have retained nomads' tastes), one fleece out of 30 (on the other hand, the owner of a camel gets all of its hair). And this form of livestock raising can only continue, even expand because of the large demand for mutton in the towns (as is known, mutton is very expensive in Algeria); in addition, for those nomads who have become sedentary and receive wages, it is a form of investment that gives a good return, the only ones whose risks and profits are perfectly known to them, and the only one they can engage in now, since a palm grove planted as an investment would soon reach the Agrarian Revolution ceiling,⁵ and since hiring a sharecropper is prohibited--this is the major difference with past practice.

The monetary value thus assumed by the herd is also found in the Ahaggar, in a far more barren environment: for instance, among the Kel Tazoulet, nomads who wander in the Tazrouk area.⁶ For these Touaregs who are holding a salaried job six months of the year, the herd (which is watched by women and young girls (a Touareg custom... that way boys can go to school) has remained an important source of food, and it is also the major form of savings, a way of putting aside any unused wages; we also note that the association of these two activities--salaried work, livestock raising--is a guarantee that nomad life will go on, as it also benefits from increased outlets due to the improvement in the standard of living. As for the village where the parents are staying while the youths are going to school, its main function is to be a relay between the town (Tamanrasset, the governorate seat) and the encampments; strictly speaking, therefore, it is not really a sedentary settlement, as nomadic livestock raising remains one of the essential components in the lifestyle of these Touaregs, although the Administration is encouraging them to settle. Now, we should note that this nomadism did not disappear in the wake of the great drought of the 1970's: this shows to what extent this type of functioning of the Touareg space has been reinforced by the wages earned on work sites.

* Achaba: from "acheb," vegetation that appears after a rainfall; by extension, "achaba" is the summer migration--literally, the search for pastures--which takes the herds and the nomads to the Tell.

Thus, as a result of the diversification of salaried jobs, a division of labor has taken place in nomadic society: some, a majority, have chosen to become sedentary, remaining engaged in agriculture on a modest scale but deriving their main income from wages which are complemented by livestock speculation; others are still engaged in their traditional occupation, livestock raising, but for profit now, and the profit is all the greater as they are few. Elsewhere, as in the Touareg society, a balance is established over a one-year period: for the men, between salaried work and nomadism; for the children, between schooling and herding.

Under these conditions, judging by the number of people involved alone, nomadism can be called residual, economically speaking; yet, it does not in the least deserve this qualifier, which has a pejorative connotation; indeed, it has managed to become a modern form of speculation while retaining its essential characteristic, adaptability--the nomad retains an extraordinary knowledge of the ecology, nomadism remains the most remarkable form of adaptation to the desert--; it is all the less likely to disappear as the demand for food is increasing as a result of the rapid demographic growth and the general improvement in the standard of living.

In short, this type of life, which has too often been disparaged and wrongly termed archaic, is once again demonstrating its adaptability, a characteristic which has always struck attentive observers: why wonder then that some officials with a good knowledge of the nomadic environment are very much concerned by the inadequacy of development plans--which are prepared in faraway offices and can imagine no other future for these livestock farmers but to settle them next to alfalfa plantations created by dint of credits? Their concern appears justified when one discovers the difficulties encountered by some ambitious projects that did not bother to heed the subtle interplay of socioeconomic components in today's Sahara!

Rural Decline, Mixed Activity or Agricultural Revival?

There is no need to be a very expert agronomist to appraise Algerian palm groves at a glance: their appearance is not encouraging; a visitor "doing" the "oases circuit" in 1983 must wonder who could have thought up the "enchantment of palm groves with three-tiered crops," so complacently described by tourist guides... and school textbooks!

Sometimes, gardens and palm trees are given over to the salina, and the basins are invaded by rushes, which means that irrigation is quite neglected; sometimes, the lowest lying areas of the palm groves are inundated by stagnant water rejected in abundance by an urban civilization which can, at last, enjoy and abuse this most precious of luxuries, running water. Everywhere, the toll is heavy: in Berriane, water from an evil-smelling lagoon which has taken over the wadi bed is recycled (!) by local residents for irrigation⁷; in Ouargla, marsh water has now permanently invaded the edges of the palm grove; in El Oued, the admirable basin-shaped gardens are being slowly asphyxiated by the rise of the ground water table, replete with waste waters;

in Adrar, it has been found most convenient to convert certain foggaras* into sewers...

And it is quite true that urban encroachments are having a brutal impact on palm groves located near towns, too often converting them into garbage dumps of consumer society or, which is not much better, into areas of wild urban development--in spite of prohibitions: "Illegal Construction, One Third of the Palm Grove Destroyed," was EL MOUJAHID's headline for an article on Biskra dated 4 November 1978--whenever access roads are practicable and an electric network has been installed... for irrigation purposes!

Should we place the blame on the difficult problem of waste-water disposal--that did not exist in former times, when water was so scarce--in a country without any much marked relief and, what is more, invaded by dunes and characterized by endoreism, i.e. the lack of a continuous slope? Should we blame agricultural decline solely on competition from industrial wages, as is often the case in the vicinity of large Algerian towns? Does the Agrarian Revolution, which "broke" the traditional organization, bear a share of responsibility? Besides, is the situation that serious everywhere? Are there not yet palm groves to be found where revival, modernization, even true dynamism, appear to prevail over neglect?

An assessment, even a partial one, of the present situation of Saharan farming communities would probably be extremely difficult, because it would be difficult to quantify, because L. Malassis's observation--"there is no agricultural explanation for agriculture"--is, to a large extent, valid in the Sahara, which, in other words, means that many factors are involved! This is what we would like to illustrate now, in an attempt at bringing out a few of the reasons that underlie the problems encountered in implementing a voluntarist agricultural policy, while showing that, as in the case of nomadism, there are examples of adaptation, even success, which are rather surprising although by no means exceptional.

Ambitions and Difficulties of a Voluntarist Policy

To eliminate fundamental inequalities to derive greater profit from existing palm groves; to expand the areas under cultivation by creating new irrigated areas, sometimes through heavy investments (Djorf Torba dam); to upgrade local production by processing it on location (tomato cannery in Reggane in the Touat); in a word to try and reduce the food dependence of Saharan governorates, such were some of the objectives of the voluntarist policy implemented in the Sahara: do the results measure up to these generous intentions?

In Algeria today, no one would try to cover up the failures of the Agrarian Revolution, and it is all to the officials' credit that they have pointed them out although, overwhelmed as they are by their many tasks, some may

* Foggaras: draining galleries bringing water under gravity to the gardens to be irrigated. When, after prolonged use, the foggara pipe has been lowered, its outlet is then below garden level and the water must be raised by means of a pumping device, traditionally a pumping beam and, more and more often, a motor pump.

have painted a somewhat too dark picture! It is certain that, in older palm groves for instance, allocations have all too often resulted in the creation of exploded units, so complex and interwoven the plots were--15 palm trees at the expense of this large landowner, 10 more in another garden, another 5 in a third, etc.--so that no effective official control is possible and, above all, the beneficiary will tend only one of the gardens and, at best, visit his other palm trees only at fertilization time or for the date harvest, thus leaving most of his lot uncultivated. It is public knowledge--and the problem is so widespread that authorities are powerless--that many beneficiaries are moonlighting, especially on building sites; when they give up their plots, at least, the situation is clarified, and many do so in the vicinity of large urban centers.⁸

It is also the whole agricultural production orientation that could be challenged. For instance, the major Agrarian Revolution sector, Makhreg, 25 km southeast of Laghouat, was supposed to become a vast market gardening area to supply vegetables to the governorate, and even to part of the Sahara (vegetables are now brought in from far away, from the Oran, Algiers and Constantine areas); but competition from Hassi Rmel, whose cover of smoke can be seen across the horizon some 100 km away, had drained the sector of "old" walled-community inhabitants, in other words the only true farmers in the area, so that it became necessary to hire those who had become sedentary only recently, nomads for whom a permanent house and an irrigated garden still have some appeal.⁹ These herdsmen by tradition make very poor gardeners and cannot even be supervised properly because there is such a shortage of field technicians. In addition, since they were allowed to retain a herd of sheep (25 heads per beneficiary), they quite naturally neglected garden crops to grow alfalfa, which fetches very high prices on the Laghouat market--and elsewhere too since many town dwellers and new-town dwellers still keep goats. As a result, the Makhreg sector is not much different from whole sectors traditionally devoted to palm groves and where alfalfa is now the only crop, a crop that needs sowing only once every fourth year and is the most obvious manifestation of rural decline wherever the head of the household has a full-time salaried job, wherever his wife is not habitually working in the fields, and also wherever goat milk is traditionally served at all meals.

Can the large areas created from scratch boast of better results, for instance the Abadla area, south of Bechar, which is the only one of its size in the Algerian Sahara? It consists of over 5,000 hectares, but less than 2,500 have been developed until now. This area was intended to "welcome" nomads wishing to become sedentary, but the results expected did not materialize: it was in such a state of abandonment that, in 1976, it had to be taken over by the Third Military Region, which is now sending young National Service recruits there.¹⁰

Certainly, just as in neighboring Tafilalet with its new dam, the rainfall deficit of the last decade has prevented the Djorf Torba dam reservoir from reaching its optimum water level (success of the project hinged on the construction of that dam, which was completed in 1969). In spite of

the dam, therefore, the expected garden crop development did not materialize (in part for the same reasons as in the Makhreg: nomads were hired where experienced farmers were required); cereal yields (hardly 7 quintals in the case of soft wheat) obtained with machinery, fertilizers and pesticides are no better than those obtained 26 years ago by mere plowing (10 quintals of hard wheat in 1952, although it must be said that that year was exceptional, considerable flooding having left silt behind); and the milk provided by a herd of Montbeliard [cows] costs 2.80 Algerian dinars per liter, although milk sells for 1.30 dinars in Algiers; at the same time, cooperative members are reluctant to supply oats-vetch to the stable, the price offered on the local market being twice the amount they get from the area! We should also mention that the development of this area has disrupted the entire regional organization that was centered on the Guir Valley, as post-flood crops were eliminated and the best ranging grounds were taken over; after part of the population had left, it became very difficult to recruit beneficiaries: some of those recruited were Reguibat, the greatest nomads in West Sahara, or people from Saida, who also knew nothing of agriculture!

These few examples of development areas show that--when it comes to planned agriculture, and in the Sahara more so than anywhere else--a prerequisite for success is an in-depth study of the environmental impact of operations that can be very disrupting: many projects emanating from international "experts" offices are too technical and neglectful of the sociological context and, when all is said and done, it is a delusion to "devise an industrial-type alternate solution to increase production"¹¹--which means that it is utopic to attempt to achieve food self-sufficiency at all cost on a Saharan scale. This is well understood by small "private" farmers: to them, agriculture is the indispensable complement of a salaried job--even though the right to consume their own produce is seen by the legislator as a relic of the past that is doomed to disappear, which is why there are no vegetable gardens or small cattle pens in "socialist villages"*--or a source of considerable income: production is then oriented to meet the demand of expanding urban markets on a Saharan or national scale, or even on an African scale (see below the case of the Western Erg palm groves). Is Algeria not fortunate to have in its Sahara a region with an exceptional climate and easily accessible through a wonderful road network? These roads are travelled over considerable distances by the small trucks of these merchants or agents who, in winter and in spring, do not hesitate to make return trips of 2,500-3,000 km to bring vegetable or even fruit shipments from western oases, as they are assured of selling them for a high price in seashore towns. And the impatiently awaited lifting of restrictions on the sale of fruits and vegetables, the effects of which were soon felt in 1980, could only accelerate the process.

Oasis Agriculture: Specialization or Complementary Activity?

To understand how these Saharan rural populations are surviving, we must go 1,300 km from Algiers and 700 km from Ghardaia, to the Gourara, away from North Saharan industrial basins. It is fashionable to predict that they will

* See in MAGHREB-MACHREK No 86: "Algerian Socialist Villages Sheltered From Reality," and in No 95: "Algerian Farmers and the State."

soon become extinct: this ineluctable fate is supposed to be the last consequence of the deterioration of the environment, and it looks as if everyone were trying to imagine new causes for concern. Yet, here are the facts: the Gourara population, which does not in the least benefit from the migratory influx which is directed toward the oil and gas fields and large northern towns, has grown as fast as Algeria's population as a whole, while retaining the largest percentage of farmers: 58.9 percent of the active population of the Adrar governorate (in which the Gourara is located) fall into the "agriculture" category; that rate is even higher in the Gourara proper, due to the fact that the governorate seat, Adrar, has a large tertiary sector. Still more surprising: the palm groves distributed over the Erg have seen their population increase by 14,000 inhabitants in 25 years, i.e. 4,000 more than the foggara oases, although the latter account for two thirds of the Gourara population and are considered to have a higher standard of living!

Emergence of an Urban Market: The Case of Timimoun

First type of evolution: it has to do with the new relations that have been established between Timimoun and the surrounding oases (there are about 100 in an 80-km radius around Timimoun). The quiet village of the 1950's, which had a population of 2,845 and was lost at the end of very poor dirt roads (it used to take one day to go from Timimoun to El Golea; it now takes less than four hours), has become a bustling small town with a population of over 8,000, many of whom derive their income from all the services that have recently come to this district seat: this means that there are many consumers, with a steady if not high purchasing power, and less and less people busy in the gardens (which is why vegetables must be brought in from the North), which provides an incentive to the development of a specialized agriculture in the neighboring palm groves, up to 30 km away.

Indeed, the Timimoun palm grove, one of the largest in the Gourara and, 30 years ago, one of the best, is now quite unable to fulfill its role as a food provider. There is no lack of water, but many other factors account for the sorry state of the palm grove, which has been reduced to a few vegetable gardens tended by old men unaware of reforms and of the fact that sharecropping is now prohibited: mistakes in the implementation of an agrarian reform that involved the nationalization of foggara waters; dismissal of sharecroppers by landowners threatened to be classified as "absentees" and who were incapable--or unable--to replace their black gardeners; massive shift of farmers to construction jobs; schooling of black children, etc. Let us add to this picture, which is in no way exaggerated, the fact that the Mguiden socialist village was unable to supply fresh vegetables to Timimoun (although this had been one of the village objectives), and we can understand why small "private" farmers took the opportunity to engage into market gardening; these new gardeners--new at least in the context of a market economy, for some vegetables have always been grown under the palm trees--benefit from strong encouragements from agricultural services, which are always ready to supply fertilizers and selected seeds to the best of them; when direct sale was again authorized in 1979, this orientation received new impetus: for instance, L'Hopital has three privileged suppliers, three small palm groves on the other side of the Erg that faces Timimoun on the west. Today, the new

Timimoun market is permanently linked to a "market garden" belt--which is of course not continuous, due to its environment and its dependence on the water supply. All means are used to carry the produce at the least cost: mules to cross the Erg, tire-wheeled carts when the oasis lies close to the road, a truck that has just delivered construction equipment, the all-terrain vehicle delivering supplies for the school cafeteria and which thus does not return empty... this is the good luck of a country where everyone knows everybody! A degree of specialization has thus appeared: in walled communities stretching along the road (or dirt-road) near Timimoun, there are many commuters (who return home every week-end); from a certain distance onward, market gardens become more numerous; this attempt at a form of regional organization, although limited, is entirely new in the Gourara.

Agriculture and Dual Activity: Aougrout and Tinerkouk

Further on, i.e. in palm groves like those of Deldoul or the Aougrout, which are connected to Timimoun by a very poor dirt road (road construction is under way in 1982), agriculture complements salaried jobs. These jobs are often restricted to a few months--long enough to save for a motor pump, to fix one or two rooms in the house, or to pay for a pilgrimage to Mecca...--and they are found sometimes on location (Tiberrhamine work sites and miscellaneous services, and the community center provide work for several hundred people), sometimes in Adrar or Ghardaia, where the Gourari are held in high esteem; in that case, the crops have not changed much--wheat, barley, dates and vegetables--although the wheat grown is a variety sold as "friq" (wheat harvested before maturity and roasted; it traditionally accompanies the "chorba"--the soup--on holidays) which, therefore, is competitive with state-imported wheat, although the latter sells for 10 times less.

There is also another case, that of the Tinerkouk palm groves, in the midst of the Western Erg. Growth there has been exceptional... and contrary to all forecasts: + 156 percent from 1952 to 1977, which is due to a migration surplus accounted for by the fact that Erg nomads have become sedentary.

The Tinerkouk environment is a harsh one; actually, the area can survive only because of workers' migrations: in the 1950's they used to migrate to Tunis or the Oran area, today to Northeast Sahara (the El Golea-Ghardaia-Ouargla road is not far); these migrations are considerable: they involve at least one out of three adults. Now, these workers are displacing the Tinerkouk center of gravity: they choose to settle at the edge of the Erg, at the foot of the first line of dunes, in the Zaouiet Debbagh community which, for that reason, is experiencing the most spectacular growth of all the Gourara walled communities: 383 inhabitants in 1952, 1,951 in 1977, over 2,000 today--in 30 years, its population has increased from 10 percent of that of Tinerkouk to 20 percent... and it keeps increasing (Figure 3). Certainly, this movement had already started in the 1950's, but it has taken such an extent that the palm grove created by the emigrants has more than doubled in area--and is without common measure with the small area developed close by in Benzita as part of the "socialist villages" operation. Each new plot is enclosed

by a high "toub"* wall... provided with a double corrugated-sheetmetal door, which means that the car is not far; a pumping-beam well (sometimes a motor-pump well) provides water for the garden which is tended by the wife; a house of the traditional type, improved by the use of modern materials (scrap iron, beams, corrugated sheetmetal for the roof, under the insulating layer of clay) is built in a corner of the lot (which has not cost anything), while young palm trees attest to the determination, and the need, not to give up agricultural activity. Why do these emigrants choose to settle here rather than in their native oasis? They want to be able to join their wives and children on their "recovery" leaves without having to walk two days through the Erg; also and above all, their salaries enable them to buy light trucks. Back home, they become occasional truckers: thus, for them too, going back to the heart of the Erg would be incompatible with owning a motor vehicle, which is seen less as a status symbol than as a working tool.

Thus, we have here an attempt at moving out of the Erg--which has not been planned by the authorities--which is closely related to employment on distant work sites and accompanied by the creation of a new palm grove. It is important to note that family ties (older people remain in the Erg), neighborhood relations and sociological cohesion have thus been preserved in the Tinerkouk... very few of whose inhabitants volunteered to move to the socialist village at Mguiden, close by, although it had been primarily designed for them.

Using the Climate as an Asset--Distant Markets

The other group of palm groves in the Erg is in the Tarhouzi: people there are not moving, in spite of the wishes of some who find that these oasis populations are too far from everything, and in spite of a project which aborted because there was no water on the Charouin hamada. The Tarhouzi is 200 km from Timimoun; the dirt road ends in Talmine, after which you must still go many hours among the dunes before reaching the palm groves that stretch along these long corridors between the dunes which the Zenete have colonized little by little. These Berbers, whose ancestors came from the edge of the Timimoun Sebkha two centuries ago, are one of the most astonishing Saharan rural populations (1 out of 8--i.e. 1 per family--is a farmer, compared with 1 out of 12 in the Tinerkouk, 1 out of 16 in the Timimoun community): it is very homogeneous and very egalitarian since it is composed of independent farmers; therefore, its land situation is sound and the Tarhouzi has been spared the resentments caused by the Agrarian Revolution, which are quite noticeable in certain fog-gara oases). True, here as in the Tinerkouk, workers' migrations are customary and oriented to the Oran area, not to its wine-growing plains as they used to be, but to the Arzew area, its industrial zone and its worksites: these migrations are short-lived, being usually restricted to the agricultural off-season, since Tarhouzi men can find jobs with people who take advantage of their summer holidays to supervise the construction or extension of their homes. The wages earned in the Tell are exchanged for food supplies bought on the way back to Charouin (center of the community), or even entrusted to camel drivers who bring them back to the Tarhouzi at the time of the date

* Toub: earth masonry.




Figure 3. The Gourara (Adrar governorate): Population Migrations, Market-Garden Crops.


Note: Each palm grove is indicated by a symbol representing its irrigation system (or by two symbols when two systems coexist in the same palm grove). We have shown the Adrar-El Golea-Algiers road used by Touat tomato truckers and through which some Gourara palm groves also ship their produce (situation as of 1982).

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Key: 1. Western Erg | 8. Foggara plus small pumping beam or motor pump |
| 2. Northeastern Sahara | 9. Sales of garden produce (including Touat tomatoes) |
| 3. M'Gaiden region | 10. Large date shipments |
| 4. [To] Oran area | 11. Planned migration |
| 5. Palm groves and irrigation methods | 12. Final population migration |
| 6. Foggara | 13. Temporary workers' migration |
| 7. Pumping beam, motor pump | |

harvest. Contrary to what is the case in the Tinerkouk, wages are just complementing agricultural resources, and workers are not looking for full-time employment (this is confirmed by the census: there are half as many Temporary Absent Residents here as in the Tinerkouk).

This is because the Tarhouzi has one peculiarity and offers one advantage compared with other Gourara palm groves: its palm trees need no irrigation (although the rainfall does not exceed 15 mm per year), no more than do the minuscule plots planted with cereals, because of the presence of a water table just below ground level, where it is easy to reach by digging ditches which are called "beurda" (i.e. "cool place").¹³ Another advantage is that the palm trees are young and therefore bring in a full yield: the slow swarming movement which involves the whole population, one family at a time, when the gardens become encrusted, choked with sand or, above all, when the water supply is exhausted, results in a constant renewal of the palm groves. Finally, most of these palm trees belong to varieties that yield the best market-grade dates in the Gourara. Their value rose when the date market--not to be confused with the market for the Deglet Nour variety which is grown in the large palm groves of the Northeast and exported to European markets--became massively oriented toward Sahel countries, very precisely toward Niger. Why Niger? Mainly because Touat traders--well-established dynasties--considering the many restrictions placed by Algerian socialism on private trade, established their headquarters in Niger, a country whose palm groves are few and do not produce much and which, above all, has the advantage--this is the essential factor--of belonging to the franc zone. This enables the traders to sell their dates for foreign currency which they can then use to buy all sorts of traditional products (henna, peanuts, etc.) and manufactured articles which are in great demand in Algeria. The last link in this "trading chain" which makes it possible to bypass the Algerian dinar zone, is the great Tamanrasset fair where all these coveted foreign products are introduced quite officially... not to mention the ever-present contraband which can hardly be controlled considering the length of the desert borders. Can we still speak of economic isolation when the trucker pays up to 720 Algerian dinars for the quintal of dates he is going to take to Niger; the small producer, however, has paid only 30 dinars to have the same quintal of dates carried by a camel through the Erg and to the road. When their small family palm groves are becoming so valuable, it is easy to understand why the Zenetes of the Western Erg (some 10,000 people) show no intention to "get out" of the Erg, all the less so as the state is now showing some concern for their welfare, which results in the creation of schools staffed by teachers native to the area or to the neighboring Saoura, and therefore well integrated, the distribution of butane gas which abolishes the boring wood-gathering chores over long distances, and finally frequent visits by medical teams.

Thus, the example of the Gourara (Figure 4) shows that all palm groves, even the most isolated, are affected by the wages paid on work sites, in offices, on oil and gas fields, etc; this impact does not result solely [as published] in a decline as brutal as that experienced by the palm groves located next to the large towns of Northeast Sahara. First, because salaried work, whether close by or at a distance, whether temporary or seasonal, represents for many small farmers (and there are still some) a complement to their agricultural activity; the cash it brings it used to modernize the farm (they will purchase a motor pump, pipes, improve the seguias, etc.), to buy consumer goods that



Jean Bisson

Figure 4. Zaouiet Debarh in the Tinerkouk (Timimoun district). Service Center for the Western Erg and Settlement Center for Work-Site Workers.

Key: 1. Self-construction

2. Service center

3. Rural Exchange Center

4. Former Saharan Administration Center

5. Old foggara palm grove

6. Fatis dirt road

7. Revived foggara

8. Benzita irrigated area

9. Emigrants' palm grove in 1953

10. Emigrants' palm grove - 1982 extension

11. Old palm grove

12. Non-irrigated vegetables (beurdas)

13. Afreg dune

were undreamt of 20 years ago and, in all cases, to improve the home; temporary employment--which, as we have seen, is the only type of employment Saharans can hope for--has at least had the effect of preserving the agricultural future of many palm groves. In addition, the increase in the number of consumers living in towns and having regular, even high, incomes was bound to have a positive impact in all areas where there remained well-established farming communities: it took just one measure, the lifting of trade restrictions, to provide strong momentum to agricultural production centers, no matter how distant. Suddenly, after a long time when its exports had been restricted to quality dates for European consumers, under the colonial system, or to second-quality dates which North Algerians no longer want now that they have become used to a western type of diet (although these dates are still appreciated south of the Sahara), the Sahara can take full advantage of its climate: it provides off-season produce (these early vegetables which can no longer be grown in sufficient quantities in the seashore "sahels") to the town populations of the Maghreb country with the largest number of towns; in spite of their high prices--due to transportation costs--there is a market for them. This is why the Touat and the Tidikelt have become a large tomato exportation area--so has the Gourara, but to a lesser degree: the agricultural centers there are too scattered, too far from the main road, frost is not unusual (but the people are starting to use plastic tunnels). On the other hand, the cannery built in Reggane, at the end of the Touat "palm street" and at the edge of the Tanezrouft--because a large socialist area was supposed to be established there on virgin land, to supply the cannery--is vegetating: it cannot compete with private traders. It must make do with late-campaign production.

As for the large El Golea palm grove, with its many artesian wells and located on the major Saharan highway, it has made a name for itself with its early exports of apricots, plums and medlars.

Therefore, we appear to have reached this unavoidable conclusion: food self-sufficiency in each of the governorate, as recommended in the Charter, for which ambitious projects were undertaken that yielded disappointing results, and which was to lead to a decentralization under which regions were strangely withdrawn into themselves (although the number of vehicles and the quality of the road network had increased prodigiously), was replaced by integration on a national scale: its material base is climatic complementarity, and it is supported by small West Saharan farming communities, although they have not benefited much from the state's massive investments. This is probably not what planners had expected: should we regret it?

NOTES

1. The last caravan that crossed the whole Sahara, from Timbuktu to the Tafilelt, went through Tabelbala (120 km west of Beni-Abbes, in the Saoura) in 1937 (As mentioned by Robert Capot-Rey: "Le Sahara Francais," Paris, PUF [French University Press], 1953).
2. Report on Labor in the Sahara. SAPEC [Fishing and Canning Company] Archives, Ouargla governorate (undated; published prior to 1979).

3. See map "Origin of Algerian Drilling Company Personnel," as of August 1979, in Jean Bisson: "Ouargla and Mزاب Country--Employment, Urbanization, Regional Decentralization in Algerian Sahara." CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], ERA 706, Tours, Volume 5, 1979 (Also CAHIERS DE L'AMENAGEMENT DE L'ESPACE published by CNERAT [expansion unknown], Algiers, No 8, Oct-Dec 1979).
4. Alain Romey: "Les Said Atba de N'Goussa. Histoire et etat actuel de leur nomadisme" [The N'Goussa Said Atba. History and Present Status of Their Nomadism] (Third Cycle Sociology Thesis, EHESS [expansion unknown], 1978); the author shared the nomads' life from September 1977 to June 1978, and therefore accompanied them on their summer migration.
5. This ceiling has been set by a "definition of national limitation ranges," and it varies according to the region, the type of palm trees, their age, etc. See: "Recueil des textes relatifs aux fourchettes de limitation" [Collection of Texts Concerning Limitation Ranges] (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform); new edition 1977.
6. Francoise Chazelas and Christophe Rocland: "A Nomadic Group in the South Algerian Development Program." Report published in LETTRE DU CRESM [expansion unknown] (Aix-en-Provence), May 1980.
7. This, at least, was the situation in the summer of 1979: it was then hoped that laying pipes would solve the problem.
8. EL MOUJAHID, 26 October 1978.
9. EL MOUJAHID, 6 August 1978, and October 1978 inquiry with Mr T. Rouighi, director of the Laghaout DARAW expansion unknown.
10. Claude Reboul: "Le lent apprentissage de l'autogestion: les cooperatives de production agricole d'Abadla (Algerie)" [The Slow Experience of Self-Management: the Abadla (Algeria) Agricultural Production Cooperatives], INRA [French Institute for Agronomical Research], Paris 1980; also: Sassi Boumaza: "Etude de quelques projets de développement agricole dans le bassin méditerranéen" [Study of a Few Agricultural Development Projects in the Mediterranean Basin] (DEA [Applied Economics Department] Report, Tours Geographical Institute, September 1982). We should point out that the fact that the American development experts broke their contract did not improve the situation.
11. Claude Reboul, op. cit. in previous note.
12. Jean Bisson: "Le Gourara, étude de Géographie humaine" [The Gourara, a Study in Human Geography], Institute for Saharan Research, Algiers University, 1957.--"Tinerkouk and Tarhouzi (Gourara): Is the Western Erg Moving Out or Getting Less Isolated?" in "Le Sahara dans les taches d'edification nationale des Etats maghrebins" [Sahara in the National Construction Tasks of Maghreb States]. Published by CRESM, Aix-en-Provence, 1982.

13. A sketch illustrating this particular arrangement was published by Jean Bisson, op. cit. in previous note.
14. Prices observed at Talmine (at the edge of the Erg) late in the campaign (April 1981).

9294

CS0: 4519/178

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

VIETNAM HEALTH MINISTER VISITS--Algiers, 17/4/83 (APS)--The health minister, A. Bouhara audiened the Vietnamese Minister of Health Mr Dang Hoi Xuan who arrived at the head of a high level delegation for an official visit in Algeria. The two delegations met yesterday for a working session. The Vietnamese delegation is due to visit the Algerian achievements in the field of health and will sign an official report and new cooperation accords. [Text] [LD180344 Algiers APS in English 1105 GMT 17 Apr 83]

TALKS WITH BELGIAN MINISTER--Algiers, 17/4/83 (APS)--Mr Belkacem Nabi, minister of energy and petrochemical industries conferred on Saturday in Algiers with the Belgian minister of budget, scientific policy and planning. The talk which was attended by Mr Hadj Slimane Cherie [spelling of name as received], commissary to new energies and secretary of the Higher Council of Scientific and Technical research dealt with the examination of bilateral relations and their development in the field of energy. [Text] [LD180344 Algiers APS in English 1107 GMT 17 Apr 83]

CSO: 4500/193

MINISTER ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT FOREIGN, DOMESTIC POLICIES

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3050, 25 Mar 83 pp 24-29, 73-75

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamal Hasan 'Ali by Yusuf al-Qa'id, Rabi' Abu al-Khayr, Badawi Shahin, Sulayman 'Abd-al-'Azim and Sayyid Zaki: "This Week's Interview with Kamal Hasan 'Ali;" in Cairo]

[Text] There will be an exchange of ambassadors in 1983 with the Soviet Union, with countries of the eastern bloc and with Cyprus. We will withhold approval of some resolutions issued by the past Summit Conference for Non-Aligned Countries.

The next 15 days will be important and decisive in the Middle East.

Any diplomatic action abroad that does not serve us here in the country is meaningless and useless.

Separating politics from economics or from culture divests both of their meaning.

Egypt's interests in the country and abroad are inseparable.

The economy, politics, culture and military agreements serve our autonomous power.

The United States is a principal arms supplier and a principal source of support for the Egyptian economy.

We begin this interview with a confession that may have nothing to do with what took place in the interview. We admit that we were prepared for the interview to turn out to be closer to an official dialogue: what will be said and what will not be said would be calculated.

But after the first few minutes Kamal Hasan 'Ali's warmth, affection, good cheer and perhaps humor spread in our midst. This was the first surprise in an interview that turned out to be full of surprises.

It is difficult to convey the friendly atmosphere of the interview and the minister's intelligent and witty answers. It is also difficult to convey the ability [he has] to hold his peace when silence is required. We were all discovering these characteristics for the first time in "the deputy prime minister."

We don't know whether it was the media agencies which had dealt with him previously that failed to bring out the spirit of this pure Egyptian or whether

his behavior with AL-MUSAWWAR was completely different from his behavior with other media agencies.

In general, it seems that the secret of AL-MUSAWWAR's interviews, which have become one of the magazine's principal features, lies in the manner in which these interviews are conducted. Even in the most serious cases an interview is conducted with a spirit of human warmth.

We asked Kamal Hasan 'Ali about the characteristics of Egypt's ambassador to Moscow, and he said the ambassador will be a tall man whose initial is M. We all laughed and we spoke of Mecca in connection with the socialist countries. Mr Kamal Hasan 'Ali affirmed that anyone who links the two would go to Hell, and everybody laughed.

We were facing a man who had experienced military life. He was one of the officers who led the Egyptian army in the October War. He worked as chief of the General Intelligence Agency; he assumed command of the armed forces; and then he undertook the task of presenting and formulating Egypt's foreign policy.

We were careful in anticipation of his presence, and we presented all [our] questions in front of him. Why does the president travel abroad so often? Isn't this done at the expense of the attention he would devote to domestic issues? To put it more specifically, what can the country gain from these trips abroad? Why do foreign countries give us aid? What do they want in return for this aid? What is expected to be accomplished on President Mubarak's next trip to Asia? What can Egypt gain from that trip? How large are the differences and what are the points of agreement in relations between Egypt and the United States? Who is responsible for the mistakes that are made in U.S. aid to Egypt? When will the Soviet ambassador return to Cairo, and when will Egypt's ambassador go back to Moscow? Does Egypt have some reservations about some of the resolutions of the last non-alignment summit? Who stands to gain from the fact that Egypt has not yet returned to its Arab brothers? What chances does the Reagan initiative still have? Why is Egypt negotiating with Israel now about normalization, particularly when Israel has not withdrawn from Lebanon? Will President Mubarak raise the subject of North Korea's military support to Iran with the leaders of that country? Despite all the loans we are receiving, why hasn't the effect of these loans become evident in Egypt? We talk a great deal about Egypt's national security: what are its parameters, what is its meaning and what is its extent? What exactly happened in New Delhi? What did Libya do, and what was our reaction to what Libya did? What is the story about the telephone call that took place at 3 a.m. between the Egyptian and Palestinian delegations to set up a meeting between Mubarak and 'Arafat? Why is Egypt displeased with the resolutions of the National Council? Will these resolutions be retracted? Is there a relationship between the fact that the League of Arab and Islamic Nations has been disbanded and the return of the Arab League from Tunisia?

It is difficult to determine in minutes and hours the duration of colloquies. This colloquy lasted only 3 hours. Nevertheless, it was one of the most exciting colloquies [I have taken part in]; it was full of secrets and news about the future.

[Question] We are delighted that Mr Kamal Hasan 'Ali, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs has joined us and has agreed to come to our gathering

for the interview of the week here in Dar al-Hilal. It seems to us that the main subject which would appropriately lead into our discussion with him is that of the relationship between what is going on in the country and the outside world, or the relationship between domestic policy and foreign policy. This question would lead us all into the discussion. Many people cannot understand President Mubarak's frequent trips to the United States and to Europe. He has a trip to Asia coming up. People think that it is the president's function to stay in Cairo and keep track of domestic affairs. It seems that they have fears or worries that these trips are being taken at the expense of the time the president should be devoting to matters inside the country. Let us be candid with each other. One of the principal critical remarks that are being made states that the president's foreign interests may be taking up time that should be devoted to internal matters. The question is this: how does your excellency see this situation? In what way is the picture different for President Mubarak, and what is the rationale for these trips? The more important question is this: What have these trips achieved for the internal situation in Egypt?

[Answer] It is a pleasure for me to meet with you. I am pleased because this is the first time for me to come here to Dar al-Hilal. This is not because I have been remiss, but it is rather because work circumstances have kept me from coming here. I am also pleased because I am coming to Dar al-Hilal at a time when it has achieved much success. Let me say in all candor that AL-MUSAWWAR's experience now is truly admirable. I wish all of you success and I wish AL-MUSAWWAR continued prosperity. I found out in my inquiries about the influence and the circulation of Egyptian weekly magazines that are sent to Arab countries that of all these magazines that are sent abroad AL-MUSAWWAR has the largest circulation. I found out that AL-MUSAWWAR is also very popular not only among Egyptians in Arab countries but also with readers in fraternal Arab countries because it is considered one of Egypt's oldest magazines. I am not saying this to praise the magazine; I am saying it because it is the truth.

How Does the Domestic Situation Benefit from Actions Abroad?

[Question] Let us go back to our first question. What are the president's trips abroad doing for the domestic situation in Egypt?

[Answer] AL-MUSAWWAR's [correspondent] asked about the president's trips abroad. He asked whether these trips were keeping the president from devoting his attention to domestic conditions.

Let me say that any political action on any level--whether it is taken by the president, by political leaders or by individuals on any other level--which does not serve the domestic situation is meaningless, futile and useless. If we are talking about the president's actions, we will find that in all his visits to foreign countries the president dealt with politics not for the sake of politics. If we isolate politics from economics, if we isolate politics from economics and culture, and if we isolate the three from the autonomous power of the state, we would be divesting politics of its realistic and true meaning. The process then is an integrated one: it is a political, economic and cultural process; it is also a military process. The military aspect plays a major role in letting Egypt develop its own power. It is for this reason that these actions are taken by the president, by the minister of foreign affairs or by any other professional. The purpose of all these actions is to seek Egypt's interests. Egypt's domestic

interests are inseparable from and equal to its outside interests. When we say that Egypt has strengthened its bilateral relations with all countries through these visits, we also mean that we are pursuing an open-door policy with all these countries in economic, cultural, technical and military areas. When we say that Egypt has become isolated, that means that Egypt's isolation will not only be political, but rather its political isolation will affect the economic, cultural, technical and military aspects [of life in the country].

The President's Visit to the United States

[Question] Can you give us a specific example of one of the president's trips?

[Answer] Let's take the United States. When the president goes to Washington, he discusses not only the political question because it is an item [on his agenda], but he always brings up the economy just as forcefully. It is indisputable that the United States, for example, provides us with economic support. This support manifests itself in the military equipment that is furnished to us by the United States. The United States is Egypt's principal supplier of weapons at the present time. Accordingly, it is also one of the principal sources of support for the Egyptian economy.

[Question] We would like to have specific figures.

[Answer] We receive close to 1.3 billion dollars annually in equipment, weapons and ammunition. In the next stage 400 million dollars of this sum will be a grant. As far as the economy is concerned, we receive a grant of almost 750 million [dollars] and 250 million dollars of grain and wheat from the agricultural crop surplus. This sum is almost a grant, and this simply means another 1 billion dollars. If a visit by the president does not cover these matters, what then would it cover? U.S. aid also comes under this economic support. It includes scientific research projects and rural development projects. Recently [a decision was made to] direct part of these investments over the next 5 years to sanitary drainage projects: 1.25 billion dollars over 5 years for sewage projects in Cairo and Alexandria. We also find that attention is given mainly to increasing crops, taking care of Egypt's soil and increasing the productivity of a feddan. All this--agricultural projects or research plans with universities--is part of the support for the economy. The economic aspect is thus one of major importance.

Regarding the technical aspect [of the U.S. aid program] and the scholarships that come under the framework of U.S. AID, we find that these cost about 40 million dollars for about 1,000 scholarship recipients. This number of scholarship recipients will be useful in the development plan. These scholarship recipients go to the United States to study or to receive training. Some of these grants are grants under the Peace Program, and recipients of these grants receive technical training after graduating from universities, but they do not study for a master's degree. Other scholarship grants enable recipients to study for a master's or a doctorate degree. All this is an economic benefit that comes to us through diplomatic contacts and visits. This is above and beyond the military support which manifests itself in weapons, in the F-16 airplanes, tanks and in the rest of the air defense equipment. This support is considered one of the components of Egypt's autonomous power.

When we take the president's trip to Canada as another example, we find that economic subjects were the most important subjects that came up for discussion at the negotiating table. The political clout of one country may differ from that of another. The political clout of the United States in the Middle East problem is not the same as that of Canada regarding the same problem. Nevertheless, we are gaining Canada's support for Arab rights. At the same time we are emphasizing economic objectives. Canada is making contributions to numerous projects. The Canadian aid system is associated with projects and not grants. [Because of Canada's aid] we began the North Cairo Power Plant Project which will cost about 100 million dollars. We will receive this sum of money in the form of a loan; and 16 million dollars of that sum will be a grant. This is an example which illustrates that the purpose of the president's visits and of ministers' diplomatic actions is to support the Egyptian economy.

What Did You Do in Western Europe?

[Question] So much for the president's visits. What did your visits accomplish?

[Answer] In March 1981 I visited the countries of western Europe, the countries of Scandinavia and the countries of the European Common Market. On the one hand, the purpose of these visits was to explain Egypt's political point of view on the problems of the Middle East. On the other hand, the purpose of the visits was to explain Egypt's economic conditions to the ministers of foreign affairs of these countries. At that time it was said that we had a surplus in our balance of payments. This view was brought up by a former minister in the Economic Community. It was also said abroad that Norway, Sweden, Finland and the other countries of Scandinavia did not have to give Egypt grants. Therefore, we had to explain to them the conditions that Egypt was going through, and I had to tell them that we had to build 2 million housing units to solve the housing problem in Egypt. I had to tell them that some infrastructure projects, such as sanitary drainage, water and health, needed repair and development. I had to tell them that we needed 35.5 billion dollars for the investments of the 5-Year Plan. In this case diplomatic action serves the economy; in other words, it serves domestic policy. If this were not the purpose of diplomatic action, then such action would be useless. Also the purpose of our diplomatic action in Africa, Asia and Japan is to serve Egypt's internal and external relations. President Mubarak's visit to both China and Japan has the same purpose. Perhaps President Mubarak's next visits to China, North Korea and Japan will confirm that.

What Is Behind this Aid?

[Question] Why are these countries giving us aid? Can they give us this aid without expecting us to do something for them or at least go along with some of their policy? Are they giving Egypt this aid because Egypt is where it is?

[Answer] It is indisputable that Egypt is the largest power and the largest country in the Arab region, in North Africa and also in the western corner of Asia. Egypt's geographical location and its position in the balance of international powers are extremely sensitive. There is no doubt that nothing is being given to Egypt for Egypt's sake. Egypt is the significant ingredient that changes the balance in the scales because its strategic position in the region carries clout. On that basis Egypt may be courted; that is indisputable. Therefore, there has to be a relationship.

Aid and Its Effect on Policies

[Question] Our basic question is this: does this aid place any restrictions on Egypt's will and on its freedom to follow one or another policy?

[Answer] If politics does not serve national interests, it ceases to be politics and becomes bias. Politics has to serve national interests. When we review Egypt's problems, we find that these problems, like those of any other country, are security problems and economic problems. However, we could be suffering from many internal problems as a result of the aftereffects of the 4 past wars for which we spent 100 billion dollars. I hope that this figure will sink in the mind of every Egyptian. This is in addition to the people who lost their lives. If we had invested that sum of money in the country, Egypt's economic situation would have changed considerably. Therefore, what comes into the Egyptian economy from one or another direction does not place restrictions on Egypt's will but is rather congruent with Egypt's interests. It is this that governs our diplomatic actions.

[Question] Now we come to President Mubarak's upcoming trips to Japan, China and North Korea. Would it be possible for us to know what is involved in those visits and what is new in them?

[Answer] We are now finalizing the details of the president's itinerary. We are still engaged in communications to make preparations for these visits.

North Korea and Aid to Iran

[Question] We've noticed recently that North Korea has been giving more aid to Iran. We also noticed that North Korea is becoming a principal supplier of weapons to Iran. Will President Husni Mubarak's upcoming visit to North Korea have anything to do with this matter?

[Answer] Our relations with North Korea are relatively old. The two countries share common interests, and they cooperate in many areas, particularly in the military area. We also have some trade with North Korea, mostly agricultural crops and phosphates. Egypt also recalls with much gratitude the fact that North Korea sided with Egypt during the war of attrition. North Korea provided a squadron of airplanes and airplane fighters to support the right flank of our armed forces on the Canal front. These are established facts that set forth the underlying assumptions of our bilateral relations. At the same time, however, we recall with appreciation that North Korea was helping Libya, but after the events of July 1977 when Libya attacked Egypt's border posts--and this was a curious situation--North Korea immediately deferred to Egypt's position and withdrew its pilots immediately when we asked her to do that. This fact gives an [added] dimension to the relationship between us and North Korea.

[Question] But the fact that Korea is supporting Iran and providing it with weapons is creating a situation that threatens stability and security in the region.

[Answer] This impels us to review matters with our Korean friends. This is particularly important at a time when the non-aligned countries are calling for an immediate end to the war between Iran and Iraq. The war cannot be stopped by giving Iran more fuel. Instead, this war must be checked and the tools of war must be held back.

[Question] The friendship between Egypt and North Korea seems to be a close friendship despite the difference between the two regimes. Even during the period of conflict between Egypt and the Soviet Union, the friendship between Egypt and North Korea continued. Were the Koreans playing a role then in order to make up for the shortage in Soviet spare parts that Egypt had during that period?

[Answer] The relationship between us and North Korea is holding. It was not broken, and it was not affected by any other political positions.

What Do We Want from China?

[Question] What do we hope to gain from the visit to China? Without going into details it is our opinion that by all standards China is still a developing country which has recently initiated an open-door policy to attract foreign investments to strengthen its economy. During our last visit to China the Chinese complained that all the investments that had been made in their country did not exceed 400 million dollars. Although China is a great country, it has not yet reached the level of advanced countries. What are our intentions regarding our relations with China? Is it our intention to use China to balance relations with the Soviet Union?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the policies pursued by China in its relations with other countries outside its borders have been sound. China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. This is a crucial point because it is this that gives true meaning to the assistance China gives other nations in Africa or in Asia. This is why the developing world accepts Chinese friendship and Chinese relations. Our relations with China began in 1955. Ever since then China has been dealing with Egypt in all areas. Although China is a developing country, every developing country has its strong points.

China's strong points are manifested in its efforts to develop the food supply. If we were to recall the history of China, we would find that 20 or 30 million persons used to die in the famines that occurred in that country. Today, no one starves to death in China. Thus, development of the food supply there did reach an advanced stage. China has had numerous food security experiments that we can benefit from.

Egypt now has numerous fish farms that are based on Chinese technology. Thus, relations between the two countries are good. There is also military cooperation between the two countries; we import military commodities from China. There is no doubt that labor in China costs less than it does in other countries. Thus by buying many weapons from China we have an opportunity to strengthen our own power and diversify the sources of our weapons.

The president's visit to China then will be a follow-up on political and economic matters that had been discussed. The president will also discuss matters that have to do with the military cooperation that exists between us. There will be a follow-up on what was agreed to during the visit of China's prime minister to Egypt last December.

[Question] What was agreed to during the recent visit of China's prime minister to Egypt?

[Answer] An agreement was reached on some agricultural projects, on some fish resources projects and on some matters that have to do with armaments and with the construction of a large convention hall particularly since Cairo does not have such a large convention hall. A location for that hall has actually been designated. It will be on the Suez Highway, and it will cost several million [dollars]. This project will be financed by loans whose terms are so easy that the loans can almost be considered a grant.

[Question] As a military man, what do you think about the standard of armaments in China? Do you believe it is good?

[Answer] The standard of armaments in China is ordinary. But with the addition of a little advanced technology to Chinese equipment, the standard of efficiency of Chinese weapons can be raised. This is not to detract from Chinese equipment, but the capabilities of these weapons can be improved. If Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah will allow me to say this, I will say that we are actually doing that.

[Question] Can we find out what kinds of weapons [you are talking about] and what additional processes are needed [to improve] these weapons?

[Answer] I cannot say any more than what I've already said.

Relations between Us and Japan

[Question] What about Japan?

[Answer] Japan was giving Egypt easy term loans until 1981. These loans amounted to 188 million dollars. In 1981-1982 this sum was increased to 220 million dollars. That sum was not increased this year. As we can see the volume of trade between us and Japan is becoming prodigious. We find that Japan has been involved in the first stage of broadening the Suez Canal, which has just been completed. There is a tendency to have Japan work on the second stage of the canal expansion also. Japan is also working on expanding the port of Damietta and building piers [there]. As we see cooperation between us and Japan has grown considerably. But what I concentrated on during my last visit to Japan in September 1981 was to attempt to persuade the Japanese that despite all the consumer goods we are enjoying, the Toyotas and the Suzukis, for example, what was required now was to push economic cooperation into broader areas that are productive in nature. Hence came Japan's participation in the al-Dakhilah Port project and in the cement iron project. Although Japan's contribution to [the latter] project, which is a joint venture, was small, its contribution [to that project] was greater in the area of management. That in itself constitutes success and it also constitutes an Egyptian need because the transfer of Japanese technology to management in Egypt is an important and a vital process. Thus we find that cooperation with Japan is helping in numerous areas of investment operations in Egypt. It is helping in the implementation of the 5-Year Plan and in the establishment of many fish farms. The fish farm at Sakha that Japan set up was one of them. There are also numerous agricultural production and animal production projects, namely in fish resources. In Aswan we find a fish research station, which is a research facility for the High Dam Lake. It was set up with Japan's help, and it was inaugurated by President Mubarak on his last visit to Aswan. All this constitutes the transfer of Japanese technology to Egypt.

[Question] We are saying that Japanese technology and the Japanese miracle are not one and the same thing. The Toyotas and the Toshiba's are not the Japanese miracle. But it is Japan's large corporations which are the product of the technological revolution in Japanese management that make up the Japanese miracle. Even Americans believe that General Motors and other large corporations in the United States can only progress by relying on Japanese management techniques. Americans now send their experts from U.S. universities and large corporations to study modern management techniques in Japan. We in Egypt must not rejoice when we build a factory. Instead, we must copy the Japanese spirit of management and management techniques which strengthened the sense of belonging in Japan. Is this part of our plans for the future?

[Answer] I agree with [what you're saying] because management is one of the principal ingredients in planning and execution. In Japan we actually find that the sense of belonging has been the main incentive behind Japan's progress. It may be my place to say that Japan was able to preserve and safeguard its authentic values which manifest themselves in the respect one shows to one's elders and the respect one shows to all those who teach us. These two values sunk in the minds of Japanese workers, and their effects were reflected on the machinery they use and in the factories where they work. Accordingly, we find that Japanese workers are creative, and they become productive quickly.

All this Aid for Egypt

[Question] You mentioned large figures [when you talked about the money] Egypt was receiving. The problem, however, is that the effect of this money is not clearly evident on the internal situation in Egypt. Why is that?

[Answer] This is the question we have to ask ourselves. What would the situation in Egypt have been like without this aid, without the loans, and without the easy credit terms and other matters? That is the question [we should ask]. In general, let's stay closer to home. Last year the budget of the Ministry of Housing was close to 650 million. Would this sum of money have been enough without foreign aid and easy term loans to provide the iron and cement [we need] from abroad? What would the housing crisis have been like in Egypt had it not been for this aid? What happened during that period that we call the open-door policy period? What happened since foreign aid to Egypt began, beginning with Arab aid--although that aid was small in relation to the sacrifices Egypt made--and during the period that followed the suspension of Arab aid? As of January 1978 western countries began making up for the lack of Arab aid, and they are still continuing to provide this aid. What would the situation have been like without this aid? Let me say quite frankly that we could not have built one house and we could not have overhauled the sewage system. It should be known that Britain pays Egypt for the sewage operation 150 million annually in easy term loans. It should also be known that Japan has recently joined the operations [that are underway] for the sewage and water [systems].

U.S. Aid: the Problem and the Solution

[Question] U.S. aid was faulted because it used to be doled out to small projects and restrictive sectors. Although these projects were numerous, they were prescribed, and citizens did not have a clear sense of their effect. That is the opposite with Soviet aid which manifested itself in a large project such as

the High Dam project. It seems that that was one of the incentives for the Americans to reconsider their aid program. In fact, it may have been their awareness of that problem that caused them to take part in the sewage project. We heard that the Americans wanted to reduce the number of projects supported by U.S. Aid and concentrate their aid on large projects which average citizens could become aware of. Is this the trend for U.S. aid?

[Answer] This notion of U.S. aid has actually evolved into something that is real. Agricultural projects, for example, have been given more attention than they were given in the past. This year 102 million dollars [from U.S. aid] were given to industry and to rural development. I believe this is not the fault of the Americans because we are the ones who control the state's capabilities. It is our responsibility to direct the aid [we receive] into areas where we actually need it, and this has actually happened.

This year 250 million [dollars] were earmarked for infrastructure projects, namely water and sewage projects. About 200 million were earmarked for industry. This does not mean that U.S. aid in its previous form was wasted. We must get this idea out of our heads. We may have directed U.S. aid in the beginning to projects that did not have absolute priority. At the same time, however, these projects were needed. But now that we have devised the 5-Year Plan, which directs all investments to Egypt's priorities in all sectors, vertically and horizontally, we have been directing U.S. aid to those projects that are mentioned in the Egyptian plan to serve our own priorities.

[Question] Americans usually adopt the theory of self-regulating market forces. They do not buy the idea of central planning, and it is difficult for them to adopt the theory of a plan and of programs that are centrally carried out. Recently, however, we've seen President Reagan talk for the first time about Egypt's 5-Year Plan and declare that he was prepared to support that plan. During our negotiations with the Americans we used to feel that a large part of the problems Egyptian negotiators faced were in their attempts to transfer these allocations that were earmarked for projects outside the plan to projects within the plan. We felt that these attempts were about to fall apart. What happened in this matter?

[Answer] One of the main features of President Mubarak's last visit to the United States is the fact that he took with him the minister of planning, the minister of the economy and the minister for international investment and cooperation. The minister of planning explained the 5-Year Plan to [members of] the U.S. Congress. That was the first time this had ever happened. One of the most important features of this plan is the fact that it defined priorities; the plan also set forth a remedy for the Egyptian economy, namely, to increase production. We don't want the foreign aid we are receiving to be consumed in the form of consumer goods. And this is what President Reagan had recently called for when he cited a Chinese proverb which states that rather than give a person a fish to eat, one must teach that person how to fish. In other words President Reagan said that it was not useful to give a country consumable aid. That country would then come back the following year and ask for more. What is important is that we help that country increase production and utilize its resources. He said that we must provide economic support for production so that a country can produce goods and do without aid. Accordingly, the United States accepted the

5-Year Plan because it set the priorities of the Egyptian economy in agricultural and industrial production.

[Question] Based on the notion that foreign policy serves domestic policy, do we take into account when we receive aid from foreign countries that the aid which is offered to us does not serve the interests of those countries that give us this aid?

[Answer] There is no doubt that this process is one in which interests are to be reconciled. In the balance of international politics and in the balance of powers Egypt carries a lot of weight with its large manpower, its creativity, its ingenuity and also its military power. Egypt carries more weight in the region [than other countries]. There is nothing wrong with Egypt's interests converging with the interests of another international party. What matters is that this aid not restrict the freedom, the will and the actions of Egypt.

[Question] Can this aid constitute some sort of pressure on us?

[Answer] We would not accept any form of pressure.

Did We Disagree with the United States?

[Question] What for example are those positions on which we differed with the United States?

[Answer] We must acknowledge the fact that friends may disagree. If there is continuous and constant agreement between a larger power and a smaller one, that means that the smaller power is yielding to the larger power. Since we can exercise our free will, we can disagree with the United States. This has actually happened because Egypt can exercise its free will, and we deal with others as equals. This disagreement was manifested recently in the departure of the PLO from Lebanon; Egypt was determined that there be a solution to the Palestinian problem before the Palestinians' departure from Beirut.

[Question] During that period the Americans applied pressure on Egypt to accept 10,000 fighters, but Egypt refused that completely.

[Answer] No pressure was applied. However, the request was importunate, but Egypt's position was extremely clear and extremely firm.

These Charges against U.S. Aid

[Question] Charges have been made against U.S. aid. Prices for capital goods and for other goods that are imported through the aid [program] are very high compared with world prices. These prices are almost 50 percent higher than world prices. The United States, for example, rejects the idea of scrutiny for companies which supply Egypt with these goods to control prices and kickbacks. Inside the country the United States divides the effort of Egyptians into useless economic activities. How then can relations [with the United States] serve the interests of our national economy?

[Answer] Let me repeat that nobody imposes his will on us. When the aid [program] began, we had not yet set down a 5-Year Plan, and we had not yet

established our priorities. Accordingly, U.S. aid leaned more towards providing commodities. This does not at all mean that it was not useful, particularly in light of the needs of the Egyptian market. That same Egyptian market needed everything during that period, particularly after the October War. We can say that the present stage is one of setting all tendencies on the right track. This is the prevailing concern at the present time.

[Question] Are we asking the aid [program] for offices that would scrutinize the supplying companies so we can control the pricing process and the kickbacks?

[Answer] Actually, this point in particular is subject to [the forces of] supply and demand. When we solicit bids in the American market, we ask for the lowest price and the best quality. There is also a U.S. law which guarantees that commissions not exceed a certain limit. Violators are likely to be penalized. Evidence for this lies in the Japanese Boeing deal. It was because of that deal that Japan's prime minister lost his job. This is a result of the fact that absolutely nothing is secret in the United States. Anyone who violates U.S. laws is likely to be called to account and to be penalized. I believe that this in itself is a guarantee [against violations]. The freedom of the press and the democracy that exist in the United States bring everything out in the open.

Which Comes First, Internal or External Affairs?

[Question] Is foreign policy an extension of domestic policy, or is it the other way round? Can that be applied to the evolution of the stages of Egyptian politics in the last quarter century?

[Answer] The question sets forth the socialist experience in Egypt on the one hand, and it sets forth the open-door policy on the other. Then it sets forth the period in which we are living as a planning period that has an open-door policy.

[Question] What we are trying to say is this: will the choices we make inside the country determine our policy abroad, or will our policy abroad determine our policy inside the country?

[Answer] There is no doubt about the fact that it is our domestic policy that determines our foreign policy. This is what I meant when I talked about having an agreement for the interests of the main question. Our interests can be found where Egypt's interests are; it is in light of Egypt's interests that our foreign policy is determined.

[Question] You raised an important question. It seemed to us at one point that it was foreign policies that determined how things would look like inside the country. It seemed that politics controlled the economy. This happened in two consecutive periods of Egypt's history. The political course of the two periods may have been different, but what we want to find out now is the nature of the present picture in internal policies and the effects these policies have abroad.

[Answer] Let me repeat in detail that Egypt's policy must abide by two positions: national security in the over-all military sense and in the internal security sense of economic ability, social development and social justice. Neither one can be separated from the other. At one point in time the Egyptian economy was dedicated to serve politics. That manifested itself in the unity that

was set up with Syria and in the Yemen war. At that time we had the economic capability that enabled us to direct Egyptian energies to some material action abroad that went beyond exercising the powers of persuasion. Egypt played a major role in that area. I don't believe Egypt wants to play that role now. Also Egypt cannot play that role. We are suffering once again from a population explosion, and we are trying to raise the average citizen's standard of living. I believe that 1967 was a decisive, an important and a vital turning point in this regard. It was the last time for us to try to play a material role abroad that was based on force. Sixteen years have gone by since 1967, and our population has grown by 17 million. Would these given factors make me inject the Egyptian economy into foreign policy? Would the Egyptian economy used in the same style have the same material and moral effect [it had in the past]? I would have to review my calculations once again, and I would have to determine my actions and even my relations with the various forces of Egypt's economic interests and its objectives in development, justice and social equity.

How Do We Achieve National Security?

[Question] In the course of your service in the armed forces and in Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the official responsible for the largest national security agency in Egypt, which is the General Intelligence Agency, we would like to get some insights into your point of view on the notion of national security and the notion of domestic security and how both can be achieved.

[Answer] The achievement of Egypt's national security requires three basic support posts.

First, Egypt's armed forces and the extent to which they can carry out the defense requirements of Egypt's national security in strategic areas and on the scene of operations. This means that there is one area for national security and another area for the scene of operations.

The area of national security extends from the Gulf westward to the borders of Tunisia and southward to the sources of the Nile. Egyptian security is part of Arab security. The scene of operations may be somewhat smaller than that; it may extend to the boundaries where one can stand and realize the objectives of national security. The two areas--the area of national security and that of the scene of operations--do not have to coincide.

For this reason Egypt must have the force of arms to defend its interests and its national security. This is why Egypt has a policy of diversifying the sources of weapons.

The second pillar of support consists of Egypt's foreign relations and the political actions taken by Egypt, by its political leaders and by other leaders. The purpose of this foreign action is to look for areas where Egypt's interests can coincide with the interests of other parties. This specifically is the objective of bilateral relations. Hence, the objective of our foreign policy is to establish a broad foundation of bilateral relations between Egypt and various countries. It is for this reason that you find Dr Butrus Ghali and me visiting these countries repeatedly.

Another thing that would also serve Egypt's national security is the establishment of good relations with all powers since we are a non-aligned country.

The fact that we have more interests with one of the superpowers does not at all rule out the fact that we have good relations with the other superpower.

Another thing that is also part of Egypt's national security and the principles that we follow--and it is this that gave Egypt its vital standing in international organizations and in the whole world--is the fact that we abide by the principles and the charter of the United Nations. We adhere to all the resolutions adopted by international organizations. A basic part of our foreign policy is based on respecting different international organizations and on helping regional organizations and abiding by their resolutions. This is what gives our policy the quality of continuity. For example, we should not drop our relations with Greece or with Cyprus because we have good relations with Turkey. Our relations with one country should not be set up at the expense of our relations with another; they ought not to be set up at the expense of principles.

The third pillar of support for Egypt's national security is the domestic front. It would have been possible to consider that [factor] first because without a cohesive domestic front we would have no foreign and no domestic policy.

The domestic front is manifested in social cohesion and not in class struggle. [We are talking about] social cohesion in every sense of the term. One would be free to earn an honest living provided one pays the state and society their due. One is to pay taxes and participate in social activities. The second aspect of this domestic front is Egypt's internal economic power through which it can resist any pressures. A strong economy is an important and a basic factor in the exercise of free will. We need wheat, for example, and we rely on aid from the United States. If we are able to become self-sufficient--and this is what the state is planning on by 1987--our self-sufficiency would at least enable us to direct the resources or the aid we receive to other sources of production since we cannot go on receiving aid indefinitely. I also consider the practice of democracy one of the principal pillars of support for our domestic front. Democratic practices allow us to hear different opinions, to reach the best and most agreeable and to overcome all obstacles that can stand in our way. There is no doubt that democracy is the foundation for progress in any society.

After all this [is taken care of] on the domestic front comes the conviction of the people.

Unless every person is convinced about what is being said; unless he is convinced that he has to be strong, to produce and to be a good citizen who pays his dues, takes what he is entitled to and does not give up his rights, we cannot aspire to have a strong Egypt. It is here that the importance of the individual in building society and in building the economy emerges.

We Will Become Completely Self-Sufficient in Wheat

[Question] Can we say that part of Egypt's strategy at the present time is to become self-sufficient in wheat by 1987? Is this objective taken into account by the Egyptian administration and by Egyptian policy in such a way that it manifests itself as a strategic course in our domestic policy? We recently heard that

the Americans want to reduce the aid [they give us] 10 percent every year. We too do not believe that a country which depends on another for its food can meet all the conditions of becoming a power in its own right. We also do not believe that Egypt can live on aid forever.

[Answer] The state has a clear plan to achieve that objective by 1987 through vertical expansion in farming; the state will also reclaim more land. These are two parallel policies whose aim is to realize self-sufficiency. There is no doubt that part of the aid is aimed at that. The best indication of that fact is the experiment in which 10,000 feddans of rice were planted in the north Delta. This increased rice production about 60 percent. Today we consume all the rice we produce, and rice used to be our second export crop after cotton. We actually find that this vertical expansion policy goes hand in hand with scientific research and with the 5-Year Plan to increase production. All this is part of the plan that the Ministry of Agriculture has to make us self-sufficient in wheat in almost 6 or 7 years.

Relations with Socialist Powers

[Question] Can we say that a decision has been made to establish balanced relations with the eastern bloc?

[Answer] The eastern countries are responsive to Egypt from an economic standpoint. I do not doubt--and I underscore that--that we could have an exchange of ambassadors in 1983 with the eastern countries, with Cyprus and with the Soviet Union. This is a result of the fact that the reasons which had led to the absence of ambassadors in our diplomatic missions have been removed. There are relations: there is a Soviet charge d'affaires in Cairo, and there is an Egyptian charge d'affaires in Moscow. The same is true with regard to Bulgaria and Cyprus.

What Was Gromyko's Son Doing?

[Question] Gromyko's son was visiting Egypt; his visit was not publicized. We heard that he said that the past bitterness in relations had ended and that he thought that the coming period was one in which relations were likely to improve. He also thought that an exchange of ambassadors would take place as soon as possible. What was the mission of Gromyko's son in Egypt?

[Answer] Gromyko's son, who heads the Institute of African Studies in Moscow, came to Egypt on a scientific, cultural mission. There were no contacts between him and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the diplomatic sense. But I can indicate here that the Soviet deputy prime minister did pass through Cairo Airport, and he was met by one of the deputy ministers. It was a very good meeting which revealed that both countries wanted to restore diplomatic relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union to their [previous] level.

[Question] What would be the characteristics of Egypt's ambassador to Moscow. There is no doubt that both parties will try to choose the two representatives they believe will be suitable for that mission.

[Answer] It seems to me that both ambassadors have to understand the stage Egypt is going through. They have to understand Egypt's commitments in international areas, Egypt's international commitments, the boundaries of Egypt's policy and

the boundaries of Soviet policy in the region. Both parties must try hard not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs.

[Question] There would have to be some indication that an exchange of ambassadors between us and the Soviets after this break in relations [was about to take place].

Have there been early indications, particularly at international meetings, either directly from the Soviets or through their friends to indicate that there are changes or at least a change in their position toward Egypt?

[Answer] The increased volume of trade and economic cooperation is a clear indication of that. Trade between Egypt and the Soviet Union in one year grew by almost 100 million [dollars]. It grew from 350 million dollars to almost 450 million. Another indicator lies in the fact that many eastern countries began increasing their economic cooperation with Egypt. The third indicator was what happened recently when the Soviet deputy prime minister passed through Cairo Airport and held talks with Egypt's deputy minister of foreign affairs. The coverage Egypt has been getting in the Soviet media has also improved. We are also receiving Soviet experts who are coming to Egyptian factories in which the Soviets had participated.

[Question] How many?

[Answer] Their number has been fluctuating: from 110 to 30 experts.

[Question] Can we consider the stance of Cuba's minister of foreign affairs in New Delhi one of these indicators? Responding to 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud, Cuba's minister of foreign affairs refused to place Libya's request to suspend Egypt's membership [in the organization] on the agenda. That was not Cuba's posture at the Havana Conference. Aren't there indicators of this kind?

[Answer] Among indicators [of this kind] is the course pursued by leftist countries at the Havana Conference and at subsequent conferences in New York and also in Kuwait regarding, for example, Latin America or the Palestinian cause. There is no doubt that these are indicators of moderation in relation to Egyptian policy; we've seen these indicators only recently in 1982. We recall that the Kuwait Conference was quite moderate as far as we are concerned, although it was taking place in an Arab country that was boycotting us and it was chaired by the left or Cuba. At the same time the conference was taking place before the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. All these are indicators of the fact that the policy toward Egypt is becoming moderate.

[Question] Of what use in general will the restoration of Egyptian-Soviet relations and the restoration of Egyptian relations with the eastern bloc be to internal conditions in the country?

[Answer] We do not dispute the fact that we have weapons from eastern countries that are still in use in the armed forces. And yes, we did make arrangements regarding this matter a long time ago--since 1972 to be specific. When Soviet experts left the armed forces, we began making arrangements so we would not find ourselves in a tight spot regarding spare parts. But it is indisputable that after relations are restored, we will be able to get the spare parts we want from

the Soviet Union. I believe that if the tension in diplomatic relations is relaxed and if we have the highest levels of representation between the two countries, we can also increase economic relations so that the needs of the Egyptian market and the needs of Egyptian factories that were built with Soviet aid can be met.

Egypt's Policy between the Two Superpowers

[Question] The two superpowers feel that their interests lie in escalating the confrontation between them. President Reagan's policy is almost based on confrontation. During the presidential campaign we felt that the U.S. president was playing on those tensions.

The fact that Andropov has been a part of the Soviet military establishment may be another factor in [the process of] escalating the confrontation between East and West, particularly since both sides have domestic problems. As far as the Soviets are concerned, the escalation of tensions may be a factor used to draw [the Soviet people's] attention away from the economic problem which is becoming worse in the Soviet Union.

Mr Deputy Prime Minister, how can Egypt establish balanced relations with the Soviets and with the Americans when there are possibilities for escalating the tension between the two countries and when Egypt has special relations with the United States? What effect would Egypt's decision [to restore relations with the Soviet Union] have on relations between Egypt and the United States?

[Answer] It seems to me, as I said, that we are a major country in the Middle East and that our policy as a non-aligned country is both stable and firm. It is indisputable that we want to have relations with all countries and with all the superpowers too. Our relations with the Soviet Union will not be established at the expense of our relations with the United States. In fact, as a non-aligned country--and it is known that reducing international tensions is one of the principles of non-alignment--we may be able to end the cold war between the two countries. From that premise then I do not think that our relations with the Soviet Union or the restoration of full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union will have any effect on the United States or on our relations with that country.

[Question] How do you see the relationship between the two superpowers in the eighties? Do you believe that the eighties will be confrontational or will there be a relaxation of tensions in relations between the two superpowers?

[Answer] It is obvious, as we all know, that the SALT talks are underway in Geneva; the subject of the missiles is also being discussed. It is indisputable that the United States is now inclined to amend some of its policies regarding the zero option. Features of this change have begun to emerge. It may thus be said that there is some wish to reconcile the two superpowers regarding the destructive force they have. From another angle such a reconciliation may have not only political but also economic consequences on developing countries because investments that are made in such weapons are unbelievably large. For example, the new intercontinental ballistic missile, which the United States tested, and also the U.S. airplane, which it turns out has not been completed, cost 6 billion

dollars. These figures will affect the volume of foreign aid to these underdeveloped countries, whether that aid comes from the east or from the west. On that basis we are hoping that the two superpowers will reach some kind of agreement, even though such an agreement may take place at the expense of small countries. Something like that happened in 1971 in the course of the detente that was reached by the two superpowers. At that time a military relaxation policy was imposed on the Middle East region. We are hoping that the objective of detente will be to bring more prosperity throughout the world for the purpose of stabilizing the world. We are hoping for this particularly since there is a considerable amount of overlapping in current economic interests between the East, the West and the countries of the developing world. This overlapping of interests may be found in the fiscal system, in the exchange of commodities, in protective customs measures, in the transfer of technology or in agricultural or industrial development in all countries.

[Question] Don't you expect an escalation of confrontations in the eighties?

[Answer] I believe that the current stage does not indicate that there will be confrontation. The confrontation between the two countries may have been severe when the first change occurred in the United States when the Reagan administration took office, and again when the Andropov administration took office in the Soviet Union. But I believe that after the recent negotiations between the East and the West and after other negotiations which are underway on the economy or on other areas, matters will calm down by the end of 1983 or early next year.

The Soviets and Their Position on the Restoration of Relations

[Question] You spoke about Egypt's position on the restoration of relations with the Soviets, but we did not hear [anything from you] about the Soviet position regarding the same matter. We also did not hear [from you] about the problems and obstacles that exist in this relationship.

[Answer] There aren't many problems between us and the Soviet Union that we may cite as indicators [of the Soviet position] or that we may cite for anything else. But as I said all our actions are governed by principles. For example, our posture on the problem of Afghanistan has not changed even though the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, for example, came out with a text [resolution] that did not favor either side. We are saying, however, that Soviet troops must get out of Afghanistan. What I want to say is that moderation does not mean a change in policy or a change in the principles upon which our policy is based. As far as the Middle East crisis is concerned, we still think that the Reagan initiative ought to be given all possible chances, not as the ultimate solution to the Palestinian problem, but rather as a practical step that can lead to [another] Fes conference and more [meetings and talks] after that. This is the idea. But the political indicators that I can say have been carried out as far as we are concerned are expressed in the wish we made for restoring relations with Moscow. This is the most significant political indicator we can give. Then we brought back Soviet experts in industry to Egypt. We brought them back to the factories that we had purchased from the Soviet Union. Then we opened the doors for more trade with the Soviet Union and also for economic cooperation. Relations between us and the other socialist countries have also improved. All these are political indicators. As I said at the outset we can never separate politics from the economy.

The Pros and Cons of Trade with the Soviets

[Question] Our trade with the Soviet Union used to serve the interests of developing the national economy. Loans were made to specific factories and to a specific industry. Even exports to the Soviet Union created a market for the goods that are produced by craftsmen, by cottage industries and by small manufacturers. But now the picture regarding relations with the Soviet Union is a very strange one. Egypt is now importing automobiles from the Soviet Union.

[Answer] In relation to the needs of the Egyptian market the number of cars we import from the Soviet Union is not as large as you think. This is particularly true when we learn, for example, that close to 50,000 automobiles were imported into Egypt last year. Of these cars 5,000 came from the Soviet Union. This does not at all rule out the fact that the Soviet Union would enter the Egyptian market if it had advanced technology.

I don't want to go on and on here about the factories that we already imported because we want to transfer advanced technology into Egypt. For example, when we build the High Dam whose power production capacity is 210,000 MW, we must not build an aluminum plant that would consume three eighths of the power generated by the High Dam. This is because we are a country that consumes electricity and we need to increase the power we generate at terrific rates, and such a plant quite simply would use up three eighths of the electricity generated by the High Dam. It would be as though we had built the High Dam to provide electricity to the Kima plants and the aluminum plant only. And here we would raise another question.

[Question] Where is the plan that Egypt has for these matters?

[Answer] This is exactly what I want to refer to. We are going through a stage where everything is being set on the right course. When we plan, we must not only make plans for 1 or 2 years, but we must also make plans till the year 2500 and not only till the year 2000.

I am reminded here of a lecture that the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir had given in 1957 at the Military Technical College. If my memory serves me well, Dr Ibrahim Hilmi 'Abd-al-Rahman was then the minister of planning, and he was on his way back from his previous position in the United Nations. At that lecture President 'Abd-al-Nasir gathered the officers of the armed forces in the auditorium of the Technical College--and I was one of those officers--and he spoke about development in Egyptian society and the dangers surrounding that development. He also spoke about the population increase which would swallow up all our savings and all our production. On the basis of that example then I can say that the problem is an old one.

What Did Libya Do in New Delhi?

[Question] After President Mubarak left the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, you headed the Egyptian delegation to the conference. It was during that period that the question of Libya came up, and Libya brought up the matter of suspending Egypt's membership in the organization. Our response was a counter proposal to suspend Libya's membership from the organization. We really did not want Egypt to present such a plan because we always want Egypt to be above any other party. But

it seems that we don't know what happened behind the scenes. What things happened there that we do not know about?

[Answer] To shed light on this point let me say that we do not dispute the fact that Egypt would never place itself on the same footing with Libya. The Egyptian people are not like the Libyans, and Egyptian leaders are not like Libya's leaders. This is agreed upon. On the other hand Libya tried to play a totally destructive role in everything it did at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. One of the destructive aspects of that role arose from the displeasure members of the Libyan delegation felt when they saw the Arabs responding to the Egyptian delegation and when they saw President Mubarak meet with some kings and presidents of Arab and Islamic countries. And the Libyan delegation worked only for disunity. Then, Libya's representative to the conference requested that Egypt's membership in the organization be suspended at the same time that Libya was sending an envoy to President Mubarak asking him to open the borders between Egypt and Libya, make preparations for a reconciliation with Sudan and make efforts to improve relations between the United States and Libya. Naturally, this contradiction in methods is very bad and very bitter [for us].

Actually, we had two objectives in bringing up the request to suspend Libya's membership from the organization. First, if Libya were to continue in this position, we had to take a stance at the conference of Non-Aligned Countries that would put Libya in its place. That was the objective. Our objective was not to retaliate in the same manner.

However, we did not have to pursue this course of action because Libya withdrew its request and did not insist [on a discussion of that request]. The tri-partite committee turned down Libya's request because there was no consensus behind it. Accordingly, it was pointless. Therefore, this turned out to be nothing more than a process that indicated Egypt's power and its standing at the conference. There was another possibility: Libya's representative was to ask for the floor during the last meeting. If he had mentioned one more time the suspension of Egypt's membership, I would have told him things he would not have liked to hear at all. We would have done that to show Libya's destructive role everywhere.

[Question] But it's been said that the Libyan representative withdrew his proposal so he can present it at another place and at another time.

[Answer] We knew about that. But it was also extremely evident that "You could fool some of the people some of the time, but you could not fool all the people all the time," according to the British proverb. This was actually evident at the conference as far as Libya was concerned.

What Cuba Did at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries

[Question] We had always thought that the true role of non-aligned countries was to act as a bridge for dialogue and serve as a communications tool between the two superpowers. During Cuba's term as president of the group of non-aligned countries, we used to complain about the fact that Cuba tried to turn the group of non-aligned countries into a tool that would be used in the confrontation between the two superpowers or a tool that one superpower would control and use against the other. Do you think that the final outcome of the conference was able to shift the conference's position to a true position of non-alignment?

[Answer] This may be a personal evaluation, but in my opinion the Havana Conference for Non-Aligned Countries turned out to be a platform for the left. In New Delhi that platform was shifted from the ultra-left to the left-center. This is the expression I used in analyzing the situation.

[Question] What are the factors that led to that shift?

[Answer] When we look at general problems such as armaments and peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age, there is no doubt that all of them are universal demands and that everyone must agree on them. When we shift to regional problems, whether these are in Africa, in Central America, the problem of Cyprus, the problem of Kampuchea, or the problem of North and South Korea, we find that the formulations which India had chosen before the conference in preparation for that conference were balanced ones that leaned neither to the East nor to the West. Instead, these formulations were perceptive of both the eastern and western positions. However, we do find that the United States was often criticized in some positions. That criticism was either rightful or exaggerated. Whether these positions had to do with the policy of the Soviet Union or that of the United States, each country has the right to express its reservations on any resolution as long as there is a consensus about that and as long as that country does not approve of these resolutions. Every country is entitled to express its reservations on any resolution within 1 month, just as is the case in the United Nations. I believe that this is what we will do on some points.

Egypt's Reservations on the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries

[Question] What specifically are those points about which we will express our reservations?

[Answer] I can give you an example here about one thing about which we will have reservations: the subject of Afghanistan. There is no dispute about the fact that Soviet troops did go into the country at the request of the government of Afghanistan. But the question here is this: does this government represent the Afghan people or not? When we say that out of 11 million Afghans--the population of Afghanistan--3 million have become refugees, how then can we stand by the request of the Afghani government and how can we be certain that this government actually represents the people of Afghanistan, one third of whom have left the country? Therefore, when we come to the text that was approved by the conference which states, "the departure of foreign troops and giving the people of Afghanistan an opportunity to..." we have to have reservations because the resolution should have referred quite clearly to "the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan."

This is an example of [one of] the points about which we will express our reservations.

[Question] Are there any other points that Egypt will have reservations about?

[Answer] There is no question about that, but these are still being carefully studied.

Non-Alignment and Debts to the East and to the West

[Question] How can you talk about non-alignment when the countries that met in India have a 560 billion dollar debt to the world? They owe 470 billion dollars to the West and 90 billion dollars to the East. How is that?

[Answer] What I want to say is that it is the objectives of the Non-Alignment [Movement] that matter. There is no doubt that these objectives are based on international ethics. But can I separate the non-aligned countries from the superpowers? I say this is not possible: it is not possible politically, and it is not possible economically. There is no doubt that economic aspects [of relations between non-aligned countries and the superpowers] are inseparable from the political aspects [of these relations]. Therefore, when the non-aligned [conference] proposes a dialogue between the North and the South, I have to take into account what the North says, and I cannot ignore the role of the East or the role of the West. It is here then that the responsibility of the East and the West rests: it rests on their economic relations with developing countries and with countries that have a similar currency crisis, a crisis of interests, protective customs measures, debts or service charges on those debts. Regarding all this, Egypt as a non-aligned country cannot unilaterally call for a reduction of the debts. We must have a dialogue. What is being proposed then is cooperation between developing countries, cooperation between the countries of the South, and wise sensible dialogue between countries of the South and countries of the North.

[If we take] India's experience, for example, we would find that India was able to become self-sufficient in grains in 10 years even though its population grew to 300 million in almost 15 years. How was India able to do that? That is the question. Thus, despite India's problems there was successful development, and the Indians became self-sufficient in wheat. Is this experience something that might be useful to us? Yes it is. By analogy India's experience can be useful to countries of the South where some developing countries have undoubtedly had some success in some projects and in some technical areas. But I cannot say, for example, that a country like Cuba can give a country like Nicaragua a 500 million dollar loan payable in 3 years or in 20 years at an interest rate of 3 percent. Here we must find out the kind of cooperation [that can be developed] between countries of the south. We must find out the techniques and the areas of such cooperation. We must find out what would be the drawbacks and the benefits of such cooperation for countries of the South.

Mubarak and the Meeting of Arab Presidents

[Question] Everyone expected the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries to provide an opportunity for President Mubarak to meet with a number of Arab presidents. Was there a plan for such a rapprochement?

[Answer] What I want to say and to affirm once again is that we do not have a plan for restoring relations with Arab countries. Relations with Arab countries depend on the wishes of those countries to restore relations with Egypt. In this regard we are taking steps: we are talking; we are deliberating; and we are receiving messengers from the Arab countries. However, diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level have not been restored yet, and this matter is up to the Arab countries.

The League of Nations and the League of Governments

[Question] Some people thought that the decision to disband the League of Nations was made to make preparations for the decision to return the Arab League [to Cairo]. Is there a relationship between the two decisions?

[Answer] There is absolutely no relationship between the two. The League of Nations was concentrating on the Afghan question. Through the League of Arab and Islamic Nations an office for Afghanistan was set up. This office will continue to function; it was not abolished when the League of Islamic Nations was disbanded. The office will continue to receive contributions for the refugees, and it will channel those contributions to the refugees who are in severe financial and economic straits in the host countries, despite the efforts these host countries are making to meet their living needs.

Who Benefits from the Disunity between Egypt and the Arabs?

[Question] Who has an interest in Egypt not returning to the Arab World?

[Answer] The question is very relevant, and it exists in our subconscious.

[Question] Ever since the Middle East crisis began, the United States has been trying to cooperate with the Arab countries in some way. It's been trying to set up cooperation between Egypt, Israel and itself; between Lebanon, Israel and itself; and if possible between the Palestinians, Israel and itself. Regardless of this matter, can we say that the United States is still holding on to this policy? How useful is this policy and what are the reasons for it?

[Answer] I know something about Egypt's relations with the United States, and I cannot attach those relations to relations with a third party like Israel, for example, except to say that the United States is signatory to the Camp David Agreement. Looked at from that perspective, there may be another connection: that the United States wants Israel to be a military power superior to all the Arab countries together. This has been the United States' original policy from the outset. Other than that I cannot say that there is a third party in our relations with the United States. At the present time relations between the United States and other countries are inclined to be bilateral.

[Question] Do you believe that the Reagan initiative still has a chance?

[Answer] I believe it still has a chance. At the present time this depends on several factors. The first factor is the ability of the United States to bring about agreement between Israel and Lebanon about the departure of Israeli and all other foreign troops from Lebanon. On the other hand a chance for the Reagan initiative depends on King Husayn's ability to act in concert with the Palestinians for the purpose of finding a solution or sitting at the negotiating table. Of course much depends on what will happen in the next 2 weeks. I believe that these 2 weeks are important to the destiny of the region.

[Question] With regard to the first part [of the Reagan initiative] we feel that the United States wants to separate the Lebanese problem from the Middle East problem. In fact, the United States thinks there is absolutely no need for

delaying negotiations on a settlement until Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon is announced.

[Answer] There are two schools of thought about this matter. One states that a solution to the Palestinian problem or to the Middle East problem may not be delayed and linked to the Lebanese problem. But we think, and this is what matters to us, that Israel must first withdraw from Lebanon. There would be no point in solving the Palestinian problem only to have another problem, the Lebanese problem, emerge. Anyone who can solve the Palestinian problem will also be able to solve the Lebanese problem.

[Question] It is Egypt's political point of view that Israel is stepping up its demands in Lebanon. What is the secret behind this sudden stepping up of demands?

[Answer] Whenever relations become tense between Israel and the United States, Israel tries to get something out of the American administration. I believe that the purpose of Shamir's visit to the United States was to explain Israel's point of view and to put a price tag on a solution to the Lebanese problem. It is our interpretation that after Shamir went to the United States, he went back to Israel's cabinet with a new plan which includes, as reported by news agencies, increasing the U.S. military presence in south Lebanon until the Lebanese army is strengthened and becomes capable of controlling south Lebanon and ensuring Israel's safety from the north.

[Question] Do you believe Reagan will be in a position to persuade Congress to increase U.S. presence in south Lebanon?

[Answer] I believe the security of Israel will always be of concern to the United States and Congress will approve that without any problems.

[Question] It is known that there is conflict between the United States and Israel about the idea of setting up early warning stations on Mount al-Baruk in Lebanon. How dangerous is the establishment of such stations to security in the region as a whole, particularly since NATO had hoped to set up similar stations 20 years ago?

[Answer] There is an American view that giving Mount al-Baruk away or including it in a security zone that will be agreed upon in south Lebanon will enable Syria to include the Mount of the Manger in its security zone. And here we would start a competitive process, and the withdrawal would be delayed. Therefore, neither idea is acceptable to the American view.

[Question] Ever since the visit to Jerusalem the Palestinian Resistance has been rejecting that visit and its outcome. Can you give us some insights into Egypt's displeasure with the recent statement issued by the National Council meeting in Algeria?

[Answer] The Resistance interfered in our internal affairs when it said, "We are supporting and backing up all national forces that reject Camp David." We are a country of institutions that are constitutional, and we have parties. At one stage all the parties without exception approved of Camp David. Only one party did not. That party rejected the treaty between Egypt and Israel. When the Resistance says it is making an appeal to all national forces, what it means is that

it is relying only on that party that rejected the treaty. The Resistance was actually disregarding all national forces in Egypt. Furthermore, no one can ever do more than we have done. No one can ever give the Palestinian cause more than we have given it. We have also done more for the Palestinian cause peacefully than anyone ever has. Our position on the siege of Lebanon must not be met with ingratitude. We do not ask anyone for an expression of gratitude, but we also do not want anyone to interfere in our internal affairs. This is why we were angry. The Palestinians' opinion of Camp David is known, and they are free to hold that opinion. If we are obliged to disagree with the organization or with some Arab countries on Camp David, our difference of opinion should not spoil our dedication to the cause. We were not angry with them because their opinion of Camp David was different from ours. We were angry because we saw that what happened in the National Council was intervention in the affairs of Egypt.

[Question] Can you tell us how deep is this anger and how far it will go?

[Answer] Three cubic meters! No, [I'm only kidding]. What I am saying is that if dialogue with the organization will benefit the Palestinian cause, we will not decline to reopen this dialogue. We will definitely do anything that would benefit the Palestinian cause, a cause that we adopted in war and in peace; we will do anything that will produce positive results. And that includes the possibility of starting the dialogue again with the organization.

[Question] Is there a wish in Egypt to stay out of the problem?

[Answer] We had stayed out of the problem, and the reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was clear, decisive, unequivocal and specific at the outset. But I believe it was the demagoguery of Palestinian leaders around Yasir 'Arafat, which was reported in Arab newspapers, that infuriated Egypt.

[Question] But what happened is that Yasir 'Arafat insisted on meeting Mubarak in India!

[Answer] Naturally it was not possible for a meeting to take place in that climate. The positions should have been defined first.

[Question] What is the story behind the request for the meeting?

[Answer] Contacts and attempts were made through some Arab leaders for 'Arafat to meet with President Mubarak.

[Question] The Egyptian man in the street is wondering to what extent can the United States influence Israel? Can the United States influence Israel or not?

[Answer] I still believe that the United States is capable of taking action, and I believe it can tell Israel what it wants when U.S. interests conflict with Israel's interests.

[Question] Why hasn't the United States done that yet?

[Answer] Who says it hasn't? Aren't there signs that this is in fact going on?

[Question] But Israel's response has been weak, and Israel has been dragging its feet about withdrawing from Lebanon.

[Answer] This is quite true. We don't find the present government in Israel to be responsive at all.

[Question] Can you give us a few examples?

[Answer] I don't believe at all that it is in the interests of the United States to have Beirut be under siege and to have that city bombarded from the air for 1 month and a half. I don't believe that the massacre at Sabra and Shatila was in the interests of the United States. The best indication of that can be found in what happened at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries where the United States was condemned in a resolution regarding Palestine that was submitted by Arab countries and issued by the conference.

[Question] Where then are the sources of power from which Israel derives its refusal to comply?

[Answer] We must never forget the magnitude of the Zionist and the Jewish lobby in the United States and the influence that lobby has on U.S. policy.

[Question] Egypt has a stance on the SAM-5 missiles in Syria. It warned against them more than once.

[Answer] We said that these missiles should not have an effect on the balance of power and should not become an excuse for a new war. This is our position. We believe that Israel can use the U.S. campaign against the SAM-5 missiles to create a new disturbance in the region by setting off another war.

Why Are the Normalization Talks Being Held Now?

[Question] Egypt had a position on Israel's aggression against Lebanon. Relations with Israel would be frozen for as long as Israel's occupation of Lebanon continued. Although Israel has not yet shown any signs of withdrawing from Lebanon, the normalization talks between Egypt and Israel have been resumed, even though Israel's position has not changed. There is also a tendency to name a new ambassador. Why is Egypt's position being changed?

[Answer] Egypt's official position is that we would not freeze the treaty because it is an Egyptian commitment. What happened is that the mainstream of public opinion in Egypt was displeased with what happened in Lebanon. Egyptians are the ones who froze commercial relations. Israel also froze the Taba talks. When an agreement was finally reached to resume the Taba talks, we found no objections to having an Israeli trade delegation attend the talks to look into the problems that have to do with changes and so on. The delegation attended, and it is still attending, but the matter ultimately depends on Israeli practices and their effects on Egyptian public opinion.

[Question] Do we actually expect the Egyptian ambassador to return to Israel before Israel withdraws from Lebanon?

[Answer] We made a commitment. We said that we recalled the Egyptian ambassador

for talks when the siege of Beirut took place, when Beirut was being shelled mercilessly and then when [the massacres at] Sabra and Shatila occurred. We agreed we would send the Egyptian ambassador back to Tel Aviv when there is an agreed upon schedule for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. This commitment still stands, and the Egyptian ambassador will not return before this withdrawal schedule is announced.

[Question] Israel took part in the Industrial and Commercial Exposition, but it did not take part in the Book Fair. What is the reason for the difference in its position?

[Answer] It is official Egypt and also Egyptian publishers that decided that Israel was not to participate in the Book Fair.

[Question] Alternatives are set for every strategic political action. Has a general view of alternative steps of action been actually formulated if it is established that the present course will not achieve the results that are being hoped for?

[Answer] As far as Egypt is concerned, we have many alternatives. The first one--and this is part of Egypt's long-term political plan--is the Egyptian-French plan which is still in the Security Council. This plan was accepted by the PLO and by all the countries of the world except Israel. This subject will come up as soon as it's needed. The other thing is that other than the Security Council, we are prepared to participate in any international conference.

[Question] In the talks that are taking place now at Mena House are the Israelis trying to link between progress in the Taba talks and progress in the trade talks? Israeli negotiators use a Shylock-like approach to get something for nothing.

[Answer] These have always been the tactics of Israeli negotiators, but we have now understood these tactics and we've had experience with them.

[Question] What about the question of Dayr al-Sultan?

[Answer] The Israeli government still has a freeze on the question of Dayr al-Sultan despite the decision of the Supreme Court. The Israeli government tried to set up an arbitration committee after the Supreme Court decision, but we rejected that committee because the arbitration committee can negotiate between the two parties, and this is something we reject. It is for this reason that this matter is frozen. Why is the Israeli government insisting on this? It is because there are 20,000 Ethiopian [al-Falasha] Jews who are living in Ethiopia under difficult conditions. The Israelis do not want to create more problems for them. It is for this reason that the Israelis are holding on to the current situation.

[Question] We admit that the fast pace of this interview and the news and important analyses that flowed from it in abundance make it one of the distinguished weekly interviews of AL-MUSAWWAR. We thank the deputy prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs for this interview.

[Answer] I am the one who is grateful to AL-MUSAWWAR for this important opportunity to talk about our country and about its foreign policy.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF LATEST PERSONAL STATUS LAW REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 21 Mar 83 p 3

/Article: "The New Personal Status Law, 4 Years after It Went into Force: The Courts Are Transferring Disputes between Couples to the Constitutional Court"/

/Text/ Four years ago the new personal status law, Law 44 for 1979 at that time, was issued. Although the "suspect" law was issued during the People's Assembly recess, by a decree of a law by the former president, the courts started to enforce the so-called law, in spite of the storm of wrath that filled the spirits of all groups and classes of people over the stipulations and provisions of the new legislation, and in spite of the opposition from the learned men of the Islamic religion (those who were not government men) and the men of the judiciary and the law to the legislative act, which had been pieced together out of the feeblest Islamic creeds. A few months later, a new tendency in the courts started to indicate that there was a serious opinion among members of the judiciary, when the courts transferred some personal status cases governed by the new law to the higher constitutional court so that it could rule on the constitutionality of this law!

Throughout the long period that has past, AL-AHRAR has been waiting for the results that the practical application of the new law in the courts would bring, and the members of the judiciary were silent, awaiting the practical results from the move of the law from its "rejected" theoretical status to the areas of the courts. Now, since the picture has started to become clear and the members of the judiciary, the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and the men of the law have come to have clearly defined opinions through which it is possible to criticise this law, which still meets with a loathing rare among the other laws on the part of the members of the Egyptian people, it has become clearly evident that the collapse and the corruption of human relations within the Egyptian family may be totally attributed to this legislation, which gives "custody" to women and not to men. Married women have started to wave the provisions of the new law in the faces of their husbands as a threat and a menace, and a grievous phenomenon has spread throughout our society with which it was not familiar in the past: the phenomenon of common law marriage.

Today AL-AHRAR is starting its "campaign" to discuss this law, concentrating on the most dangerous feature in the provisions of this law, which is the wife's right to sole possession of the marital residence, when she is divorced, and expulsion of the husband from it, until his children go beyond the child-rearing age, when he can reclaim his apartment and expel the wife from it! There also is the matter of the pluralism of wives, which Islam permits in a frank Koranic stipulation and in the verbal and actual sayings and doings of the prophet as well. The new law has proceeded to restrict this pluralism, also frankly! Third are the stipulations on "the payment of alimony," which has been put in effect in Egypt for the first time! The issue of "child-rearing age" exposes the evil and the bad quality of these stipulations, which threaten young children and children of nursing age, rather than looking after their interests and treating them fairly.

AL-AHRAR is beginning its series today over a serious issue in the provisions of this law, which has been preoccupying public opinion since the law was issued, the issue of the wife's sole possession of the marital residence, and expulsion of the husband from it!

What have the men who are assigned to enforce this law said?

A Hybrid Law

Counsellor Mursi al-Shaykh, chairman of the court of Dumyat, says, "This law came into being as a hybrid. It was issued by republican decree just 2 days before the People's Assembly was convened, and there was no pressing need for the president to use the right the constitution conferred on him regarding cases of maximum need, such as general mobilization in time of war, for example. There was no pressing need or imminent threat calling for the issuance of a law in this form. One of the most serious stipulations in this decree on a law is the sole possession by the child-rearing mother of the 'rented' marital home, unless the person divorcing her provides her with another suitable residence.

"The case was raised before the courts on what would happen if the marital home was 'owned by the husband.' According to the stipulation, the wife would not have the right to sole possession of this dwelling, even though that is contrary to the wisdom behind the stipulation that the child-rearing wife should remain in the marital dwelling. In this manner, the draft missed a chance to solve a temporary problem by considering that the wife should be in sole possession of this dwelling in her capacity as a child-rearing woman. When this child-rearing stage ends, the wife loses her rights to stay in the marital dwelling! Here, a new problem arises: where will this wife go if she was divorced 10 to 15 years before, during the child rearing stage, especially if she has become advanced in age and has reached the age of despair, or gone beyond it, and lost the apartment as well? Where will this lady go? The persons drawing up the law did not deal with this, and on top of that the housing crisis has been growing more aggravated with each day!"

The Expelled Wife

Counsellor Mursi al-Shaykh, chairman of the court of Dumyat, continued, "Moreover, the persons drawing up the law did not deal with the problem of the husband who has only this apartment, which usually costs him everything he has, as well! Moreover, the persons drawing up the law violated the general rules of law. Civil law gives tenants the right to benefit from an asset that has been rented; now comes the decree on the personal status law, which is unquestionably lower in degree than a law, and this deprives this tenant of his right to benefit from the apartment that has been leased out to him, and hands it over to the wife who has been divorced. That is matter. How can the principal in a rental agreement be expelled and prevented from exercising his right, while the secondary person can take his place, even if he has not exploited this right (the use of the apartment)? This shows that the provision was couched in broad form, without reservations, and much talk and individual theorizing has been raised around that."

Counsellor Mursi al-Shaykh, chairman of the court of Dumyat, added, "The appeals some feminist bodies have made have had a perceptible effect, with the emergence of this law, on the basis of some women's desire to be liberated and become independent of their marriage. This law eventually provoked women and wives to rebel against their husbands. In fact, the law has become a direct means for threatening husbands, because, if a man divorces his wife, his fate will certainly be banishment! Even after the husband is expelled from his apartment so that it may be in the sole possession of his child-rearing divorced wife, some divorced women resort to common law or secret marriage so that they may retain the apartment of the 'failed' marriage. This creates a sort of rancor between the father and his children who are being raised by their mother. This law is also in violation of the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence. The Hanafi scholars of Islamic jurisprudence spoke of compelling the father to rent out a residence for child-rearing, in which the children would be raised, but there was nothing to state that the man should be evacuated from his residence so that his divorced wife should reside in it, along with those she was raising, even if she had another dwelling of her own. This is in violation of the views the scholars of religious jurisprudence have come up with."

Counsellor Mursi al-Shaykh rounded out his conversation with another of the most important problems that are constantly being raised in practice before the courts, as an inevitable consequence of this law, with its strange stipulations. He wondered, "What would be the solution if the wife lives with her husband in the apartment of his parents, or one of his parents, and then he divorced his wife? Would the man and his family also be expelled from their own dwelling? This problem is actually being raised before the judiciary, and this decree on the law has not dealt with it!"

"Another problem is, if the wife has children of child rearing age, and others who have gone beyond that age, where will the son who has gone beyond child rearing age go, if problems arise between himself and his mother and she expels him? This usually happens in practice. The son, for example, objects

to his divorced mother's frequent telephone conversations or objects to some of the people who visit her in the residence; a quarrel of some kind breaks out with his mother, or she marries another person 'by common law' and her husband mistreats her son who is beyond the child-rearing age. In all these cases, for example, what happens if the mother expels her son, who has exceeded the child-rearing age? Will he go to his father and live with him? The father himself has no dwelling, since his divorced wife has taken it away from him! What does this decree on a law offer to remedy this sort of situation? The courts demand that the stipulations be put in effect, but there are also individual ideas!"

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hamid Ghirab, a court chairman, adds, "We can assert, with complete respect to Islam, that this amendment, the decree on the new personal status law, which has amended the provisions of Law 25 for 1920--we can determine that the amendment is constitutionally void just from the standpoint of the law, because the constitution delegated the president at that time to issue decrees that have the force of law 'in cases of maximum urgency,' when the People's Assembly was in recess. But there was no state of urgency whatsoever that would permit or allow him that, by any stretch of the imagination."

The court chairman Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hamid Ghirab went on, "The People's Assembly was not in recess at that time, because the aforementioned republican decree was issued when the assembly was present, just 2 days before it was to convene, and no more. God and history are the witness that this amendment has openly invalidated the stipulation of God's book, and has opposed the authority of God's verses, even though there is no room for opinions, in spite of the divine stipulation which states, 'a second time, a third time, and a fourth time.' The people who set out this amendment, whoever they were, considered that what was a presumption against God, common law, was essentially to supersede Islamic law, and common law has become subject to a nonending storm of trials and tribulations. This amendment has put all Moslems in a position of confusion and embarrassment. The wife's right to the marital residence has totally destroyed the husband's rights and subjected him to difficult problems that he has no power over through the judiciary and sometimes the office of the public prosecutor. It has been proved, in the light of experience, after the application of the new law, that some wives have abused the rights granted to them in ways in which the devil must have intervened, by ways that are rare and strange of their kind. The reader can understand the sense of what I am trying to say!"

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hamid Ghirab, the court chairman, went on to say, "A court totally rejected the notion that a wife whose husband married another woman without her consent should be divorced. This court asserted that this 'amendment' was offensive to and in violation of God's law and the secular constitution, and concluded by demanding that the entire case be handed over to the higher constitutional court, criticizing the amendment and demanding that it be ruled unconstitutional."

A violation of Islamic Law and Justice

Counsellor Ahmad Kamil Salamah says, "Although Islamic law gives the husband the right to divorce his wife by his own will and sets forth precise

conditions when the wife requests a divorce, most important of which is that material or moral harm should have befallen her from the husband, we nonetheless observe that the new personal status law has brought forth an unfortunate new matter which is in violation of the provisions of Islamic law and the logic of justice, since we have, for example, noticed in it, in the section on arbitration, a stipulation that gives the wife the right to divorce even if the abuse is her doing! If this stipulation is compared with the article that gives a child-rearing divorced woman the right solely to possess the marital apartment, we will find a strange, odd discrepancy. How so? Article 10, which was created for the first time in Law 44 for 1979 on personal status, requires that in the event the two people seeking arbitration fail to make peace, the results will be reviewed. It then stipulates that if all the abuse is the doing of the husband, the court will rule that there be a final divorce, without prejudice to the rights of the wife, that if the entire abuse is the doing of the wife, the court will rule that there be a final divorce in exchange for an allowance which will be paid by the wife, and if there is mutual abuse between the two spouses, the court will rule that there be an allowance or that there not be one. If the person causing the abuse is not known, it will rule that there be no allowance (compensation). From this stipulation, one is to infer that it compels the judge to divorce the wife in every case, whether or not the abuse is her doing, that is, that the divorce in all cases is the wife's right by the finding of the judge, and, if one result of the divorce is that the child-rearing wife has the right to the sole possession of the marital residence, that means that she can demand a divorce and sole possession of the house without her husband at any time she wants and for any reason whatever! This, in our view, is to be considered inverted logic; no human mind can accept it, and no conscience can approve it. It also contradicts the spirit of Islamic legislation. It has become an easy matter for a wife to be granted a divorce in all cases, even if it is apparent to the court that the abuse of the marital relationship was the doing of the wife. All the wife needs to do is to ask for a divorce and she will get it. Then, according to the provisions of the personal status law on it, she will have the right to be awarded the marital residence."

Counsellor Ahmad Kamil Salamah asks, with the utmost bitterness:

"Does the stipulation that gives the right to sole occupancy of the marital residence when she is divorced provide her the requisite protection? Of course not. Indeed, it harms the wife when it explicitly decrees that the divorced wife is to be deprived of that residence if she marries someone else. If this stipulation deprives the wife of a natural right which God has given her, which is the right to live with a man with whom she has become intimate and fond, that matter will subject her to the dilemma of whether to exercise that right or be deprived of housing at a time when it is difficult for people to find housing! That will prompt her to do one of two things: either to enter into a common law marriage, a type of marriage that the law does not acknowledge and the judiciary does not approve, and one that does not give her the right to demand marital rights, or to fall into the abyss of waywardness!"

What Is Needed Now

What is the solution, in the eyes of the men of the judiciary who have faced the law, in practical terms, in the arenas of the courts and have observed wonders of wonders in the results of the enforcement of this law? Is there an alternative? What are they demanding now that 4 years, which have passed like an eternity for most Egyptian families and households, have elapsed since the law went into force?

What is the optimum solution, to the men of the judiciary?

Counsellor Ahmad Kamil Salamah says, "I demand that this legislation, which was set forth to cope with special cases, and whose proponents managed to influence its passage one way or another, be abrogated rapidly. It is well known that legislation is set forth for all the people, in order to remedy matters that are outstanding, in expression of the conscience and needs of the people."

Counsellor Mursi al-Shaykh, chairman of the court of Dymyat, says, "The legislators are requested to amend this law by setting forth comprehensive, flexible stipulations for all divorce cases. As regards marital dwellings, a remedy must be set out for husbands who have been ordered to leave their dwelling and for sons who have gone beyond the child-rearing age. It is necessary to deal with the husband's control over what happens in the marital apartment that his divorced wife has sole possession of and in which his children are living. He has the right to have the right to keep anyone out he does not want to have in the presence of his children, including girls, and whose presence in the dwelling of the divorced wife he considers will bring harm or abuse on his children. The optimum solution is for us to return to the requirements of Islamic law regarding all personal status matters."

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CSO: 4504/277

RULING PARTY ORGANIZES SUMMER JOBS FOR STUDENTS

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 19 Mar 83 p 2

[Text] The National Democratic Party's Secretariat in Cairo has worked out a plan to provide more than 5,000 jobs for university students during summer said Mr Mahmoud Fahmi Abdul Baqi, Assistant Secretary of the NDP in Cairo.

The Secretariat said Mr Abdul Baki, has already contacted companies of the public and private sectors, which agreed to provide jobs for the university students in Cairo.

The students who will work at companies of the private sector will receive wages ranging between LE 30 to 50 monthly while companies of the public sector will determine the students' wages according to the number of work hours, added Mr Abdul Baki,

Applications are now available at a special office opened by the Secretariat at Kasr el-Eini Street, said Mr Abdul Baki adding that students will fill the applications and submit them to the same office which will select the best job for every student.

The Youth Committee of the Secretariat will hold a meeting today under the chairmanship of Mr Mohamed Radwan, Secretary General of the NDP in Cairo, to discuss a number of topics relevant to the project, said Mr Abdul Baki.

The committee will also discuss the participation of university students in a campaign to clean Cairo during the months of the summer, said Mr Abdul Baki who added that male and female university students are invited to take part in this campaign which also aims to plant a large number of trees in the capital--MSS.

CSO: 4500/158

DEPRIVED AREAS IN CAIRO TO GET UTILITIES

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 19 Mar 83 p 3

[Text] Cairo new governor Mr Yussef Abu Taleb yesterday stressed the need to finish implementation of services projects in the Capital according to set schedules. He also said that coordination and cooperation between executive bodies are highly imperative so as to put an end to the Capital's problems.

Mr Abu Taleb was presiding over a meeting of the governorate's executive council, the first since he assumed office last Tuesday.

During the meeting, Mr Abu Taleb said he would pay special attention to providing all utilities to deprived areas of the capital. This includes the Governor added water supply, sanitary drainage and electricity.

For these utilities, some LE 1,024,000 have been earmarked for electricity, LE 63,000,000 for sanitary drainage at Dar Essalam Southern Giza, Ain Shams and other places in the Cairo Suburbs and LE 41 million for water supply for urban expansion at Nasr City Al Ahram plateau and also for setting up a new water station in Fustat, Mr Abu Taleb said.

In the meantime the Health Ministry's undersecretary, Dr Osman el Zameiti said that LE 1.4 million had been allocated for setting up 6 health units at the Seventh District of Nasr City Bab el Sharia Maadi, Bassatin and Mataria.

The projected health units, Dr Zameiti added, would be fully equipped to accommodate some 100 beds in the internal divisions in addition to outside treatment clinics which will be entitled to receive all cases.

The governorate plan, Mr Zameiti said, includes the setting up of two clinics at Nasr City in addition to promoting outpatient clinics, laboratories, X-ray and intensive care divisions in 11 hospitals in Cairo.

Cairo is presently undergoing noticeable change in terms of its main utilities specially with regard to the traffic problem for which certain drastic measures are presently applied to bring about discipline and control over such a problem.
--MSS

CSO: 4500/158

EGYPTAIR MAKES PROFIT FOR 1982

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 20 Mar 83 p 2

[Text] Despite the challenges faced by EgyptAir in recent years, the national airline was able to make LE 9 million in profits last year the Chairman of EgyptAir, Mr Mohamed Fahmi Rayyan said.

It was the first time in the corporation's history that profits had been made by the transport sector, Mr Rayyan said, adding that EgyptAir was planning these days to purchase a number of airbuses and new Boeing 767 aircraft.

From mid-May, Mr Rayyan said, EgyptAir will hire a 747 Jumbo plane to operate on the Far East and Japan route, the measure is being taken so that EgyptAir will not lose its passengers while negotiations are continuing for the purchase of the airbuses and Boeing aircraft.

Negotiations are currently being conducted for the reopening of EgyptAir routes to Algiers and Beirut. The airline has already begun flights to Baghdad, the EgyptAir Chairman said.

Speaking of the challenges overcome by EgyptAir, Mr Rayyan said they were three: the first pertaining to the transport fleet EgyptAir had to purchase new aircraft; hence the deal according to which eight airbuses have been recently purchased.

Our second challenge, Mr Rayyan added, was the substitution of planes which have been transporting some 3,600 million tons annually. However, despite the fact that EgyptAir had received 7 planes as gifts, the number of aircraft actually added to the national fleet was only four Boeings which the Corporation is still paying for on the installment plan, Mr Rayyan said.

"It was not just the renovation of the EgyptAir fleet that I had to cope with as a pressing task, but also to introduce the computer system to the corporation's activities which involved handling the most up-to-date technology used in the airline business, Mr Rayyan said.

Similarly, it was imperative to improve the catering service, the tax free shop, ground equipment and the air cargo village, Mr Rayyan said. He added that all these tasks had to be fulfilled within the limits of EgyptAir's budget.--GSS

CSO: 4500/158

SURPLUS NOTED IN FERTILIZER STOCKS

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 22 Mar 83 p 2

[Text] For the first time in years the country is having a surplus of fertilizers stocks, said the Minister of Agriculture, Dr Yussef Wali, at a meeting with the NDP members currently receiving a training course at the National Studies Institute in Cairo.

Highlighting the policy of his Ministry Dr Wali said the fertilizers required for summer agricultural cycle will be delivered to farmers in due time and in enough quantities.

Meanwhile we will be conducting a survey of the various crops and the quantities of fertilisers required for each crop throughout the country to be provided in supplies that cover the needs of all farmers.

Dealing with the loans required for food sufficiency projects the Minister said the interest rates were reduced to seven percent against 14 in the past years. This low rate of interest is aimed to encourage such productive projects.

The move to increase food production coincides with the efforts currently exerted to convert the Egyptian village, the unit of the rural community into a productive rather than a consuming gathering.

About 150 banks, the Minister continued, are contributing towards the financing of village projects through long-term loans extended to the farmers. The village development projects are also aided by funds extended by the US AID.

Cooperation between Egypt and Romania will moreover consolidate agricultural mechanisation projects. This will materialise when the \$30-million worth machinery units are to be completed. We have designed 61 units to serve mechanisation throughout the country.

The mechanisation projects and the village development activities are currently carried out in three governorates, namely Caliubia, Sharkia and Assiut. An expansion of the project is projected for eight other governorates next year.
--GSS

CSO: 4500/158

BRIEFS

OIL RESERVES--The total output of petroleum, natural gas, and butane gas was 34.5 million tons during the period from July 1981 to June 1982, according to a report on activities of the ministries and provincial local councils for that period. The report was passed to the People's Assembly by the government. The report said that this quantity represented 95 percent of the total quantity proposed in the plan for that year. It said reserves stood at 4,708 million barrels including 2,943 million barrels of petroleum and 1,765 million barrels of natural gas. As regards the activities of the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade, the report said that negotiations have already started between the Ministry and the European Economic Community with a view to reaching a second protocol for economic cooperation. The Ministry of Economy has also started talks with France for the import of 35,000 tons of wheat, with Canada for the import of fish worth \$3 million and with Italy for food aid worth 15,000 million Italian lira, said the report.--GSS [Text] [Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 20 Mar 83 p 2]

EXPATRIATES IN IRAQ--The number of Egyptian working abroad has been assessed by the concerned department at the Ministry, the Minister of State for Emigration Affairs, Mr Albert Barsum Salama, said yesterday. Statistics show that Egyptians living in Iraq represent 42 percent of the total number while Saudi Arabia comes next in hosting the biggest number of Egyptians. Mr Salama further illustrated that the Ministry had recently prepared a draft law to govern emigration. The Minister also threw light on some of the problems which Egyptian scholars encounter abroad, and declared that the Ministry would spare no effort in solving such problems, among them their wages, which are inconsistent with the soaring prices in Europe. Egyptian employees who obtain working contracts endorsed by official bodies will be granted unpaid leaves so as facilitate matters for them, added Mr Salama.--GSS [Text] [Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 20 Mar 83 p 3]

CSO: 4500/158

LIBYA

'GREEN BOOK' INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE

LD120839 Tripoli JANA in English 1635 GMT 12 Apr 83

[Text] Al-Bayan Al-Awal, Jumada Thani 29, 12 Apr (JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY)-- The first international conference on Mu'ammarr al-Qadhddhafi's ideology (the Green Book in theory and practice) continued its proceedings here at Qar Yunis University last night.

The Spanish researcher Marciano Sancias delivered a paper entitled "Popular and Nationalist Cultures" dealing with scientific framework of the Green Book and the question of cultural imperialism.

He stressed that political and economic independence could not be totally achieved without cultural independence. He referred to colonialism's and imperialism's protracted efforts to struggle [as received] the peoples' culture and exploit their resources.

The multi-national companies are also engaged in this process by imposing economic dependency ideas and imperialist culture. He affirmed that the Green Book created a mass culture and guaranteed the right education as a natural right to all citizens. Mr Murad, a researcher from Canada, opened his speech by thanking the Jamahiriya people and the revolution's leader for hosting this grand intellectual demonstration on the Green Book. He said that the third universal theory is the only solution to the problem of mankind. Criticism should be constructive because that facilitates the task to achieve prosperity to all societies. He reiterated Colonel al-Qadhddhafi's staff major Jallud's statements that most of the research papers described the theory and did not analyse it. Mr. Tobishi, director of the International Studies Institute from India, said that Colonel al-Qadhddhafi's comments and explanations of the Green Book should leave no doubt among some participants on the Green Book which not only concerns Libyans but all the peoples of the world. He asserted that all the democracies which depend on representation are frauds and the people's democracy is the only alternative where all the people share in the decision making.

The floor was then given to Ahmad Ibrahim from the Jamahiriya who presented a study on the class of slaves which was raised in the debate. He pointed out that this class has appeared throughout history in different forms and

it still exists nowadays represented in the wage-workers. The end of this class ends when wage system ends, he added. Mr Ibrahim referred to the natural law in the Green Book pointing out that it is the sound situation of mankind living free in nature without the intervention of the current laws governing and controlling the life of the people. The current laws, he went on, are a formulation of an unjust and distorted situation, that is the relation between a slave and his master has been made a law to refer to.

He concluded if there should be a law, it should be formulated and written by the masses and then it would be representative of the masses interests.

Dr. Rif'at al-Waqil from Egypt dwelt on the leader's dictum "Democracy is popular rule and not popular expression." He said: "Despite the fact that this conference is discussing the third international theory as an internationalist and not a nationalist theory, forgive me to refer to an aspect of our Arab affairs. Most of our Arab peoples, as in Egypt, Sudan and Iraq, are subjected to the rulers' repression and are denied the right to practice democracy, as explained by the leader this morning. If these peoples are given the opportunity to practice the above dictum, then they would not have endured repression which resulted in Egypt signing the Camp David accords and Egypt would not have been isolated from the Arab nation, nor would the Arab homeland been subjected to military aggression. This aggression was starkly manifested in the Zionist invasion of Lebanon, the strike at the Palestinian resistance and Lebanese peoples and the Sabra and Shatilah massacres."

He added: "We are in great need for direct people's democracy called for by the Green Book so as we live in freedion."

Doctor Abdul Rahma from Pakistan read a paper entitled "The Conflict of Classes" in which he said that a free society "must be free of conflicting classes and where everybody works for building that society." He stressed "The third international theory includes higher ideals realising prosperity for all societies. The people are working earnestly in the light of this theory. Thus it has become the leader of all the peoples endeavouring to liberate themselves, regain their dignity and rid themselves of dependency and exploitation."

In a debate on the class struggle, Mr. Muhammad Majdhub from the Jamahiriyyah pointed out that ever since history began mankind struggled for happiness and so as to reach happiness, man should be liberated and live free and this in turn requires fulfillment of needs which is impossible without controlling the resources or possessing authority and the ability to take and carry out decisions. This result is absent in all the current regimes whether dictatorships or multi-party systems. This is the first time a theory heralds a complete and integrated formula which enables man to rule himself by himself and exercise decision-making and has the ability to carry out those decisions.

On the issue of selection, he pointed out that it is quite different from elections. It is a role of the masses to select the suitable person to carry out their decisions, he said, that he is only an executive tool whether he is a member of a people's committee or a secretary. In contrast, he concluded, the elected person, according to the current systems, can decide on "representation is fraud."

The delegate of the Saharan Arab Republic was one of the speakers at the evening session and he opened his speech by delivering the greetings of the Saharan people and its leadership, the POLISARIO, to the Libyan people and its historic leadership. This large group of participants indicates the internationalism of the thought of Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, the Green Book, he said. He reviewed the sufferings of the Third World countries during and after the first and second world wars inflicted by colonialism and imperialism. He called for rejecting both traditional theories and apply the alternative solution heralded by the third universal theory in the Green Book. For this historic gathering to coincide with the students revolution in the Jamahiriyah has great significance as that event is a natural extension of the great Al-Fatih revolution through which the students confirmed their consolidation with Al-Fatih revolution pointing out that the students' dynamic force is now adopting the self-administration as practical exercise towards the people's control over all their resources in life including administration planning, execution and enjoying results.

The POLISARIO delegate added that through the presentation made by the thinker Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, it became quite clear that the tattered civilization, values, definitions, dogmatism and hostility towards the man is an imperialist phenomenon. And it became clear also after careful studying of the Green Book that the problems under discussions are the concern of man and how to reach freedom, happiness and prosperity.

The Jamahiriyah, which applied the Green Book, has achieved great successes in the political, economic and social fields and enabled the Libyan people to control its authority, wealth and arms and face courageously the U.S. imperialist repeated hostilities and conspiracies against the Libyan people. He pledged the solidarity of the Saharan people with the Libyan people, the loyal friend of all national liberation movements and oppressed peoples.

Mr Farid Jahari from the Egyptian Nasirites organisation commented on the Panamanian research paper on self-administration. He stressed that the third universal theory is different from the Marxist and capitalist theories; otherwise it will not be called the third alternatives or the third universal theory. He praised the point on social unity and its relation with the democracy of the masses which is linked to the absence of parties struggling for power. He talked about the experience of the late Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir represented in the alliance of the working people as third alternative which then was called Arab socialism which depends on the peaceful integration of classes. He compared the Panamanian experiment of nationalising Panama Canal to the events in Egypt and Suez Canal nationalisation and the three-partite aggression and how 'Abd al-Nasir through the unity of the Egyptian people and the support of the Arab people was able to enter the battle successfully against three aggressors.

Mr Muhammad Suleiman Jarelnabi, the representative of the Sudanese revolutionary force, was given the floor and addressed the conference saying that parliaments are falsification of democracy and are made to steal authority from the masses to give it to the governments and so become a legitimate barrier between the masses and authority. The "party system is the rule of the minority over the majority and therefore it is also a fraud and undemocratic as confirmed by the first part of the Green Book."

Mr Raoul Tabares, representative of the independent youth in Portugal, talked about the cultural revolution and the problems of youth within the western democracies and so-called elections and how they live very bad circumstances and do not enjoy any form of democracy. Democracy, he added, can only be achieved when the masses possess authority, wealth and arms as heralded in the Green Book.

Mrs Rahima Bitar from Palestine said in discussions on the Green Book's relation to the women's issue that this issue is related to other political, economic and social issues. She said Palestinian women are greatly suffering as a result of imperialist-Zionist hegemony, not knowing the meaning of stability and security and living in a constant state of anxiety and sorrow for more than 30 years.... She said this bitter reality has imposed on Palestinian women grave human responsibilities. On the other hand, she added that the Green Book had giving women their total rights and clarified the duties that they are to carry out in life.

Later, Mr Malik from Pakistan said in discussion on freedom and democracy that Islam does not recognise dictatorship or exploitation in any of their forms. He said the Green Book is of great value and importance because it draws basic guidelines and clear goals for the solution of fundamental problems from which humanity suffers, including dictatorship and exploitation. He added: "We should implement all the Green Book's principles as it is the ideal source of successful methods for dealing with the problems of democracy. By implementing this theory, we would have made great strides in liberating the masses from slavery and exploitation and taken them a step forward towards prosperity."

The Palestinian researcher 'Ali Husayn al-Hilu presented a paper entitled "Class Struggle." In it, he discussed the intellectual development of previous theories on the concept of class in society. He said: "Contemporary society in this age, the age of imperialism, is not only divided into classes. The whole world is divided into classes, exploiting nations and ruling minorities with exploited majorities. The class struggle is still at its strongest and the late mankind remains threatened. Contemporary societies are passing through a severe and dangerous multi-faceted crisis in which economies, morales and society vary. Under those complicated circumstances, the third universal theory made its appearances, offering humanity new concepts of policies, economics and society. The Green Book also made its appearance as a new school in revolutionary thought."

"The third universal theory has come to guarantee the future of humanity and to liberate it from all forms of oppression and exploitation. The Green Book's data aim at creating an equitable and just society where all forms of exploitation are completely eradicated....

"The third universal theory rejects the class system. As an alternative, it calls for the creation of a political system where it is impossible for any one person or group to monopolise power and wealth. Whether this system accepts individual variations of wealth on the basis of variations in individual production capabilities, this condition prohibits the accumulation of wealth in its capitalist conception."

Mr. Oscar Ogenetto from Nicaragua told the participants that the Honduran forces have carried out a military offensive against Nicaragua saying: "We need your solidarity and support against this blatant intervention and we would like to express to you the gravity of the situation in Nicaragua in these hours in particular. I am speaking on behalf of over 17 organisations, in the name of the fighters in Nicaragua and Latin America.... We, the Latin American peoples, are becoming free one after another and imperialism is well aware of that and that is why it is planning and carrying out offensives against Nicaragua and other Central American countries. This flagrant invasion of Nicaragua by Honduras and U.S.-backed anti-revolutionary forces comes within the imperialist strategy which aims to dominate control and terrorize the peaceful free peoples."

After that, a member of the Chilean delegation read the following statement on the critical situation in Nicaragua:

"While participating in the first international conference on the Green Book, U.S. imperialism has escalated its aggression against the Nicaraguan people where the U.S.-backed Somoza forces crossed into Nicaragua attacking the Nicaraguan people. These operations are within the U.S. White House strategy that might lead to a grave repercussions and a threat to world peace. We strongly condemn the imperialist aggression against Nicaragua and pledge our solidarity with the heroic people of Nicaragua as well as the Sandinist front and the new government. We join our voices with the Nicaraguan Government and call for a complete halt to U.S.-backed hostilities and violations of national territorial waters and withdrawal of U.W. [as printed] fleets present on Nicaraguan shores."

The statement also pledged solidarity with the revolutions in Cuba and Grenada and all the revolutions in the world which will achieve inevitable victory towards building the new society.

The secretary of the International Green Book Research Centre, Mr Ahmad Shahati, explained the dimensions of the U.S. imperialist conspiracy against the Nicaraguan people. He said the conference will send a cable of solidarity

to the Nicaraguan revolution's leadership affirming the participants' readiness to stand right alongside the Nicaraguan people against U.S. imperialism. He said: "Stemming from the Green Book's philosophy, the philosophy of freedom, socialism and progress, we in the Jamahiriyah extend our unlimited support (as the leader has affirmed) to the Nicaraguan and Salvadorean people and to all freedom fighters in Latin America. We also affirm our strategic support for the Palestinian people. The Palestinian cause is the cause of the entire Arab people. This has been affirmed by the revolution's leader and the Libyan Arab people in their revolutionary programme to halt the advance of the Zionist death wagon.... We in the Jamahiriyah will be ready as an armed people to stop the Zionist death wagon and liberate every inch of Arab territory."

Mr. Shahati affirmed the Libyan Arab people's support for the world liberation movements that are attending this conference from the precept of the Green Book's philosophy and the third universal theory, the theory of universal liberation. He said:

"If the third universal theory, which we are discussing in this conference, is adopted by the world's people, it would liberate mankind and make the individual his own master. The Green Book is the philosophy of liberation and human freedom."

CSO: 4500/188

KING HASSAN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, LEADERSHIP TERMED 'ENLIGHTENED'

Rabat LE DEMOCRATE in French 3 Mar 83 pp 3-5, 7

[Extract from "Citations de S.M. Hassan II" [Quotes From His Majesty Hassan II], Ed. Smer, 1981, pp 20-29, by Mustapha Sehim]

[Text] One passage deserves to be quoted:

"The annals of history are rich in proof that the Moroccan people is a great and noble people, whose genius is fertile, which has always been equal to events and which has accomplished miracles.

"The reason for the everlasting nature of this people down through the centuries, for its ability to meet all tests, its dignified triumph, head held high through all perils, resides in the qualities and virtues of its children, in the brotherhood, affection and tolerance that reign among them, particularly during difficult times. It resides in the solidarity and mutual help, the unity and thought, the respect properly shown for the elderly and the affection given to the young, the sound traditions of the country. May each and every one of you preserve these virtues intact and demonstrate conscientiousness and maturity in the exercise of your rights and duties as citizens."

Everything is contained in this cardinal text, pronounced on 3 March 1961 in the first solemn speech of His Majesty Hassan II, who had just taken the throne. In it, one finds the "greatness," the "nobility" of the Moroccan people, its "genius," the "qualities and virtues of its children," its "tolerance," its "courage," its "high spiritual values." In this text, one also finds the conceptual core of the thought of the sovereign that one must try to analyze more closely.

In the beginning, naturally, came nationalism. The sovereign placed that value above all others. That nationalism has deep roots. It is anchored in history. There is finds reasons to hope and to try, whether that history be grandiose or not. But for him, Morocco remains on the whole the "cradle of a shining civilization" that has built "its greatness" on "peace and brotherhood among peoples." This reference to history enjoys the great advantage of enabling "old countries" to find, "down through the centuries and the milleniums, the historic milestones that serve as reminders to them." These reminders have a

meaning: They are to point to "a positive direction always tending toward a search for human well-being."

Consequently, that history embraces the entire legacy of the centuries. But it also incorporates the personal memories of the king: memories of childhood, memories of school days, memories of when he was next in line to the throne and of his days in exile accompanying his august father, His Majesty Mohammed V.

One has but to read a few significant pages from "Defi" [Challenge] to measure the extent to which the king's thought is penetrated by reminiscences, references and memories that call forth, not only the Alid throne, but all Moroccan history.

The thought of His Majesty Hassan II presents an obvious syncretic quality. It embraces all the ages of Morocco and all the phases of its nationalism. A comparison with General de Gaulle, *mutadis mutandis*, seems essential. Like him, in fact, he assumes all the history of his country's nationalism. He does not choose and does not exclude. He claims.

National Unity

The second trait to point out is the unitarian nature of the sovereign's ideas. For 20 years, one of the constants of all his action has scarcely changed: the pursuit of national unity. This syncretically unitarian approach is opposed to all factors of division. On the occasion of the general amnesty measure (13 April 1965), he emphasizes that he has "made the firm decision to substitute understanding and solidarity for disputes and hatred."

In the same spirit, a few weeks earlier, he emphatically states that "one of our most fervent desires is to see our people gathered together in closed ranks in a perfect, solid union, sheltered from uncontrolled passions." In the same speech (3 March 1965), he makes an "appeal for unity, convinced as we are that in this instance, it is the most effective means of safeguarding the nation's accomplishments and of moving forward down the path of progress, glory and prosperity."

Whence his conception of the Moroccan people. Not only is it a community, but a living being, expressing its joys and concerns and with which an intimate, almost irrational bond, is maintained: "It was grumbling three years ago," he would say, "but its pulse is strong." Targeted are artificial divisions, condemnable because they strike at the unity of the Moroccan people. The king is particularly harsh with regard to political, trade union and financial "feudalities." But his strongest condemnation is reserved for the Moroccan "rich" who "are the worst ingrates that the world has ever created." On this point, the king adds: "All the rich in all societies are satiated, ungrateful people, but my rich people are worse because they are rich in an underdeveloped country. If they were satiated in keeping with our standing, I would accept it. But they indulge themselves on the scale of a Germany or a France." Social distinctions in Morocco could be a factor of national division, even of potential political destabilization if they should become intolerable. The king is aware of this: "We are moving toward the segregation of social strata

in this country, something that has never existed...but that traumatizes all of us." This situation is troublesome and His Majesty Hassan II scarcely conceals it. It also implies vigilance and determination. "Nevertheless," the king states, "as long as there is breath in my body, they (the rich) will find me in their way."

Under such conditions, it is completely normal for this unitarian nationalism to cast aside divisions between the right and the left. They are foreign to his vocabulary. On 7 May 1965, in an interview granted on Belgian television, the sovereign said that "being on the right or the left is a luxury and a luxury of political or philosophical speculation." He was to say the same thing 16 years later, on 31 January 1981, to a Saudi film director in Djeddah: "These concept of the right and the left are definitely foreign to us. Are we not the *Umma* [community], the intermediate nation?"

A similar attitude explains the royal distrust of imported doctrines, especially when they take the form of a socioeconomic system. Of socialism, he condemns the deviations to which it has led in many places and retains only its generosity -- that is, "a state of mind," "a combination of virtues." "For it is Islam that has gone to the very core, that has organized the life of the individual, in his family, in his community, in his country, in his relations with other parts of the world." And yet, this does not exclude a dialogue of cultures and civilizations: Islam is not sectarian. That is what the king emphasizes when he says that "when a Moroccan socialist participates in a colloquium or conference of the Socialist International, he can but serve that body, in my opinion. On the condition, naturally, that in the way in which he fashions his thought, whether or not he identifies with the Muslim philosophy, he must add the note of his authenticity."

Historical, syncretic and unitarian, the thought of His Majesty Hassan II is also basically empirical. By that -- and another parallel must be drawn here with General de Gaulle -- one must understand the primacy of the doctrine of circumstances over the a priori doctrine. Whether it be a question of domestic or foreign policy, the sovereign does not confine himself to definitive attitudes. While he remains always on course, he nevertheless adapts to the terrain, to the circumstances and to the ratio of forces. Regarding the recovery of the kingdom's territorial integrity, the king considers the international situation, preferring the path of dialogue and negotiation to that of violence and confrontation. But there must be no mistake about it. That attitude is not a basic factor; it is but a method. If the ratio of forces is modified or if the country's higher interests are at stake, the king will adopt the "maximalist" position, sometimes disconcerting for all those who make the royal empiricism a constant.

There is no lack of examples to illustrate that empiricism. "Amir Al Mouminine" [sic] In 1974, he authorized the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism], which, despite all the variations in terms, remains a communist party. Confronted with Algerian maneuvers, he refused to take irreparable measures that might "be an affront to the future." Taking the other side of the inflammatory, bellicose proclamations of the Istiqlal Party, he preferred to initiate a slow, laborious, but in the end, fruitful process with Madrid for the return

of the southern provinces. Likewise, he left it up to the government and House of Representatives to pass an insipid, mediocre law in April 1980, spectacularly announcing, a few months later, a one-third reduction in home rental fees. The launching of the historic Green March is, in the final analysis, related to this fact: The king is fond of sensational moves that enable him to demonstrate his capabilities and, more generally, to follow his destiny. He refuses to be only a chief of state concerned with the management of affairs of state. He is first and foremost the monarch and his action can only evolve on the crests of history, on a level with the multisecular legitimacy that he embodies and the Alids dynasty he represents.

Political and Constitutional Ideas

From that thought stem his political and constitutional ideas, those regarding the status of the monarchy as well as those relating to the organization of the government. More generally, the problem is as follows: How does the Moroccan political system fulfill the double role of legal regularity and stabilization of juridical production and political life?

Regarding the former, legal regularity, important questions are posed. The first of these has to do with constitutional supremacy, which must be defined. It means, in fact, that the constitution is the supreme law of the land. In other words, the entire legal order is determined and conditioned by constitutional rules.

In Morocco, the legal arrangement does not escape this overall scheme. Many royal declarations emphasize the fact that constitutional rules are the foundation of the idea of law essential at all levels: "The kingdom's constitution was welcomed by you with all the more enthusiasm because you considered it to be the basic rule that must govern your political life." "You have made that document the essential source of your references." "The constitution, our supreme law."

As for the second function, that of legal and political stabilization, it is basically founded on the notion of rigidity. It in fact implies a rigid nature of the norms set by the constituent. But does rigidity therefore mean immutability?

The decisive response is given by the constituent himself who, in Section XI of the constitution entitled "Concerning the Revision of the Constitution," states that "the monarchic form of government and provisions relative to the Muslim religion cannot be the subject of a constitutional revision." Thus the shape and domain of constitutional supremacy, forming the higher stage of the legal and political arrangement, are stated. This block of constitutional legitimacy is the basis of the Moroccan system. It imbues all legal and political production. This block therefore includes the higher standards and is articulated around two megapolitical values: Islam and the monarchy. It finds its basis in the very essence of the country and it alone permits and justifies the personality, identity and existence of the national community. In other words, it is the expression of constitutional legitimacy.

Here one should come back to the royal conception of the monarchy. It remains fascinating for constitutionalists. First of all, the first basis of its strength and everlasting nature: serving the people. The "constitution that I built with my own hands," the sovereign would say on the eve of the first constitutional referendum in 1962, "is above all the renewal of the sacred pact that has always united the people and the king." It is therefore more than the translation of a new combination of power. It is the expression of a symbiosis between the throne and the people. Nor is this historic law gratuitous; it results from an age-old heritage. The monarchy is not a super-structural institution. It is part of the country's very infrastructure. "For a dozen centuries," the sovereign writes, "the same realities remain. They are only more imperative."

An important conclusion is derived from this historic status of the monarchic institution. It is related to the fact that "more than ever, the Moroccan people need a popular, Islamic and governing monarchy. That is why in Morocco, the king governs. The people would not understand if he did not govern." As a result, the Moroccan monarchy has responsibilities that precisely consist of remaining "faithful to its principles." This situation is a constant factor and "it will always be thus as long as the people remain attached to their king and as long as the king remains the authentic representative of the people's will." The problem thus posed is that of the political capacity of the regime in a straight line with systemic theory.

In Morocco, the sovereign must express the deeper aspirations of his people and fulfill his triple "religious, national and political mission," lacking which he can scarcely keep the throne. In addition, His Majesty Hassan II says so in these terms: "...The day when -- God forbid -- Morocco should be afflicted with a sovereign who is not the spokesman of the deeper aspirations of his people, who does not watch over their well-being, then I pray to God that such a sovereign should never take the throne."

In the constitutional thought of Hassan II, if the sovereign is to reign and govern, he must be above the legislative, executive and judicial powers that receive from him a delegation of competencies, not of powers. This arbitration must ensure the regular operation of government as well as the continuity of the state. "But in order that the institutions defined may operate under the best possible conditions, for the good of the people and the greatness of the nation, in order that the authority and continuity of the state may be protected, it is necessary for your king, the protector of the constitution and defender of individual freedoms, may at all times oversee and follow affairs of state and, if need be, with the consent of the people and their approval, triumph, as in the past, over the obstacles standing in our way."

Royal Arbitration

We must now clarify the role of that arbiter. In the mind of the sovereign, he cannot be a kind of privileged witness keeping score, a "passive arbiter." On the contrary; he can only be an arbiter ruling on veritable conflicts and becoming the actual organizer of the side, its leader. This conception, which was defended concerning General de Gaulle, seems to apply to the role of the

monarchy in the Moroccan political system. It therefore goes beyond the role of a sports or legal referee and is based on the need to defend the general and national interest. This status as an arbiter places the sovereign above powers and parties, making him a higher authority able to represent the will for national life and the nation's legitimacy.

From the royal declarations, one concludes that the sovereign is above parties: "His party is the entire nation." This stems from the fact that "one has never seen a king head a party or belong to a party or help a party." This notion of arbitration is not reduced to a single possibility. It involves several, depending on the circumstances, in order to respond to the diversity of situation. As for the intensity of his intervention, it is variable and depends on the seriousness of the situation. But how is one to carry out this role of arbitration? There are various means. The first has to do with the status of the monarchy in the Moroccan political system. It does not in fact derive its legitimacy from the body of electors or from an organic link with the organs it is supposed to rule upon. Rather, it rests on a religious, historic and contractual basis. Other means concern the action of the Cabinet he heads, the recourse to elections in order to rule on opposition between the government and the House of Representatives, the referendum and finally, the use of special powers in application of Article 35 of the constitution.

The status of the monarchic institution also explains the royal conception of the separation of powers. The three Moroccan constitutions naturally confirm this principle of the separation of powers, but the principle has a limitation, recalled on 13 October 1978 in the opening address of the parliamentary session: "Thus is confirmed what I have always stated to you, whether you be the legislative or executive power, to wit, that if the separation of powers is indispensable, it can in no case concern the supreme responsibility." One may wonder whether this separation of powers is not rather a separation of functions: a governmental function, a legislative function and a judicial function.

Furthermore, what meaning does the sovereign give to democracy? First of all, one must emphasize the criticism he makes of "formal democracy": "A voter's card and a ballot mean nothing in themselves." From this standpoint, the royal conception turns its back on slogans and implies "a...firm and realistic idea" of citizens, of "their duties and responsibilities vis-a-vis the nation." In other words, democracy is a cultural fact, a way of being, a daily effort, "a state of mind, a daily construction."

These expressions are contained in "Le Defi" published in 1976. But they were already contained in the address delivered at the University of Bordeaux on 25 June 1963: "Being a democrat today or practicing democracy does not mean speaking of the great ideals in the abstract, without applying them in concrete action." "It means, on the contrary, abstaining from any demagoguery.... Nowadays, one may say that democracy is nothing but a collective agreement on the national level.... A veritable contract in which there are not only obligations, but also sanctions, must bind individuals as individuals or as a community, with the state...."

King Hassan's entire philosophy of democracy is found in the foregoing phrases. For His Majesty, democracy does not consist of political alliances with a given faction claiming to be the opposition; it is found elsewhere. It comes down to the people's sovereignty, with all that implies with respect to suffrage and the process of ratification. This approach is undoubtedly the cornerstone of 20 years of a laborious search for a democratic Moroccan political system which the vicissitudes of politics and ups-and-downs have checked more than should have been the case, against the king's wishes.

This quest for a "Moroccan democracy" stems only from the will of the sovereign. It is also somewhat imposed by the mission entrusted to him by his father, King Mohammed V.

The king is aware of the mandate he must assume in the line of policies set forth by the "country's liberator." If he likes to recall the teachings of his father, whether it be a question of democracy, the unity of the kingdom, peace or the defense of its independence and sovereignty, it is in order better to situate the loyalty of his action. If he also likes to claim to be a student in the "school of His Majesty Mohammed V," it is in order to draw upon the teachings of virtue, wisdom, patriotism and courage. It is also out of a concern for forging an image of his reign that will be on a level with the image of the Alids dynasty. So true is this that the sovereign does not reign solely for the present, but for the judgment of history, the legend of the centuries also.

Consequently, a phrase such as the following takes on its entire significance: "Perfection is not of this world, but I believe that with the help of God, I have worked to surround this country with all the political and legal protections and guarantees possible" (speech of 21 May 1980). This also gives new meaning to these phrases by Maurice Druon: "Before they discover the virtues of their leaders, people often wait for a period of nostalgia. For the time being, the Moroccan people are in agreement in recognizing that they are living under a great reign." Morocco does in fact enjoy an important place on the international scene. When one draws up the balance sheet of the past 20 years, one can measure the considerable progress made under King Hassan II. The rate of economic growth, ambitions for which were about 1 percent only a short time ago, easily exceeds 4 percent. This is not insignificant when one realizes that nowadays, even industrialized nations are toiling mightily to keep a level of 4 to 5 percent in recent years. Schools, hospitals, institutes and universities have increased in number, while the needs of a population that has doubled in size but that has reached a respectable standard of living are growing. In other words, Morocco is no longer the same as it was in the 1950's or 1960's.

The reign of King Hassan II is undeniably a glorious one. Our country has embarked upon a path of progress and prosperity while preserving its sacred traditions. It now gives the striking example of a country that perseveres in its wisdom, without sacrificing anything to foreign models. Witnessing the failure of so many foreign experiments, Morocco has stayed the course, faithful to its traditions, advancing along the royal path traced by King Hassan II.

Compared with so many other countries, Morocco can presume to establish a democracy, rare in a world stifled by dictatorships and in which all energies are expressed. Political parties exist in large numbers and debate at will in Parliament. Newspapers and a press representing all factions: Morocco can pride itself on having the widest range in all African, even Third World, countries.

On the purely diplomatic level, Morocco, guided by King Hassan II, becomes one of the strategic crossroads of the world. The image which international public opinion has of our country is that of a wise, nonaligned, fiercely independent nation that is both traditional and modern at the same time.

It is a homage to King Hassan II, whose great virtues everyone, from Africa to America, recognizes. King Hassan II, unifier of the nation, has given Morocco its full dimensions, Arab, Muslim and African as well. The role which our sovereign plays in the outcome of the crisis in the Near East and the restoration of their homeland to the Palestinians is central. All foreign ministries agree, without exception, on paying well-deserved homage to our sovereign, whose action has been a keystone in the region.

Is it necessary to recall, along the same line of ideas, that if the PLO has acquired and solidified its authority, it is thanks to the 1974 Arab summit conference presided over by King Hassan II? "The spirit of Rabat" is quite simply the confirmation of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. It is also the result of laborious mediation of King Hassan II.

Today, nine years later, the Palestinian resistance has acquired the "right of passage" and nearly all countries and peoples recognize its fight, through the action, whether private or official, of King Hassan II.

Among the latter, the Fes summit conference remains the cardinal event that will mark the history of the Arab Muslim world. The weight of the sovereign's action is considerable and the kingdom of Morocco derives unprecedented prestige from it that now compels the admiration of many.

The Festival of the Throne, which the Moroccan people celebrate with great joy, is certainly not the time to draw up balance sheets. It is an opportunity to strengthen the symbiosis of a king and a people that owes him everything. The Festival of the Throne is also the strengthening of bonds uniting the Moroccan people and the Alids monarchy.

Through the crises and strife in the world as a whole, Morocco, guided by its king, has forged its own path, consolidating and strengthening its democracy and developing its resources, training its elite, uniting its sons and projecting its action throughout the world like a beacon. It is a high place of wisdom and culture.

Credit for this goes largely to King Hassan II, an enlightened statesman and unifier who has never ceased to see the kingdom of Morocco rise up as a great nation, strong and proud.

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

CULTURAL PROGRAM WITH QATAR--Doha, 15 April (MAP)--The action program of the cultural agreement concluded between Morocco and Qatar was signed Thursday in Doha by Dr Said Belbachir, Moroccan Minister of Cultural Affairs, and Mr 'Isa Ghanim al-Kuwari, Qatari minister of information. Following the ceremony, organized on this occasion, Dr Belbachir underlined that the signing of the action program constituted another milestone in cooperation relation between the two countries and expressed hope that this initiative will contribute to the unity of the whole Arab nation. The Qatari minister of information said for his part that the cultural agreement concluded between the two countries was a solid base for consolidating relations between the two brotherly peoples. Dr Belbachir is on a visit to Doha to attend the Moroccan cultural week in Qatar being held since 13 April. [Text] [LD160246 Rabat MAP in English 1212 GMT 15 Apr 83]

CSO: 4500/193

PROGRESS IN ARAB-FINANCED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS REVIEWED

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 21 Feb 83 p 9

/Article: "The Birth of Seven New Development Plans in the Rural Areas"/

/Text/ The Central Region will be witnessing a leap in popular development in the 3 years 1983-85. Its point of emphasis will be the absorption of economic areas of specialization with which the area is distinguished, and specialized scientific staffs, with the goal of implanting successful regional development at reduced costs, realizing high rates and a profitable economic yield; in addition, there will be an approach toward the development of rural areas that are rich in raw materials, as an essential dimension and a new turning point in the application of new decentralization policies. AL-AYYAM's followup in ministerial departments in the Central Region shows that 20 development projects were presented for discussion last week before the Popular Development Committee under the chairmanship of Mr 'Abd-al-Rahim Mahmud, the governor of the region. In its sessions, which went on for 2 days, the committee reviewed the projects and classified them in three stages, taking, in terms of priority and the degree of importance, the projects whose feasibility studies have been completed, which total seven pilot projects with rapid pay-outs. The governor gave an important speech, and Mr 'Ali al-Tum, the former minister of agriculture and current technical consultant to the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development in Khartoum, also attended the session.

The counsellor spoke about the goals and plans of regional development from his long experience.

The projects were categorized. Among the projects put under construction in the first stage, those to process milk and produce meat, eggs and fish. There are other projects for the other two stages: these are fodder cultivation and livestock feeding. Other projects will see the light of day in the next 3 years. The costs of the first stage come to 25 million Sudanese pounds, and there will be an effort to get foreign currency.

Proposed Projects

The goal in this project is to develop and improve 100,000 feddans in the central rain zone, known as the Savannah belt, south of the Governorate of the Blue Nile (al-Rusayris and al-Damazin), where the measured rainfall comes to 600 millimeters, by introducing mechanized farming in a crop cycle whose basis will be corn and oil crops. The project is in harmony with the goals

of development in the country; the idea behind it is that it is aimed at developing new rainy areas and farming them in newly created cycles. Among the proposed oil crops are:

Safflower, which is a promising crop. The research that has been carried out on it has proved that it has high productivity. In addition, there will be an expansion in the cultivation of (al-filsbara) irrigated by rainfall, since it is considered better suited to the conditions of farming by rainfall than other leguminous fodder, realizing an output that comes to 12,000 tons per feddan.

In addition, we will adopt the technical procedures for carrying out a classification census, removing trees, cleaning up the ground, opening up roads, providing water and water sources by developing existing reservoirs, and providing all the various resources in a manner in keeping with the schedule.

Production of Vegetables and Fruit and Livestock Feeding

The establishment of a mixed farm for the production of vegetables and fruit and livestock fattening over an area of 40,000 feddans in the Sinjah area.

The purpose in the project is /to cover/ local consumption over an area of 5,000 feddans, with the rest to go for exports and processing.

It should be mentioned that the vegetable and fruit crops admit a vertical concentration and modern technology. In addition, they have rapid payouts, and all the basis ingredients for expansion exist in the central regions, in terms of acreage, permanent irrigation, suitable weather and technical expertise; in addition, the main production season coincides with the requirements of foreign markets in the winter season. There also is a similar notion of establishing a project situated on the Madani-Khartoum road, over an area of 117 /1,000 feddans/ at a cost estimated at 1.7 million pounds.

Meat Production

It is expected that the Sudan will produce a surplus of 47,000 tons of meat in 1985, and it is expected that the central region will score great success in this area, in view of the tremendous animal and agricultural resources it possesses.

It is recommended that this project be established in the al-Qarayin area of the Blue Nile Governorate, where fodder and livestock are available.

Since this project is a large one, it might be carried out in the second or third stage of execution, at a cost of \$65 million. Its economic payout is estimated at 25 percent.

Since the al-Rusayris reservoir covers 62,000 feddans and is a lake with average fish production, and 300 fishermen are now working it using 200 boats, it is considered appropriate to benefit from the lake to produce large amounts of fish to meet the needs of the urban centers in the middle of the country. The cost of the project that has been prepared is estimated at 100,000 pounds.

In the Shite Nile area, the government of the region has prepared another study on the production and marketing of fish. The goal of the project is to increase the current income of fishermen. The cost of the project will be 2 million, and construction will start next year, 1984.

15 Million Eggs

The development studies in the region are continuing with the establishment of a farm to produce 15 million eggs a year. On the basis of the study that has been set forth, it is expected that the project will realize a payout of 967,000 pounds.

Milk Processing

The project has the goal of producing a plant situated in the area near the White Nile to produce cheese and yogurt packaged in sanitary containers. As is well known, the White Nile is crisscrossed with clay plains which are among the richest areas of the Sudan in livestock and the production of traditional cheese, which meets 90 percent of the Sudan's requirements.

A start will be made on this project and it will be given priority in execution.

Fodder Production

Among the programmed studies on the second stage is the construction of a plant to produce fodder. The Central Region will be one of the most productive areas in the Sudan in terms of fodder, and it is expected that the Sudan will realize an annual surplus of 7 million tons of concentrated fodder, which it will be possible to export to fraternal Arab countries.

I can state that the project will help meet the food requirements of livestock production projects in the region and will contribute to the use of agricultural wastes. It has been recommended that it be set up in the Sinjah-Sannar area, on an area of 15,000 feddans; the plant will operate at a productivity of 150,000 tons per year, at a cost of \$15 million. In another area, a project will be established in the east of the Blue Nile, which will be bordered to the south by the al-Harqah and Nur-al-Din livestock feeding project, on an area of 15,000 feddans. The project will be artificially irrigated by pumps which will draw from the al-Jumay'ab mill.

The Particle Board Industry

Among the major future studies on the third stage, extending studies that were previously performed by the competent agencies in the al-Jazirah project department, was the establishment of a particle board industry using cotton stalks. A technical feasibility study will take place, and support and financing will be received. It has been assumed that a company will be established with the effective participation of the al-Jazirah project.

Red Brick

The efforts of the government of the Central Region have not been restricted to the establishment of agricultural and livestock projects in remote rural areas which are still complaining of economic and cultural backwardness. In the first stage it has also been decided to establish a project of produce red brick in the town of Madani, proceeding from the premise of interest in the requirements of the population growth and the course of redevelopment and construction which has been organized in the region's capital. The project will be to produce 60 million bricks, at a cost of 1.7 million Sudanese pounds.

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CSO: 4504/271

TUNISIA

MINUTES OF MIXED TUNISIAN-LIBYAN COMMISSION SIGNED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 25 Mar 83 p 4

[Article: "Signing of Minutes on Manpower, Professional Training and Social Security -- Toward the Regularization of the Situation of Tunisian Workers in Libya; Transfer of Tunisian Assets to the CNSS; Development of Information Between the Two Countries"]

[Text] Having been in session since 21 March at the Ministry of Social Affairs, the mixed Tunisian-Libyan Commission for manpower, professional training and social security has completed its activities.

During a ceremony organized in the afternoon, the minutes approving the activities of the commission were signed, on the Tunisian side by Mr Mohamed Ennaceur, minister of social affairs, and Mr Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Mabruk, Libyan secretary of public service, for the Libyan side.

In the speech he made on that occasion, Mr Mohamed Ennaceur stressed that the positive results achieved by both parties are such as to reassure the Tunisians working in Libya concerning the conditions of their stay and their work, and concerning the facilities which will be available to them for the transfer of their property and assets.

The minister of social affairs also indicated that the prospects offered, thanks to the results of the activities of the mixed commission, constitute an additional step on the road to cooperation between the two countries in the areas of employment and social affairs.

For his part, Mr Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Mabruk expressed his satisfaction with the results obtained by the commission "all the more so as such actions," he added, "are of a nature to draw together the points of view between the two brother countries and to consolidate bilateral cooperation."

Let us note that the minutes in question include numerous points on which both parties have reached an agreement, to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

Thus, and in matters of employment, the two parties have stated their desire to continue to apply the principle of job priority to Tunisian nationals in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah, and have agreed to proceed with the exchange of

information relative to the employment needs and the available human resources before June 1983. This exchange will take place twice a year in the future.

Furthermore, it has been agreed that the Libyan party will take the necessary measures to regularize the situation of the Tunisian workers recruited to work in Libya, and thus, to allow them to complete the arrangements for their stay and to transfer their assets under the best possible conditions and as soon as possible.

In the area of social security, the two parties reached an agreement whereby the Libyan party will transfer, as soon as possible, to the National Social Security Bank [CNSS], the assets of Tunisians who have worked in the Jamahiriyah, which are owed to them because of their contributions to the social security system or because of job related accidents, as well as any other acquired rights.

The two parties also agreed to proceed with the exchange of information relative to the implementation of the bilateral Convention and all other legislation in force, as well as to the possible transformations which might affect them and relative to social security legislation in both countries. Within this framework, periodic meetings will be held, at least twice a year, to examine and smooth the difficulties which might hamper the implementation of the convention.

As for professional training, the participation of the Institute for Training and Advancement of Cadres in Rades in the advancement of Libyan training personnel, in various specialties and depending on Tunisian opportunities, received the go ahead of both parties, which also made known their willingness to study the possibility of proceeding with the twinning of the Institute of Rades with the Training Institute for Cadres in Mousrata.

On the other hand, the Tunisian party has agreed in principle, as far as they are able, to the Libyan request concerning the recruitment of Tunisian training personnel and experts to work in Libya on the implementation of the programs which will be Arabized.

Finally, in terms of Tunisian experience in matters of family production, the two parties have discussed programs for the training of the "productive family" and the possibility of letting the Libyan party benefit from Tunisian experience in this field.

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CSO: 4519/181

TUNISIA

CREATION OF TUNISIAN-SENEGALESE-HUNGARIAN COMPANY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Mar 83 p 7

[Article: "Creation of a Tunisian-Senegalese-Hungarian Manufacturing Company; Horizontal Technological Transfer"]

[Text] A Tunisian-Senegalese-Hungarian manufacturing company, specializing in medium voltage fuses, based in Tunis, will soon be created.

The agreement was concluded at the end of the recent visit to Senegal by the chairman and managing director of STINEM [Tunisian Electromechanical Engineering Company], Mr Fethi Kefi, at the invitation of his counterpart at SENELEC [Senegal Electric Company], Mr Louis Alexandrenne.

The two parties decided to meet in Tunis next May in order to proceed with the analysis and final examination of the study prepared for this purpose by STINEM, a study which has been conducted over the last 3 years by the Tunisian company in collaboration with the Hungarians.

The planned mixed company will be based in Tunis and will be capitalized at 60,000 Tunisian dinars (40 percent STEINEM, 10 percent STEG [Tunisian Electric and Gas Company], 30 percent SENELEC, and 20 percent Hungary). With a total investment cost of 130,000 Tunisian dinars, it will get short and medium term bank loans, granted by the BNT [National Bank of Tunisia] on the order of 67,000 Tunisian dinars.

Its production has been set at 10,000 fuses per year; 3,000 units will be sold on the Tunisian market, 3,000 on the Senegalese market, and 4,000 on the markets bordering both Senegal and Tunisia.

Once established, the mixed company, the offices of which will be built on land already purchased in Sejoumi, will expand its production to other industrial articles of common interest.

In addition, the Tunisian and Senegalese parties have concluded agreements on:

- the supply to SENELEC of electrical equipment produced by STINEM, in the amount of 150,000 Tunisian dinars per year;
- the training of Senegalese personnel and cadres at STINEM to enable them to maintain the purchased equipment;

- participation of a delegation from SENELEC in the seminar to be organized by STINEM for next October, on the theme: "Security of Personnel."

Mr Fethi Kefi also specified that, to make these decisions concrete and while waiting for firm orders, an agreement has been concluded for the supply, in the very short term, by the Tunisian party of a series of samples of industrial products (estimated at approximately 50,000 Tunisian dinars) to study their reliability in the Senegalese electrical network.

On the other hand, STINEM (which manufactures a varied range of electromechanical articles, from switches, disconnecting switches, circuit breakers, insulators, prefabricated equipment, to disconnecting switches for single-phase networks) has committed itself to manufacture all types of special insulators for the Senegalese Electric Company.

Finally, the two chairmen and managing directors have agreed to exchange periodic annual visits.

Furthermore, the chairman and managing director of SIAME [Electrical Equipment and Materials Manufacturing Company], Mr Abdelmajid Limam, went on a market study trip to Senegal with an eye to selling meters and circuit breakers, manufactured by his company, a subsidiary of STEG, to that country.

The goal of this trip was to acquaint people with Tunisian products and their technical characteristics, he explained, noting that the tests which were carried out were conclusive, and that the contacts he has had with Senegalese officials showed that they were completely satisfied with the quality of the Tunisian products which fully meet their needs and their standards. "We have also observed that our products are competitive in terms of price relative to those proposed by other countries, which constitutes another encouraging sign for our being able to conquer the local markets," the chairman and managing director of SIAME also said.

Furthermore, Mr Limam disclosed the existence, at the study stage, of a project to establish an assembly line for electric meters in Senegal. This project is set within the framework of horizontal technological transfers and there are plans in this respect for the training of Senegalese technicians at SIAME, he indicated.

The officials of STINEM and SIAME noted that their visits to Senegal follow upon the visit of the chairman and managing director of SENELEC to Tunis early last February, at the end of which a cooperation agreement had been concluded between the Senegalese company and its Tunisian counterpart, STEG. According to the terms of this agreement, the two parties have agreed on the exchange of technicians, on the supplying of technical assistance to SENELEC by STEG, specifically in matters of training and operation of the electrical installations and of purchasing materials manufactured in Tunisia.

They remarked that this is a concrete manifestation of STEG's desire to promote Tunisian-Senegalese cooperation, which will henceforth be furthered by the creation of channels of communication between the two countries (maritime and air lines, telephone, telex).

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CSO: 4519/181

TUNISIA

ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL DELEGATION VISITS TUNISIA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 25 Mar 83 p 2

[Article: "Italian Industrialists in Tunisia"]

[Text] A delegation of Italian businessmen has been in Tunisia for a few days. It includes industrialists belonging to various economic sectors appropriate for an intensifying of bilateral cooperation.

Italian industrialists are already present in Tunisia in various sectors of economic life. This is the case, specifically, in the fields of commercial, industrial and financial cooperation, and of technical assistance.

At the public level, financial aid from the Italian government amounted to 161 billion Italian liras (1970-1980).

Similarly, trade exchanges between the two countries have experienced an increase -- a moderate one, true, but a continuous one --, with a remarkable advance during the year 1980, going from 368 million dinars in 1979 to 450 million dinars in 1980, or a rate of increase of 46.7 percent.

This favorable evolution is based on the sizable increase (77 percent) of Tunisian exports in 1981 compared to 1980, and an increase of imports (27.2 percent).

Such a trade evolution was translated by a drop in the deficit of the Tunisian balance of payments with Italy and by a net increase in the cover rate of imports, which went from 63.5 percent in 1980 to 88.3 percent in 1981.

A structural analysis of the bilateral trade revealed that Italy sold Tunisia primarily energy products (25.6 percent) and metallurgical products (18.1 percent): iron, cast iron, steel, copper, aluminum; and textile products (15.1 percent): fibers, synthetic fiber fabrics...

Italy, in turn, bought from Tunisia: foodstuffs (16.1 percent), energy products (57.2 percent), chemical products (15.2 percent), and textile products (5.5 percent).

Act 72: 24 Italian Companies Approved

Thus, within the framework of Act 72-38 of 27 April 1972, a special regime supporting industries which export their production completely, 24 Italian companies were approved for establishment in Tunisia: 12 of them in the textile sector; 3 in the leather and shoe sector; 3 in the mechanical, electrical, and electronic sectors; 4 in the sector of miscellaneous industries (lumber, paper, etcetera...); and 2 in the foodstuffs sector.

These projects have contributed to the approval of 1,723 jobs, for an approved investment of approximately 14,455.594 Tunisian dinars.

As for the projects accepted under Act 81-56, which promotes manufacturing industries and industrial decentralization, the production of which is intended for the Tunisian market and partly for export, 25 companies with Italian participation have been approved by the Investments Promotion Agency [API], among which:

- 1 in the textile sector;
- 12 in the mechanical, electrical and electronic sectors;
- 2 in the leather and shoe sector;
- 8 in the miscellaneous industry sector;
- 2 in the chemical industry sector.

The jobs approved under this law, for the projects with Italian participation, amount to 1,356 and the investments amount to 28,826.692 Tunisian dinars.

The latest Tunisian-Italian negotiations have led to the signing of important economic agreements. We will note primarily the convention signed in 1979, between the Italian and Tunisian governments, against double taxation of income. This important agreement should benefit industrial projects, a real transfer of technology for production intended for export. There is also a technical cooperation agreement between Tunisia and Italy, aimed at facilitating economic studies and technical advice relative to the promotion or improvement of Tunisian development projects.

Organized by the API, in collaboration with the Italian Foreign Trade Office, the visit of the Italian industrialists is aimed at promoting cooperation between Tunisian and Italian partners in matters of technology, of subcontracting and of export markets.

The delegation consists of approximately 30 people, representing businesses in the automobile parts, leather and shoe, pharmaceutical products, electromechanics and agro-industrial sectors.

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CSO: 4519/181

TUNISIA

SEMINAR ON PLANNED INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS OPENED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Mar 83 p 7

[Article: "Identification of Industrial Projects"]

[Text] The first specialized seminar on the analysis and assessment of industrial projects, which falls within the framework of the national training program in project analysis and management, was opened at Hammamet by Mr Moncef Belaid, managing director of the CNEI [National Industrial Studies Center], in the presence specifically of the representative of the UNDP, in Tunis.

The objective of this seminar, which will go on until 8 April 1983, is to improve and strengthen the knowledge of the upper level cadres (economists, engineers, financiers), of industrial enterprises, of the civil service, of development banks, and of public or private institutions involved in the preparation and selection of industrial projects, and those in the areas of identification, preparation and assessment of industrial projects.

The organization of this seminar, in which 29 officials from 19 institutions and 3 foreign officials, representing institutions in Morocco, Algeria and Hungary, was carried out by the CNEI, in collaboration with the BCT [Central Bank of Tunisia] and the CNEA [National Agricultural Studies Center].

The program of the seminar involves the following themes:

- 1) Identification of projects: sector related studies and market studies;
- 2) Technical study of projects: technological choice or level of project;
- 3) Financial profitability of the project at the company level (operation with micro-computers);
- 4) Economic profitability of the project at the level of the community.

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CSO: 4519/181

TUNISIA

DEVELOPMENT OF FRG-TUNISIAN COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 25 Mar 83 p 3

[Article: "Tunisia-FRG: Mr Von Ammerongen: 'Tunisia Is Major Base of Operation for Development of German-Arab Exchanges'"]

[Text] Bonn (TAP [TUNIS-AFRICA PRESS AGENCY]) -- "Thanks to its political stability, its relatively advanced economic and administrative infrastructure and its qualified manpower, Tunisia is a major base of operation for the development of German-Arab exchanges in general and the intensification of exports from the FRG to this region in particular." This was stressed in a statement made to the TAP agency in Bonn, by the president of the Federation of Chambers of German Industry and Commerce [DIHT], Mr Otto Wolff Von Ammerongen.

According to Mr Von Ammerongen, the close industrial cooperation established between the two countries, specifically in the sectors of textiles and of the mechanical and electronic industries, has made it possible to widen the prospects of a more integrated German-Arab cooperation, specifically involving the petroleum producing countries, which could be developed -- within the framework of such cooperation, referred to as "triangular" and associating a country on the verge of development, such as Tunisia, with West German technology and with Arab petroleum capital -- specifically in large scale industrial projects, which require a large consumer market and firm export outlets, but which also guarantee a real transfer of technology to Tunisia as well as to the other countries associated with such projects.

In this context, Mr Von Ammerongen warned against a continued drop in the price of petroleum, which could in the long run hamper the development of such cooperation, specifically if some day, due to a continued dwindling of their financial resources, the Arab petroleum producing countries were forced to reduce their investments abroad.

As for bilateral FRG-Tunisian cooperation, Mr Von Ammerongen, while expressing his satisfaction with the exemplary state reached by this industrial cooperation, manifested by the presence of 83 German businesses in Tunisia, stressed that "a great deal remains to be done." Among the sectors in which cooperation between Tunisia and the FRG could be developed and broadened, the president of the DIHT mentioned the manufacturing industries, specifically the mechanical, electrical, electronic and electrotechnical sectors, in which Tunisia has already made not unimportant progress, "which has allowed it to acquire the technological bases for its light industries," he added.

Asked about the repercussions of the latest 15 percent drop in petroleum prices decided on by OPEC, and on the 5.5 percent revaluation of the West German mark, on the foreign trade of the FRG in general, and with the Arab world in particular, Mr Von Ammerongen indicated that the main Arab partners of the FRG, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, have enough monetary reserves at their disposal to compensate for the latest drop in petroleum prices and to continue to finance their investment programs normally."

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CSO: 4519/181

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

COOPERATION PROTOCOL WITH YAR--Tunis, 15 April 1983 (TAP)--["Pool" item]--A protocol on the Tunisian-Yemeni talks held during the visit of Yemen Arab Republic minister of economy and industry, Mr Muhammad Hizan Shuhati, to Tunisia was signed on Thursday in Tunis. In this protocol the Yemeni side has undertaken to give priority to Tunisian products as far as Yemeni import quotas are concerned. In the industrial domain the two sides have agreed to intensify their cooperation mainly in the phosphate fertilizers sector, owing to the importance of these products in the area of agricultural development. The two sides have concluded a framework agreement whereby Tunisia will help Yemen to develop its tourist industry. Tunisia and the Yemen Arab Republic have also decided to develop their cooperation in the area of fisheries. In the field of education and teaching, Tunisian teachers will be recruited to work in Yemen while Yemeni students will be sent to Tunisia to continue their studies in Tunisian schools of high education. [Text] [LD160200 Tunis TAP in French 1300 GMT 15 Apr 83]

AGREEMENT WITH BELGIUM--Tunis, 19 April (TAP)--["Pool" item]--Tunisia and Belgium Monday signed in Tunisia a financial co-operation agreement under which Tunisia will receive 125 million Belgian francs of public credit with favorable conditions. This credit will finance Tunisian development projects. [Text] [LD200159 Tunis TAP in English 1410 GMT 19 Apr 83]

TRADE UNION COOPERATION WITH SPAIN--Tunis, 12 April (TAP)--The Tunisian General Trade Union (UGTT) and the Spanish Workers' General Union have recently signed in Madrid a cooperation agreement following the visit of the UGTT Chairman Habib Achour to Spain. This agreement provides for the exchange of visits and consultations on trade union problems on the international and local fronts. [Text] [LD130109 Tunis TAP in English 1410 GMT 12 Apr 83]

ENVOY TO TUNISIA--The Nigerian ambassador to Tunisia, Alhaji Tanimu Saulawa has presented his credentials to President Habib Bourguiba in Tunis. At the ceremony, Alhaji Tanimu pledged to strengthen the cordial relations between Nigeria and Tunisia. He commended Tunisia's cooperation with Nigeria in the efforts towards a total decolonization of Africa. The ambassador said that Nigeria and Tunisia were fully committed to the establishment of a new international economic order that would usher in a large measure of self-sufficiency in the developing world. [AB140910 Lagos Domestic in English 0700 GMT 14 Apr 83]

CSO: 4500/192

FINNISH REPORTER VISITS ALGERIAN REFUGEE CAMPS FOR SAHARANS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Apr 83 p 23

[Article by Heikki Alli: "The Children of the Sahara Have the Strength to Live; Merciless Desert Has Been Made to Produce Food, Yet Refugees' Lives Depend on Aid from Others"]

[Text] In the last installment of our series of articles on the Western Saharan War, we describe the situation the refugees of the area are in and in part report on the prospects for getting a government into operation among the refugees. The earlier installments of the series were published on 26 and 29 March.

Only rocks and sand grow on the Tindouf Plateau in the back country of South-western Algeria. Even in early spring the hot noonday wind dries up one's breath. Only the desolate rows of rock shards spill over the unbroken gray expanse of the undulating desert. As though a hunk of the moon's surface had been torn out and transplanted here.

The eye almost refuses to believe that one could live here. Nevertheless, over 100,000 human beings live here in an area of 100 square kilometers.

They are Western Saharan refugees. They have been here for 7 years now, some of them even longer, that is, since the Western Saharan War broke out at the end of 1975 in the area occupied by Morocco and Mauritania.

The Western Saharan liberation movement, the POLISARIO Front, brought the civilian population to safety here. Six and a half years ago I saw how death stalked the camps here. Little children died here like flies. The long flight and incessant wind had ripped to tattered heaps that scarcely remained standing the traditional tents of a people used to a nomadic life.

As we drove into the camp, a bunch of little children rushed to meet us. All the curly-headed moppets wanted to compete with one another to prove who could walk on his hands the longest on the stony soil licked by the wind.

In any refugee camp anywhere in the world you generally see from the children first how the living conditions are. In the Saharan camps the children now look healthy and in good shape. Here you no longer see swollen, distended bellies due to a lack of albumin.

Tomatoes

In the midst of it all, on the edge of the camp a millet field was in bloom, not a very big one but here, nonetheless, on this unlivable land. They grow grain and vegetables on a plot of ground a couple of hectares in size, protected from wind and sand by brick walls made of clay. There are cultivated plots in every camp. The inhabitants call them gardens. Furthermore, there are trees and shrubs as protection. Before there were none of these at all.

"It's hard here. Especially tomatoes are delicate plants and in winter the nights are cold," Baba, a Saharan agronomist explained.

"Tomatoes," I mused. Are we really here after all? Baba yanked a carrot out of the ground. I tasted it. Maybe the environment makes them taste sweeter than Finnish beets.

In the middle of the cultivated patch there is a bored well many tens of meters deep from which water is pumped into a tank reminiscent of a swimming pool for the evening watering. If they could get more water, the patch could be expanded. "Now there is usually only enough rain for the needs of the hospitals, sometimes for the schoolchildren," a Saharan who had studied farming in Spain said.

"Our most important job is to show our people, who have now been forced to abandon their nomadic life and settle down, that we can teach ourselves to grow our own food, even though we have to break up the soil each time to nearly the depth of a meter," the Saharan explained. "It's easier in our Sahara because the soil is not as hard to work as it is here and we have phosphates to produce fertilizers."

There does not appear to be any real shortage of food in the camps now. However, these people are completely dependent on aid from the outside. Nearly everything except water has to be brought in from elsewhere. Aside from Algeria, help has come primarily from the Western countries. About 20 tons of powdered milk has just arrived from Finland as well. The Saharans did not forget to remind us of this.

In Tents

They now live in army tents of the same type the Algerian Army uses, reinforced for desert conditions. The tents are grouped into neat rows. The different sections of the camps are bounded by perfectly straight strings of rocks. Everywhere there is an air of permanency or at least long-term provisionality.

In the tent a cluster of lengthy Saharan greetings flies in your face. Again they offer you tea. They make it over an LPG flame, no longer over the traditional coal stove as before. Here they would run out of firewood. They had already searched the area with a fine tooth comb in trucks within a radius of hundreds of kilometers 6 years ago.

The earthen floor was covered with a straw mat and thick Saharan woven fabrics, which are as soft as grass to sit on. The Saharan flag, or at least its colors: green as the revolution, red as the blood of heroes, white as the products of the soil, black as colonialism and in the middle a crescent moon and star, the symbol of the Maghreb, of the Arab countries of Northwest Africa, shone from hand-knotted wool carpets.

Nearly only women, children and old men can be seen in the camps. Every young Saharan male is now a "mukattil," a warrior. They are "somewhere inside" Western Sahara, fighting, they always reply here.

Civilians

Cloaked in the traditional aniline-red costume of the Saharan women, made of linen many meters long to protect them from the sand-filled wind and the sun, 28-year-old Mahmuda Kharrashi has not seen her husband in 5 months. Two or three times a year her husband comes here on furlough and spends a couple of weeks visiting with his wife and two children.

"The next time, we'll meet in a free Sahara," Mahmuda laughed. The reply is typical of the wives in the camps.

Not a single civilian from these camps has returned to the "areas liberated" by the Western Saharan POLISARIO. The POLISARIO explains that it is not yet possible to go back, that their safety cannot be guaranteed. Sometimes they arrange for civilians to visit their homeland, but not to remain there.

The front claims that some of the civilian population still live in the "liberated areas." Over 100,000 people live in these camps, a figure the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has recently confirmed. The POLISARIO Front has, on the other hand, estimated that the Western Saharan population amounts to about 750,000. I did not see a single civilian resident in Sagui el-Hamra on a 1,000-km tour of the northern part of Western Sahara. Where the rest of the population is the front does not more specifically explain. Nor does it say how much of the Saharan population is living in the areas "occupied" by Morocco either.

Founded by the POLISARIO here, the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic is now exercising the civilian functions of its national existence in the area where the military are fighting inside Western Sahara.

The Women

Although that area is in Algeria, the POLISARIO republic "temporarily" controls it. All the refugees are organized. There are three camps. They are called "wilayas," governorates. They have been named after the three biggest towns in Western Sahara: al-Aiun, Smara and Dakhla.

The camp directors are all men, but otherwise the women's role in camp operations is quite decisive. When the refugee problem arose, we launched a really exceptional program in Arab country districts; we set about training women

because almost all the men were at the front. This is what the director of Camp Smara, "wali" Muhammad Khaddad, a member of the POLISARIO Politburo, said.

The women are responsible for the life of the camp from the distribution of food to health care. Most of the nurses in the hospitals, which are neatly built with clay bricks and concrete, are women. The Saharan doctors, who have studied abroad, mainly in Spain, France and other Western European countries, have trained them here.

"There wasn't a single Saharan doctor in these camps 6 and a half years ago. Now all the doctors are Saharans. We don't have enough of them yet, but we manage," said Muhammad Fadil, the director of the big general hospital with many departments that was built detached from the regular camps for security reasons.

Medicines and care supplies are always in short supply. Refugee conditions notwithstanding, the hospital director explained, they have surprisingly already shifted to a phase of more preventive health care than before. The greatest emphasis is on child care. Just the opposite of what is generally the case in industrialized countries, the Western Saharans' objective is to raise the birth rate in order to increase the size of the small population. However, they did not provide us with any figures on the number of births.

Girls' School

About 20 km from Camp Smara there is a cluster of light-colored buildings many hundreds of square meters in size, almost imperceptible in a hollow created by hardened mounds of sand. The flags of the Saharan Republic flap on their flagpoles bent by gusts of wind.

"Kullu watan aw shahid -- all of the fatherland or the death of a hero," can be read in beautiful Arabic calligraphy on the largest wall of the buildings grouped together into the shape of a rectangle.

This is a girls' school, named the 27 February Day School after the independence day of the Saharan Republic. Young girls march here in khaki-colored field uniforms with their hair wound in desert-gray turbans. Dressed in a uniform unmarked for rank a woman teacher gives the commands for close order drill. The girls had no weapons. But here they are also taught to fight.

"They get 7 hours a week of combat training," said Sallamha Mulai Ahmad, the assistant director of the girls' boarding school. However, most of the courses offered at the school, which was founded over 4 years ago, are civilian education courses, almost the same subjects as in Finnish high schools plus traditional Saharan handicrafts.

"So far women have not taken part in the fighting per se," Sallamha said. Our battle is here, in the camps, she added. She takes a self-assured stand on the Saharan woman's role in the society. Our traditional nomadic life has forced men and women to enjoy equal status.

Here a woman is not merely a mother and children's caretaker. Sallamha has been married for many years now. She has not yet had time to think about having children because the "people's struggle" has taken time. Such an attitude and such an opportunity are extremely rare for women in the Arab countries.

"Still Little Chance of Peace"

There are two paths, either fight or negotiate. The opportunities for negotiation have so far been limited. Talking about them now would be putting the cart before the horse.

This is the situation in the Saharan War, which has been going on quietly but undeniably for over 7 years now. This is the way it still is from the viewpoint of the Western Saharan Democratic Arab Republic.

Saharan Republic Prime Minister Mahfud Ali Baiba presented us with this view. We were sitting Arab-style on the floor of the cool-walled reception room for guests furnished with woolly carpets, a few dozen kilometers from the oasis town of Tindouf — in Algeria.

The interview was not conducted in Western Sahara, in Hauza, where the Saharan Republic says its government is temporarily located. A day before I had finished spending a couple of days with POLISARIO fighters in Hauza and its outskirts. I hear that the government offices there are underground somewhere, but they would not even agree to take a foreigner to them blindfolded. "For security reasons," they answered my question.

"Morocco has the ball now," the field-green-clad 30-year-old prime minister said. Despite his youth, he is a veteran of the Saharan War, has participated in it right from the start and as prime minister since the Fifth POLISARIO Congress last October. He was wearing the same kind of wool combat jacket I had seen on the Palestinians.

Conciliation

"The ball has been in Morocco's hands since President Bendjedid Chadli and King Hassan II met," Prime Minister Ali Baiba indicated. The Algerian and Moroccan chiefs of state had met for the first time since the outbreak of the Saharan War. It was felt that the meeting was a sign of swift progress toward a negotiated settlement.

"Algeria is merely trying to bring the views of the parties to the war closer to one another," Ali Baiba remarked. He reminded us of Algeria's role as a conciliator 3 and a half years ago when an accord was reached between the Saharan Republic and Mauritania. "But the king of Morocco does not want a peaceful solution and is instead still preparing for war." Without even mentioning the United States once, he alluded to Morocco's allies. According to its agreement with the United States, this year Morocco will get arms worth 500 million markkas from the United States or a loan to buy them. The amount has quadrupled in 2 years time.

Supporters

What about support for the POLISARIO? Does it come primarily from Algeria and Libya? The prime minister did not reveal how much military or civilian aid is being received from Algeria or Libya, nor can reliable information on this be obtained from elsewhere.

"Military aid is part of the general support we get and it has grown as the fighting has increased," Ali Baiba said. Aid has come from elsewhere too, "but it can never make up for our people's struggle. Algeria and Libya may understand this better because they are nations in this area and have themselves fought against colonial powers. This is a colonial problem," Ali Baiba reminded us and said that Algeria had only recently also reminded Morocco of that.

In the opinion of POLISARIO opponents, the Saharan War has been financed by Algeria right from the start and is an indication of Algeria's efforts to obtain a direct route to the Atlantic via Western Sahara for its own natural wealth in the Sahara.

Of its partners in the future of an independent Western Sahara, Ali Baiba declared that "the Saharans will never forget who their friends are and who their enemies are."

In the prime minister's opinion, the Nordic countries' attitude toward the Western Saharan question would serve as an example for others. "They have helped us from the beginning."

Revolution

"Our relations with the Soviet Union and the other European socialist nations are of the same kind as those we have with other nations that have not recognized the Saharan Republic but do recognize its people's right to self-determination," Ali Baiba replied to our question. "So far we have received no aid from them," he said.

Ali Baiba did not specify what relationship the "Saharan Revolution" bears to Africa's other revolutions like those of Ethiopia, Angola or Algeria. "We are an African people and we respect their achievements, but each of us has his own features," he parried the question.

"The Saharan Republic intends to participate as a full-fledged member in the 19th Summit Conference, which has already foundered twice, but for which preparations are now again being made by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)," Ali Baiba confirmed to us. "The OAU resolution to hold a plebiscite to decide on the future of Western Sahara cannot be implemented as long as Morocco occupies the area," he said.

11,466

CSO: 3617/102

NATURE, CAUSES OF DOMESTIC RECESSION ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 21, 22 Mar 83

/Article by Muhammad 'Abd-Naji and Sami al-Haddad: "The Recession in the Kuwaiti Economy"/

/21 Mar 83 p 7/

/Text/ The recession which has dominated economic activity has been strongly linked to monetary and financial changes in the local economy. One can, while not neglecting the external factors, say that the crisis of stocks in the al-Manakh market was the factor that set off the recession that had been latent in the domestic market for some time. While the material and tangible sectors could be expressive of the true nature of the crisis in actual conditions, the monetary changes represent the best elements for expressing the monetary side of the phenomenon of recession through their quantitative and numerical portrayal of the factors of the market and commercial activity.

At this point one can say that the commercial banks, in spite of the wariness of their banking policies, could be expressive of the true nature of the crisis, through their activities. In this context, the changes in "demands on the private sector" are the most likely sources for revealing the extent of the private sector's efficiency and activity, and its demand for credit facilities an expression of the economic condition it is experiencing. In this framework, one can say that a survey of publicly released figures on banking activity in Kuwait will enable them to reveal important aspects of the crisis. Important indicators concerning the recession in commercial activity are apparent in the monthly monetary bulletin issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait for 1983, which one can sense as follows:

1. The retrenchment in private sector demand deposit:

The period following the middle of last year, in particular since July 1982, has witnessed a palpable retrenchment in the volume of demand deposits in commercial banks, of private sector. These dropped from 1,092,500,000 dinars in July 1982, and continued to drop in a series of monthly reductions, until at the end of last year, specifically last December, they came to about 837 million dinars; that was a drop of about 254.5 million dinars since the month of July. With the start of the current year, these came to about 850.2 million

dinars, which was the level that held last September. The retrenchment in deposits reflects the private sector's need for immediate liquidity to cover financial affairs that had been in suspense because of the stock market crisis. On the other hand, it also reflects the phenomenon of some people holding onto their cash assets in other currencies or transferring them into other forms of deposits. The drop in demand deposits is to be considered an indication that they were not used to pay the customary instalments by stock market investors.

2. The drop in local interest rates:

Aside from the role of external influences on international interest rates on local rates, the local interest rates were subjected to the severe influence of local conditions connected to the crisis in the al-Manakh market. It has been acknowledged that rises in interest rates occur as an index of intense demand for borrowing, in order to pay instalments on financial transactions in the market or to cover commercial instalments. The drops in interest rates have occurred as an objective indicator that demand for loans dropped to modest levels as a consequence of the al-Manakh crisis and the state of recession in the market. From the above-mentioned Central Bank statistics, one can infer that interest rates, as of September 1982, dropped in a noteworthy conjunction with the intensified burden of the crisis in the market. A retrenchment was observed in interest rates for a 1-year period from 13.09 percent in September to 8.01 percent last December, and the retrenchment, which reached 7.50 percent in January 1983, continued with the start of the new year. Meanwhile, interest for a 3-month period dropped from 12.28 percent in September to 6.18 percent in December, that is, to half its previous level. It then dropped further, reaching 5.68 percent in January 1983. Interest for a 1-month period dropped from 10.67 percent in September to 5.55 percent in December 1982, and then dropped in January 1983 to 5.16 percent. Short term interest (for a week or day) declined as part of the same trend.

The drop in the interest rates stands as an indicator of the recession in commercial activities and the slowdown in the level of local activity in the financial sector, which was affected by the crisis in the money market and by commercial recession in general.

3. The continued severe recession in the securities market:

It became apparent that the volume of transactions in the shares of Kuwaiti companies offered for public subscription in the last quarter of 1982 came to about 55 million, worth 476 million dinars, whereas the volume of shares transacted in the same period of 1981 was estimated at about 64,787,000; that is, the volume dropped by more than 9 million shares. The efforts the transacting companies made to break up conflicts among people making transactions were not successful, and new early signs of confidence in a market that had been marred by anxiety and wariness did not manifest themselves, even with regard to the future, as long as there were no rapid prospects of a letup in the crisis. Unless the solutions that have been set out absorb the real nature of future market demands and individuals commit themselves to resolving the crisis

among various parties, the market will continue to be burdened by the severe crisis which has brought the other activities of the society into further frustration and slow activity along with it.

While so far we have been reviewing the different aspects of financial and monetary changes, by casting light on the other features of aspects of the recession, which are embodied in the degree of retrenchment that has afflicted the national accounts, we will reveal the degree to which foreign factors have had an influence in rounding out the local recession crisis.

The retrenchment in national accounts:

Last year, and the beginning of this year, witnessed a tangible retrenchment in the rates of public revenues and government spending, as an objective result of the drop in Kuwait's revenues from oil exports, because of the drop in the price of oil on the international markets and the limited size of local exports. In this context, total government revenues dropped from 921.7 million dinars in the first quarter of last year to 714.3 million dinars at the end of the third quarter. In the face of this, public spending (capital and current spending, spending on construction and spending on completions) dropped from 710.6 million dinars in the first quarter of 1982 to 587.6 million dinars at the end of the third quarter. Thus the volume of the national accounts surplus shrank from 211.1 million dinars in the first quarter to 12.7 million dinars in the third quarter of the last year, reflecting the effects of oil income and income from foreign investments on the level of public spending, which constitutes a fundamental focal point in trends of domestic economic activity. Spending policy in the early part of this year reflected an attitude of wariness about international economic vicissitudes and the building up of expectations to cope with any future emergencies.

The drop in the size of the balance of trade surplus:

In the light of the retrenchment in exports, in particular oil exports, which dropped from 5,111,500,000 dinars in 1980 to 3,967,300,000 in 1981, then came to about 217.3 million dinars in February 1982 as compared with 406.7 million in February 1981, a retrenchment which was accompanied by an increase in imports, which rose from 1,764,900,000 dinars in 1980 to 1,939,500,000 dinars in 1981, and, in February 1982 came to about 182.6 million dinars as compared with 105 million in February 1981, the balance of payments surplus declined in conspicuous fashion, dropping from 3,754,700,000 dinars at the end of 1980 to 2,602,100,000 dinars at the end of 1981, and totalling about 77.9 million dinars in February 1982 as compared with 241.6 million dinars in February 1981.

There is no doubt that these retrenchments underline disruption in the rates of trade with the outer world and reveal one of the sources that have led to a low rate of growth in general and a low rate of contribution of exports to gross domestic product, which will have an effect of the future of development.

These stagnant conditions in the domestic economy have reached a point where it is necessary that one hasten, without delay, to intervene on an official

basis to remedy the crisis before it becomes aggravated. The rates of growth of the economic sectors have severely declined under the influence of local factors, for whose treatment sound bases must be set forth, and under the influence of foreign factors which we consider it is necessary that one be careful to face up to, in accordance with the resources available.

It is not possible to delay reviewing the urgent task of dealing with the recession, because it exceeds the most prominent issues that have been raised regarding our domestic economy in its intensity.

The effect on national accounts demands that one make a re-evaluation of priorities in a manner that will guarantee that a positive balance is created in favor of the development process. We should not consider that that will be possible unless it has an effect in creating new opportunities for transcending the state of recession and proceeding toward the desired revival.

/22 Mar 83 p 7/

/Text/ The wheels of domestic trade are now passing through a group of influential factors that have limited their capability to a degree that has provoked questions and queries on the extent to which this situation will continue and whether there are indications that the crisis will ease so that domestic commercial activity can return to its normal condition in terms of its internal and foreign weight. It appears, from the nature of the crisis, that the proliferation and interaction of influential factors, and their effect on one another, is the most significant element. In particular, there has been a difference in opinion on the type of factor that is the most influential--whether it is the crisis in the al-Manakh market or the Iraqi-Iranian war and the psychological effects it has created in the area, which have affected the nature and the pattern of the citizen's general conduct, which has greatly influenced his various patterns of consumption. In addition, there is the Middle East crisis in general, a political crisis for which so far no early indications of a comprehensive settlement have appeared. Then, finally, there is the OPEC crisis, and the disorganized retrenchment that has resulted from that in the rates of oil imports, in the domestic context and in the context of the Gulf states as a whole.

The questions that are still at issue are: What are the most influential factors, what type of commercial activity has been most affected, and to what extent will this crisis continue to exist? In examining policy on the state of the commercial market, in order to learn about the real nature of what is going on inside that market by following the various activities of some enterprises, the view was as follows:

The food market:

People observing the market say that demand in the subsidized sectors has not been affected and that in general the course of trade in foodstuffs is constantly declining because of a group of overlapping factors, the most important of which has been the political situation in the area as a whole, alongside

the constant increase in the standard of living, to an extent that is not in keeping with per capita income. This had had an obvious effect on the citizens' consumption patterns. This phenomenon has attracted the attention of officials in banks, who observed a drop of 25 to 50 percent in imports into the country. Observers explained that, in addition to other factors, by the fact that storage companies have recently raised prices per cubic meter by 10 to 15 percent, which has increased storage costs. In addition, a number of merchants have declined to import commodities for which there is little demand, calculating that any emergency might increase their cost, especially since there is an official tendency to raise expenditures on services, and might lead to an effect, albeit indirect, on consumers' buying power.

Concerning the role of the al-Manakh crisis, the most obvious phenomenon is the difficulty of obtaining purchases on credit from merchants, because some of them have been affected by the crisis. As far as the most important changes in consumers' buying power go, one can say that demand for high-quality, high-priced goods has been noticeably affected, while demand for other goods has not. In addition, the process of regulating migration into the country and the departure of more than 50,000 workers from the country has had an obvious effect on activity in the food market, especially when we realize that this group was one of the greedier consumer sectors and had great weight in the market.

The market for readymade clothes:

People conducting transactions in the market consider that the course of trade within the market has been greatly affected, to a degree that has come to 50 percent in the case of some goods. Consumers today have started to think twice before buying, because the general situation is not contingent on the economic situation--rather, these people consider that the political situation in the region and a group of other reasons have all plainly influenced the psychology of the consumer. It is sufficient to say that the market of Iraq and Iran made up 50 percent of the total foreign markets that Kuwaiti merchants dealt with. In addition, there has been the obvious activity in the Saudi market, which continues to merit attention; there, import activity has started to be brisk, because exporters and producers have gone into the market themselves, without middlemen; as a result of inflation and the decline in demand for their products, they have been compelled to move into many consumer markets without giving attention to middlemen or big merchants in the area. As a consequence of this, Saudi merchants have been encouraged to deal with many markets abroad. In general, the market as a whole has been affected, in terms of all sectors, and the al-manakh crisis was one of these influential factors, although in the degree of its influence it did not just affect the Kuwaiti market but spread to all the neighboring markets. However, the local merchant, in spite of these circumstances, still has been fully prepared to work, and, motivated by that desire, he has not ceased searching.

A question continues to be raised:

There are small shops that have been living off their daily sales, and, in the context of this situation, have started to be unable to meet their costs. What will their behavior be?

The Automobile market:

Demand for large cars in general has declined, because of a group of factors, among which has been the high price of gasoline. The al-Manakh crisis greatly affected the behavior of customers, especially Kuwaitis, who were used to replacing models every year. This phenomenon has declined perceptibly. As regards activity in small car sales, that is proceeding strongly in the market.

The market for electric appliances:

The activity of sales of electrical appliances, such as refrigerators, gas stoves and television sets has not been greatly affected, since the change in that did not exceed 10 percent, although more than one factor, of which the crisis in the al-Manakh market was one, enters into the explanation for this drop. People conducting transactions in the market have observed that the phenomenon of the replacement of electric appliances with other new ones has declined greatly from its previous level, and they have attributed that to the rise in spending on services on the one hand and the current political circumstances the area as a whole is going through, and the negative effects they have left on the patterns of behavior of the local consumer.

Scientific, chemical and medical equipment:

People dealing in these consider that the degree to which the scientific, medical and chemical equipment market has been affected is to a large degree connected to the major project the Ministry of Public Health and the university are involved in.

The real estate sector;

The real estate sector is firmly linked to the al-Manakh crisis, since many people have been detained because they did not pay off their debts, and had real estate notes that had to be paid within the next few months. In addition, there are people who had been selling real estate on instalments in order to buy stocks on instalments, which made the problem more complicated. Expectations are that there will be a severe crisis in the real estate market starting early next June, which is when the deferred real estate notes will start to be due. This crisis will be no less severe than the crisis in the al-Manakh market. The first signs of this crisis appeared recently, in complaints presented to the office of the public prosecutor.

In general, the movement of sales within the real estate investment market has recently started to rise, as a result of the increase in intense speculation within it. Prices have risen by the equivalent of 15 to 20 percent in this market, although annual returns from it are no greater than 6 or 7 percent. Therefore, this rise in prices can be attributed to speculation. As regards activity in the real estate housing market, that has dropped by a noticeable degree, and has been followed by a retrenchment in prices which came to about 15 percent because of a lack of buyers on the one hand and an excess of supply over demand on the other.

The construction sector:

What cannot be doubted is the fact that the construction sector has been greatly affected, because of its firm connection to the real estate sector; it is a sector that follows the movement of real estate, in terms of sales, purchases, and construction work.

In general, activity in the construction sector may be broken down into two types:

First, work with the government sector, and second, work with the private sector. Work within the government sector is done through the bids set forth by the Central Bid Committee or those set forth by other ministries or governmental or quasi-governmental bodies, such as the al-Shu'aybah Authority and the oil companies.

Activity in the private sector is restricted to villas for citizens, commercial and residential complexes, central markets and so forth. One can state that the al-Manakh crisis has had an extreme effect on work within the private sector, since a great incentive existed for spending on private villas and for buying real estate and building residential buildings, residential complexes, and office and central market buildings. These activities were greatly affected because of the obvious retrenchment in this area of strong incentives. The government sector was affected somewhat, especially when we realize that the number of bids has not declined, but has perhaps risen in the form of the bids offered on residential dwellings, the opening of projects in the area of al-'Aridiyah, south al-Sulaybikhat, and perhaps south Sabah al-Salim, and so forth. The contractors' ability to carry out these government commitments will depend to a large degree on the extent of their liquidity and the extent to which they are affected by the al-Manakh crisis, especially in the first months after the project is awarded to them. There is a possibility that they will absorb the next instalments in covering the commitments which arose when they were affected by the al-Manakh crisis, while neglecting their commitments toward the projects that have been awarded to them.

The gold market:

Sales activities in the gold market have declined greatly for a number of reasons, the most important of which have been the rise in prices internationally, alongside the weakness of the local consumer's buying power on the other. People dealing within the market have attributed the weakness of consumers' buying power to a group of factors that have affected their personal behavior, including the rise in the costs of living, the political circumstances that the Middle East area as a whole are going through, and the psychological effects imparted by the Iranian-Iraqi war as well, especially since no initiative for a comprehensive resolution of the issue has yet appeared on the horizon.

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CSO: 4404/296

GOVERNMENT REFUSES REENTRY OF PALESTINIANS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 309, 4-10 Apr 83 p 15

[Text] Diplomatic sources have announced that the Gulf states have attempted in recent weeks to convince senior Lebanese officials to allow a number of Palestinians--between 10 thousand and 12 thousand--to return to Lebanon on the grounds that they have been working in the Gulf for a long time, are carrying Lebanese documentation, and belong to families who emigrated in 1948. However, their passports only contain the phrase "permission to exit," and not the phrase "permission to return."

The officials responded that they were unable to reconsider the decisions taken by the concerned security offices since it was clear that the Palentinians agreed to the condition levied by these offices when they presented requests for passports and exit visas, but not reentry visas. This number of Palestinians left Lebanon during the recent events and after the Israeli invasion. They informed the concerned offices that they were willing to abide by the stipulation that they not be permitted to return.

The Gulf states said that new measures have been enacted by security officials stipulating that any individual in the country without work must be expelled. Information presented by these officials indicated that this number of Palestinians had come to the Gulf from Lebanon.

The Lebanese officials refused to consider this argument, but held to their current position that no Palestinian who agreed to the aforementioned condition would be permitted to return. The officials said that they did not have clear information concerning the number of Palestinians who left Lebanon with the condition that they not return. This, however, does not mean the Gulf countries can ignore the huge number of Palestinians living in Lebanon and the political and economic problems the country faces, or the inability of the Gulf states to receive this limited number of Palestinians and find, with other Arab countries, a solution to the problem of the Palestinian presence in the Gulf.

Lebanon stressed, in connection with this, that contrary to news published in Gulf papers concerning reprisals against the Palestinians in Lebanon, the government of Lebanon had not carried out any reprisals but, rather, had enforced the law in light of security interest.

In addition to domestic considerations which prevent the government from accepting the return of this number of Palestinians to Beirut, there are international considerations which reinforce the government's position. The issue of Palestinians is not confined to the Gulf states, but extends to certain European countries. Before the Gulf states raised this issue, West European states asked the government of Lebanon to permit Palestinians living on their territory to return to Lebanon on the grounds that they were carrying Lebanese papers and belonged to families who had emigrated in 1948. However, the Lebanese authorities denied the request and informed the European states that they could take any appropriate steps as long as such steps did not require the return of these Palestinians to Lebanon.

The Lebanese government then proceeded to inform the European states and the Gulf states that it had information proving that groups of these Palestinians had returned to the Biqa' and the North and that the goal of the attempts being made was to get permission for them to return to Beirut. The Lebanese government considers the return of these groups to the Biqa' and the North to be illegal, and although the current situation in the two regions prevents the government from enforcing the law, the law will be enforced there after the return of the legitimate government. As long as the legitimate government controls Beirut, the law will be enforced there, and the government will not allow the return of any Palestinian who left Lebanon with a passport stating "permission to exit." After the withdrawal of foreign forces the government intends to study the issue of the illegal presence of Palestinians who entered Lebanon after 1948.

CSO: 4404/322

FUTURE OF PALESTINIANS IN NORTH, BIQA' EXAMINED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 310, 11-17 Apr 83 p 3

[Text] Besides attempting to remove obstacles to an agreement on withdrawal of foreign forces, Lebanese officials are cooperating with American administration officials and a number of Arab countries in behind the scenes attempts to examine the future of the Palestinian fighters deployed in the Biqa' and the North after the withdrawal of foreign forces, and to convince these Arab countries to receive the fighters as they did after the West Beirut problem was solved.

Informed circles say that the problem of the fighters who are distributed throughout the Biqa' and the North is not an easy one and that the complications which exist are more serious than those that prevailed during the withdrawal of the fighters from West Beirut. The efforts undertaken so far have indicated that the majority of Arab countries which accepted Palestinians from West Beirut and its suburbs are not willing to receive additional fighters, even though half of them have returned to Lebanon. The excuse cited by the Arab countries is related to the economic hardships that would result and the fear of the negative repercussions these hardships would have on conditions in general.

Lebanese and American officials are trying to convince the Tunisian government to agree to receive the majority of the fighters who will depart from the Biqa' and the North. Yet it is difficult to say if the Tunisian government is ready to go along with this.

Information and accounts of the true number of Palestinian fighters vary. Some information indicates that there are 10 thousand fighters in the Biqa' and the North. Other information raises that number to 12 or 15 thousand. It is worth noting that the number of combatants who have withdrawn from West Beirut and the southern suburbs was estimated to be around 8,500.

However, it is not a question of numbers for the Arab countries. Rather, it is a question of principle, the principle being to limit the number of Palestinians received and to leave the majority of them in Lebanon until their problem is solved.

These circles add that the Arab countries which agreed to accept the fighters after their departure from Beirut were aware that the majority of them would return to Lebanon, that is, to the Biqa' and the North, since the Lebanese government does not control these two areas. Accepting the fighters after their departure from the Biqa' and the North would mean accepting them permanently in these countries because the Lebanese government, which would occupy the area after the withdrawal, would not allow any of them to return.

These circles anticipate that a settlement to the problem will be reached based on a former statement issued by U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, in which he called on the Palestinian fighters to surrender their heavy weapons to the Lebanese army and depart from Lebanese territory with their light weapons. These circles add that it is unlikely that the PLO would agree to hand over its heavy arms to the army since it is not in a position to implement the same plan it carried out in Beirut, wherein the organization gave its heavy arms to Lebanese organizations which had cooperated with it. This plan was one of the main reasons for the entry of the Israeli forces into the West Beirut and the southern suburbs.

CSO: 4404/322

OMAN

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SEYCHELLES--Prompted by a sincere desire to expand the ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, national sovereignty and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, the governments of the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Seychelles have decided to establish diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level. As they declare this joint statement the governments of the two countries hope that the establishment of diplomatic relations between them will contribute toward the development of the ties of friendship and joint cooperation and serve the interests of the two countries. [Text] [GF161450 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 16 Apr 83]

CSO: 4400/288

QATAR

BRIEFS

QATARI BUDGET--An official source at the Qatari Finance and Oil Ministry has told QNA that Qatar has been affected by the severe drop in its oil products and by the drop in oil prices. The new budget is estimated at 5.35 billion riyals. The source noted that the revenues reached 8.91 billion riyals against 18.08 billion riyals in the previous budget, implying a drop of 51 percent. Expenditures reached 14.26 billion riyals against 16.11 billion riyals in the previous budget, implying a reduction of 11 percent. [Doha QNA in Arabic 1130 GMT 17 Apr 83]

CSO: 4400/288

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

IMPORTS THROUGH DUBAI IN 1982--Dubayy, 16 Apr (WAM)--According to a statistical report prepared by the Dubai Customs and Ports Authority, the volume of UAE imports that passed through Dubai ports in 1982 totalled 4.557 billion kg compared with 5.322 billion kg in 1981, a fall of 14.6 percent. The value of imports in 1982 totalled 17.865 billion dirhams, compared with 19.679 dirhams in 1981, a fall of 4.3 percent. The imports included foodstuff, livestock, beverages, tobacco, oils, chemicals, manufactured goods and machinery. [Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 1810 GMT 16 Apr 83]

CSO: 4400/288

GOVERNMENT PLANS TOP ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD

Madras THE HINDU in English 28 Feb 83 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Feb. 27

The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, is reported to be thinking of setting up an energy board, council or commission to advise the Government on better uses of renewable and non-renewable sources of energy through well-coordinated utilisation.

Though she has not yet decided on the composition and terms of reference of the proposed panel, one of the names being considered for its chairmanship is Mr. K. C. Pant, a former Minister of Energy, who had made valuable contribution in the past to the improvement of power generation.

The Energy Board, Council or Commission, which will have more or less the same status and advisory role as the recently constituted Economic Council, will be required to take an integrated view of energy development in the fields of petroleum and coal as well as thermal, hydro-electric and nuclear power generation to overcome one of the major bottlenecks in the country's agricultural and industrial development.

Investment in oil industry: It will also advise the Government on better ways of utilising biogas, recycling used lubricants, development of solar energy, and popularisation of solar cookers and fuel-saving Nutan stoves.

The country will be investing Rs. 5,000 crores more in the oil industry to reach a production of 30 million tonnes of crude by 1984-85 to meet 70 per cent of the requirements. The Ministry of Petroleum has also been working on a five-year perspective plan for ONGC which will have to acquire exploration equipment on a large scale, involving considerable investment.

But what is worrying the Government is the sharp rise in kerosene consumption, well above the normal rate of increase, because of the growing scarcity of firewood and its

rising price. The demands of the State Governments for kerosene for 1982-83 are 21 per cent higher than the 1981-82 figure.

Alternative domestic fuel: The Centre, therefore, wants to take steps to popularise and make available alternative sources of domestic fuel to contain the growing "kerosene thirst" within manageable limits, while investing more in oil exploration to make the country nearly self-sufficient in oil by the end of this decade.

A similar effort is being made on the coal front to improve the quality and quantity of production. But the Government is unable to embark on a crash programme owing to paucity of funds since the money provided for coal development is not adequate for a breakthrough on this front.

Coal production: The total coal output in 1981-82 was 125 million tonnes. But the anticipated demand in 1984-85 will be 173 million tonnes, eight million tonnes more than what has been envisaged under the Sixth Plan. As coal production is closely linked with thermal power generation, it has come to acquire special importance in the context of the current efforts to meet the critical shortages of energy impeding agricultural and industrial development.

Improving thermal generation: As a result of the steps taken to improve maintenance of the existing thermal power plants, the capacity utilisation has gone up from 44.4 to 46.8 per cent. The Sixth Plan envisages a step-up of total power output from 112 billion units in 1979-80 to 191 billion units in 1984-85. In taking steps to improve the performance of the old and the new plants, a simultaneous effort has to be made to eliminate various factors contributing to slippages and delays in generation as well as transmission.

Setback to nuclear power output: The

Government is equally concerned about the setback to the nuclear power programme which is far behind schedule. But here, the country has been faced with many political constraints and technological hurdles. The inordinate delay in commissioning the Kalpakkam plant at a time when Tamil Nadu is faced with a critical power shortage is only one of the many problems afflicting the country's nuclear power programme. The Tarapur and Rajasthan plants have been generating at less than half their rated capacity while the construction schedule at Narora is far behind.

The proposed energy board, council or commission will include experts on oil, coal, conventional and nuclear power to enable the Government have the benefit of their expertise in making an integrated effort to overcome the shortages.

CSO: 4600/1845

PROSPECTS OF INDO-SOVIET SPACE COOPERATION TOLD

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 28 Feb 83 p 20

[Text] BANGALORE, February 27--EVERY thing being equal, within a year India will join the select band of countries whose cosmonauts have taken a look at this planet from space.

Two Indian cosmonauts, Wing Commander R. Malhotra and Squadron leader R. Sharma, both products of the test pilot school in Bangalore, are currently undergoing training at the Yuri Gagarin cosmonaut training centre. One of them will be selected to fly aboard the Soviet "Salyut-Soyuz" orbital research complex. The mission is planned for the spring of 1984.

At present, they are studying the Russian language, astronomy, cosmonautics and basic systems of the "Salyut" orbital station and the "Soyuz-T" spacecraft.

A feature of the joint Indo-USSR seminar-cum-workshop on space research, which concluded its five-day session here on Friday, was a special discussion on the proposed joint manned flight into space.

Provisionally, the first Indian cosmonaut will spend about a week in space, carrynig out seven experiments in space medicine, five experiments in material science and over ten tasks in remote sensing of the earth from space. This programme of experiments will require no less than 30 hours of the cosmonaut's working time in orbit. Yoga exercises may be tried to find out whether they can be an answer to "space sickness."

The Indo-Soviet joint space mission, mooted at a summit level meeting four years ago, now becomes part of a protocol signed on Friday between the Indian Space Research Organisation and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The protocol covers various aspects of future co-operation in space research, with particular reference to remote sensing, astronomy and astrophysics, meteorology and atmospheric sciences, tracking of staellites and space technology.

The protocol comes at the end of a review of the 20-year-long Indo-USSR co-operation in space research.

During the seminar-cum-workshop, specific proposals by both sides were made for discussions to provide a framework for future co-operation. These included the possibility of using ground-based facilities, both in India and Soviet Union, for research in astronomy, flying Indian payloads in Soviet spacecraft for scientific studies, planning for co-ordinated experiments for studies in upper atmosphere and ionosphere and joint scientific investigations of important problems of meteorology.

The possibility of using the optical tracking network in the Soviet Union and India for precise determination of the trajectory of Halley's comet was also discussed.

Soviet scientists, in co-operation with scientists from Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, France, Austria and Federal Republic of Germany, are working vigorously on the project devoted to the exploration of comet Halley. In the framework of the project, two spacecraft are planned to be launched in late 1984. The success of the mission largely depends on the correct selection of the spacecraft trajectory which is calculated from the ephemerides of comet Halley. As academician V. A. Kotelnikov pointed out, Indian scientists can also observe the comet from Kavalur. The station at Kavalur may be used for such studies after appropriate re-equipment, thanks to its geographical location and advantageous meteorological conditions.

Gamma Astronomy

Another aspect of Indo-Soviet co-operation is joint research in gamma astronomy. India has a unique range for stratospheric studies, located in Hyderabad, near the geomagnetic equator. The site offers advantageous conditions for experiments in astrophysics, particularly gamma astronomy and cosmic rays. And even weak gamma sources can be detected reliably.

Soviet scientists from Lebedev Physical Institute, USSR, and Moscow Physical-Engineering Institute, together with their Indian colleagues from the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, developed a methodology for observations and data processing. The Soviet side manufactured and furnished gamma telescopes to be flown on Indian high-flying balloons and support equipment. The Indian side was responsible for the mission, including attitude control, telemetry reception and recovery of the instruments. From 1977 to 1980 nine balloons with gamma telescopes were launched. The experiments yielded valuable results, although not all of the launches were successful.

From the Indian side, Prof. S. Dhawan noted that astronomy and astrophysics are among the most exciting front-line areas of science. In India, there are nearly 30 research institutes and university departments engaged in this area of research. However, less than half of these are well-equipped.

Satellite Systems

India has two problems in designing satellite systems. On the one hand, it is stated, India is a sub-continent and the best use of satellites occurs when

there are many users all over the country. Spacecraft can send down megabits of information to a large ground station which can process and distribute this to users. The question is whether it will be more efficient and also economical in the long run if the data is processed on the spacecraft itself and selectively received directly by the widely dispersed users on the ground. Onboard processing is thus a major challenge.

Another interesting and important area, from the Indian viewpoint, is autonomous station-keeping by spacecraft. Although India is a sub-continent, on the global scale, it has no tracking stations in other parts of the world. Research on autonomously maintained satellites will, therefore, be worthwhile in the future.

Three Indian satellites have been jointly launched with Soviet rockets so far. "Aryabhata" was launched in April 1975 to conduct studies in X-ray and gamma astronomy and aeronomy. "Bhaskara-I" and "Bhaskara-II" launched in June 1970 and November 1981, were meant for remote sensing of the earth.

CSO: 4600/1844

FURTHER REPORTAGE ON SITUATION IN ASSAM

Causes Analyzed

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 3 Mar 83 p 9

[Article by S. Gurudev]

[Text]

GAUHATI, March 2.—Mrs Gandhi has said that an elected Government will be in a better position to handle the situation in Assam. The implication is that the advisers "botched" it and that the new Congress (I) Chief Minister, Mr Hiteswar Saikia, will have to restore sanity. (The movement against the foreign nationals gained momentum during J. N. Hazarika's short-lived Asom Jonata Dal Ministry.)

The Prime Minister told reporters at Nellie that she had come to see things for herself, not to apportion blame. She saw burnt-out huts on her way to Muladhar, but no half-devoured or decomposed bodies such as those washed up at the waterfront at Gauhati. Mrs Gandhi, who was visibly shocked, heard enough at the refugee camp to reconstruct the tragedy.

Mr R. V. Subramaniam leaves a State that is burning. In his second spell as adviser, his method was to effect radical transfers and give his men extraordinary powers. Senior officers on deputation in Delhi and elsewhere had to return, much to their annoyance, but were disarmed by Mr Subramaniam's sincerity and dynamism. They accepted the challenge and became conscious partners in the scheme for protecting the people and ensuring their right to vote.

A number of theories have been disproved and some myths exploded. The assumption that crowds would scatter, given a sustained lathi-charge, proved to be baseless. But, for two years or more before February, the Central Reserve Police had done a professional job in the urban areas and had earned the displeasure of the "ethnic Assamese" who spoke of a "reign of terror". The authorities at Dispur were convinced that force was the answer to what they called the All Assam Students' Union's "tactics of attrition".

They over-reacted, even under conditions which did not go out of control. The CRP's power made Janata Bhawan complacent, or so it seemed, and the official media deviated from facts.

The situation then did not look particularly tense, but the movement was far from ebbing. Small traders, wage-earners and parents with adolescent children were fed up and longed for a solution. That the Assamese intelligentsia was with the movement needs no confirmation since the Sahitya Sabha was a member of the Gana Sangram Parishad. The upper and middle classes, well-represented in the secretariat and the subordinate services, were active.

QUIET POLITICS

Despite six years of quiet politics by Sarat Sinha as Chief Minister, the effect was marginal. The traditional "levers" were intact and could be operated to embarrass, even frustrate, the administration. The airlift of thousands of people for polling duties at the last moment showed what the local "karmacharis" could do. An over-confident Chief Electoral Officer was taken by surprise.

Those who opposed the elections intimidated large sections, sabotaged communications and attacked police outposts during the first phase, from February 5 to 12. Then came the polling on February 14 and 17, and group clashes escalated.

ed into communal violence. Gohpur was dwarfed by Nellie which, reports say, was insignificant compared with the carnage around Samaguri. The second phase, which has begun on February 12, is marked by more grievous massacres.

What needs to be known is whether a large part of the force was tied up with election duty, whether its dispersal was feeble. The planners were obviously mistaken in deciding the ratio of the force needed for poll duty and for maintenance of law and order. They argue that thinning out the force would have exposed the probationers and others from outside to violence and death.

As far as polling arrangements went, the staff in several cases had not reached their destinations on due dates. Mr Golap Borbora of Janata, a former Chief Minister, alleged that polling centres were changed at the very last moment, and in some cases, five to eight booths were set up in the same building.

Police apart, Central Intelligence had warned against pressures building up. Union Home Ministry officials were inclined to agree but the State Government's assessment prevailed. The latter felt that urban terrorism of a kind was likely, trouble in the rural areas could be contained. Sixty constituencies were considered safe, about 20 troublesome and the rest "containable".

Mr Subramaniam and his key officers carried out exercises to determine the strength of the force needed, including security personnel and election staff, and the transport requirement. They reassured the Centre that the situation was under control.

GOVERNOR'S SUPPORT

The Governor backed the advisers. He believed that elections should be held to encourage the silent majority to reassert itself. The elections became a prestige issue and, finally, a matter of survival. The Centre had reportedly wanted to amend the Constitution to extend President's rule as late as December.

Mr Subramaniam's objectives were to run the administration and ensure civil liberties. He mentioned specifically the right of political parties to hold meetings, with police protection, if necessary. In the new year, candidates were provided with armed guard. George Fernandes called this "a dress rehearsal" for future general elections.

The prospects of a limited probe into the massacres are not bright. But no one can deny communal incitement and official apathy. The first reaction of a stricken group would be to send a message to the nearest police station or outpost. If help was not forthcoming, the reason was that the available force was either committed elsewhere or inadequate, or that "they looked the other way".

The refugees at Nellie alleged that the police had fired on them, adding to the panic. The CRP had alerted all its units about attempts

by agents provocateurs in police uniforms to fire on them. The shooting at Goalpara was no aberration and certainly not due to "some misunderstanding created by miscreants". A volatile situation was handled deftly by Assam's Director-General of Police. Fortunately, the CRP discipline saw them through. The cremation of the jawans was memorable, with thousands of mourners from Goalpara town, including women with flowers for the dead.

After many years the Bodo, Lalung and Mishing tribes are alleged to have killed or helped to kill either of the linguistic groups and a religious minority. The Bodos met with initial provocation when two tribal boys were murdered and a candidate's son was rumoured to have been kidnapped. The fact that fewer Bodos were killed is no consolation for them, since 7,000 of them are at the Kokilaboro camp near the Bhutan foothills and somewhat difficult to reach. Though Lalung villages have been attacked, their plight has remained relatively unnoticed. In North Lakhimpur, the Mishing and the "ethnic Assamese" attacked immigrant Hindu villages with no evident provocation.

Land may be at the bottom of it but more important was the incitement. At Gohpur, some Nepalese and tea garden labour joined the Bodos, the former out of fear of being thrown out and the latter for economic reasons. Tea garden labour do not take kindly to those disrupting their supplies of food. All these reasons, however, do not account for the frenzied killing and arson. One had to look for the hidden hand and the subtle incitement.

DREAM ABANDONED

Whether slogans like "Udaychal Zindabad" were really heard or not there is confirmation that the dream of Udayachal or a plains tribal State on the North bank of the Brahmaputra was abandoned years ago since other tribes like the Miri had their own dreams. Mr Saikia, then Home Minister in the Sarat Sinha Ministry, manoeuvred expertly and not much was heard of Bodo aspirations till the adviser, Mr H. C. Sarin, accepted the demand for Bodo-medium schools and for rendering tribal blocks homogeneous. The Bodos settled for a full-fledged autonomous council. Logically speaking, the Plains Tribal Council of Assam has lost its mandate now, but one cannot rule out emotional outbursts.

Darrang, incidentally, calls for a special study because of the skill and technique of the agitators. Booby traps were set up to cripple surface communications. There were camouflaged nails and pits at both ends of a bridge or culvert. Vehicles of the CRP had two or more flat tyres. A commandant held the record with 100 punctures. As for the explosive devices, with or without a timing element, even Army experts were impressed.

Role of Political Parties

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Mar 83 pp 1, 9

[Article by Praful Bidwai]

[Text]

GAUHATI, March 3.

SEVERAL political parties and all communal and religious organisations are fishing in the trouble waters of Assam.

Their activities, calculated to gain a foothold or expand their base among specific communities and groups, have contributed to an exacerbation of the law and order situation and a heightening of communal tension in many areas of the Brahmaputra valley, say senior officials of the Assam administration quoting intelligence reports.

The parties and organisations that are particularly active include the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and, to a limited extent, the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), besides the ruling Congress (I).

CONG. (I) GOES UNDERGROUND

While the Congress (I) continues to be locally active in the immigrant Muslim pockets of lower Assam, its leaders and MLAs have so far kept away from the Assamese-speaking areas of the state. Most of them still remained in a semi-underground state in upper Assam and in areas where the turnout in the assembly elections was very low. Few Congress (I) MLAs have left their heavily guarded premises at Dispur to visit their constituencies even under police protection.

The PTCA is confined to Goalpara, Kamrup and Darrang districts, but is actively campaigning for a separate "Udayachal" state comprising areas which have witnessed clashes between tribals and non-tribals.

The BJP and the RSS, on the one hand, and the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, on the other, are also clearly identified with specific communities or ethnic-linguistic groups at the local level.

Leaders of the various parties have so far refused even to form peace committees in the areas marked by communal frenzy or to set up relief organisations on a sub-divisional or district level. Their work is exclusively directed at helping or defending their followers and at criticising or casting aspersions on others which, say intelligence reports, has often turned into "instigating communal violence."

BJP'S EFFORTS

According to these reports, the

BJP is making a serious effort to win over a section of the leadership of the All-Assam Students' Union-Gana Sangram Parishad. It has held over 60 meetings with local agitation leaders in various parts of the state in the last fortnight alone. Some of its senior leaders have also had important discussions with some office-bearers of the AASU and AAGSP.

The BJP leaders are understood to have sought to convince the agitation leaders that it is vital to make a distinction between the Hindus and the Muslims among the immigrants from erstwhile East Pakistan. It is not clear if the effort has succeeded, for their credibility in the state has not been very high. Even their stand on the elections was seen by many people, including leading intellectuals who back the agitation, as an "expedient and opportunistic" one — sitting on the fence, to start with, and, at the eleventh hour deciding to oppose the holding of the elections when it became clear that the AASU-GSP would actively campaign against the poll.

To match the work of the BJP, the Jamaat-i-Islami has been very active amongst immigrant Muslim youths in Nowgong and Kamrup, including some leaders of the All-Assam Minority Students' Union (AAMSU). It has apparently resorted to open, virulent communal propaganda in at least 20 towns and villages.

The Jamaat has also succeeded in winning over a section of the supporters of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema which, at least until recently, desisted from the adoption of an aggressive communal stance in Assam. Supporters of both these groups are now using the local Tabliq Jamaats, a forum that exists in many parts of Assam for religious discussions and discourses.

Teh Jamaat has apparently expanded its following by three times in the past year and a half.

RSS INDIFFERENCE

However, compared to the RSS, the Jamaat still remains a numerically small force. The RSS following has increased at least four-fold over the last three years. It now runs a little over 300 regular sakhas all over the state.

Over the last six months, seven important meetings or training camps were held in Assam by the all-India leadership of the RSS. At two of these, the RSS chief, Mr. Balasaheb Deoras, was present. Over the past two years, more than 70 meetings of activists have been held in Assam to

plan the expansion of the organisation and the thrust of its propaganda and "education campaigns".

Three years ago, the RSS was virtually non-existent in Assam and its state leadership was basically non-Assamese. Its only pocket of influence was in Nalbari in Kamrup district. Today it has a strong, if small, base in each of the major towns of the state and is especially powerful in Nowgong, Kampur and Dhing (Nowgong district), Tezpur and Mangaldoi (Darrang), Sildar (Cachar), Jorhat (Sibsagar), Dibrugarh and, of course, Gauhati. Many of these areas recently witnessed communal violence.

The RSS has also a very visible presence in AASU's "volunteer force", a grouping of squads trained in self-defence, the use of small arms and so on. The force was set up three years ago.

In relation to the communal organisations, parties such as the Janata and the regional Assom Jatiyatabadi Dal and Purbanchaliya Lok Parishad have performed poorly. The Janata, which led the ministry in 1978-79, had now only a token presence in the state. The two regional parties are too dependent for their survival on the existence of, and their presence within, the Assam agitation.

The parties of the left, until recently a strong and growing force in Assam, are in a semi-paralysed and demoralised state. The election results were like a slap in their face. Their participation in the elections has alienated them somewhat from the Assamese-speaking people in certain areas. Their leaders and activists face "social boycott" from their neighbours, and worse, physical assaults from those who accuse them of being "agents of the Bangladeshis" and "collaborators of the Congress of the Congress (I)".

CSO: 4600/1855

RESERVE BANK REDUCES COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING RATE

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 1 Mar 83 p 1

[Text] BOMBAY, February 28--THE lending rates of scheduled commercial banks have been reduced by the RBI. The reduction, which will range from 0.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent for various categories of bank advances, will become effective from April 1.

Announcing this in Bombay today, Dr. C. Rangarajan, deputy governor of RBI, said that the ceiling on lending rates was being brought down from 19.5 per cent to 18 per cent. This was considered essential since "the real rates of interest are high," he added.

The RBI governor, Dr. Manmohan Singh, had promised during mid-December that the RBI would be prepared to have a fresh look at the lending rates of banks, if the rate of inflation continued to be low in the subsequent few months.

While banks will benefit from the reduction of tax on their interest income, announced by the Union finance minister today, they will have to bear some burden themselves.

Dr. Rangarajan said that lending rates in the highest bracket, which had increased by as much as 4.5 percentage points from September, 1979, would be subject to a somewhat larger reduction than the rates for other categories which already had its significant concessional elements, and which had also experienced minimal increases from September, 1979.

He said that the RBI believed that the revised lending rate structure would stimulate growth of the real output.

He made it very clear that this did not signify any basic change in credit policy. The RBI has reiterated that banks should continue to ensure that credit is made available only to meet genuine production requirements.

Since the lowering of the lending rates of banks across-the-board would help a wide spectrum of borrowers, including large and medium industry, agriculture, small-scale industry and exports, it is nothing short of a reversal of dear money policy being followed by the monetary authorities for a number of years.

Some commercial banks had already reduced their lending rates to 'prime' borrowers in recent months, since they were enjoying fairly comfortable resources position and having excess liquidity.

No doubt, the spread between income and expenditure of banks will narrow down, but each bank will have to look to its own position.

Captains of industry and trade have been clamouring for quite some time for lowering the cost of credit. They should feel happy that their demand has been met by the authorities.

The RBI has announced the schedule of lending rates of scheduled commercial banks from April 1.

In the case of lending rates, which are fixed at 17.5 per cent, they are to be brought down to 16.5 per cent. Those which are not exceeding 17.5 per cent are not to exceed 16.5 per cent, and those which are 19.5 or not exceeding 19.5 per cent are to be brought down to 18 per cent.

In the case of short-term loans for agriculture, there is a reduction of one percentage point across-the-board. In the case of short-term loans for small-scale industry, not covered by the reduction up to 16.5 per cent, the reduction will range between 0.25 per cent to one per cent. In the case of short-term loans for exports, there is a reduction of 0.5 per cent.

For state-level corporations, assisting artisans, village and cottage industries and loans for state-sponsored scheduled castes and tribes development corporations, there is a reduction of one percentage point.

CSO: 4600/1846

FISHERMEN CHARGE 'LOOTING' BY SRI LANKANS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 1 Mar 83 p 23

[Text]

MADRAS, February 28 (PTI)

THE Sri Lanka naval guards, ostensibly engaged in patrolling their sea lanes, penetrate deep into the Indian waters and "loot" Indian fishermen of their precious prawn catches at gunpoint "not less than three days in a week", according to spokesman of the Rameswaram Vercottu Fishermen's Association.

They told a PTI correspondent, who visited Rameswaram recently, these guards carry away a booty of 300 to 400 kg. of prawn catches a day, valued at more than Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 40,000.

The secretary of the association, Mr. P. Arulanandam, said this had been going on for a long time since the agreement on Katchathivu some years ago and all representations made to the assistant director on fisheries at Rameswaram and the district authorities had proved a cry in the wilderness.

The association spokesman were emphatic that this "atrocious" was committed in the Indian waters, and almost at the sight of the Indian land.

They said the naval guards with their high-speed boat could reach an Indian boat within minutes once they sighted it, leaving the latter no chance to escape.

These guards they said were normally brutal to the Indian fishermen, beat them up mercilessly even at the mildest protest. One of the guards was fond of shouting "You go and complain to Indira Gandhi", they

said.

The Rameswaram fishermen said normally they set out fishing prawn in the evenings and returned in the small hours next day. It was during this early morning return that the guards waylaid them and looted their catch.

These fishermen were also sore at the "callous indifference" of the government of India to their SOS. What was more was that they were warned not to trespass into the Sri Lankan waters.

The fishermen said, in contrast, the Sri Lankan fishermen could always be seen fishing in the Indian waters with impunity mainly near the Devils Point (Kandapur), Adams Bridge, near the Dhanushkodi pier and even at Karikathi near Mandapam. The big size fish available in these spots were their main attraction.

They said, however, the relations between Sri Lankan and Indian fishermen were very cordial and they often co-operated and helped each other.

Asked whether Indian fishermen had encroached on the Sri Lankan waters, the fishermen said the sea, unlike land, had no walls to indicate the border and the fishermen were ignorant of the finer points of longitude and latitudes. Even on the land nobody could compute these things and what to take of the sea, they asked.

The Rameswaram fishermen said a rational and sensible solution to their problem was an agreement between the two governments, enabling free fishing by fishermen of both the countries in the narrow sea waters dividing the India and Sri Lanka.

BRIEFS

AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES--India has acquired air-to-air R-23R guided missiles, Minister of State for Defence K P Singh Deo said in the Lok Sabha on Friday, reports PTI. The missiles operated in conjunction with air borne radar, the Minister told Mr A R Mallu in a written reply. Mr Singh Deo also denied that defence aircraft were used recently to fly Central Government employees from Delhi to Gauhati. He said in a written reply that defence aircraft were only used for airlifting para-military forces for the elections held there. Capacity utilisation in Ishapore Rifle Factory had declined to 33 per cent because of demands for newer types of rifles, Defence Minister R Venkataraman said. Replying to Mr Satya Sadhan Chakraborty, he said the capacity utilisation was expected to go up to 65 per cent in the next three years, with the factory starting production of new types of rifles. Efforts were also being made to promote export, he added. [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 5 Mar 83 p 5]

CSO: 4600/1843

TUDEH, SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED

Tudeh Party Leaders Released

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 27 Mar 83 p 5

[Text] While it is now over a month since the arrest of Dr. Kianouri, First Secretary, as well as some of the members of the Tudeh Party Politbureau, no official list of indictments has yet been issued by the Prosecutor against the accused individuals. The last statement in this connection was made by the Prime Minister when he confirmed the espionage charge in respect of some of the Tudeh Party of Iran (TPI) leaders, but at the same time said that accusation against all the detainees is however not that of "espionage".

According to latest reports, during the past fortnight, some other of the detainees have been exonerated and consequently set free. These individuals, who are also members of the TPI Politbureau, have been told that the arrest of the Party leaders hasn't come due to their Party activities, but there exist some other documents against them. One of these individuals is Abdolhossein Agah, one of the theoreticians of the Tudeh Party.

The TPI announcement which was released last February in protest against the arrest of the Party leaders, was last week broadcast on the radio program of the "National Voice of Iran" which is a clandestine radio station located outside Iran (March 25). The Radio announcer, while reading out the text of the announcement and speaking of support by the TPI leaders of the Islamic Government of Iran, urged that early measures should be taken towards their release. The "National Voice of Iran," which had began operation in the last years of the Shah's rule, apparently had no official link with the Tudeh Party, and, in the past, introduced itself as a representative of the National and progressive forces of Iran. But unofficial information said that the Headquarters of this Radio Station, which is located in one of the East European Socialist states, is being run by the Tudeh Party. This Radio Station continued to function even after the victory of the Revolution, and strongly backed Imam Khomeyni and the Islamic regime of Iran.

Another report says that Dr. Kianouri, in the early days after his arrest, was taken to a gathering of the war cripples in Hosseiniyeh Ershad. There, he was questioned by these individuals who were crippled as a result of the war against Iraq, and was admonished for the TPI support of the Soviet Union. The crippled audience had told Kianouri that "we have lost organs of our body as a result of the Soviet-manufactured weapons, and got crippled. Despite this, how is it that you back the Soviet policy?"

Ties With USSR

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 27 Mar 83 p 7

[Text] Last week, the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) organ PRAVDA carried another article on the Irano-Soviet ties. Its tone was harsher than the earlier one, and it backed the Tudeh Party of Iran (TPI) openly (March 23). The PRAVDA writer, after referring to the TPI's previous record of struggle against the monarchical regime, advises the Iranian Government to take measures for the release of the party leaders before it is too late.

Observers consider as unusual the open support extended by PRAVDA to the Tudeh Party and its advice for the release of the party leaders. In the opinion of these observers, direct interference of the Soviets in this issue is mostly related to the differences between the governments over other matters, since had the Soviet Government enjoyed the desired ties with Iran, it would probably have ignored the issue on the arrest of the TPI leaders.

No official reaction has thus far been shown against the PRAVDA article by IRI officials. It is said in diplomatic circles that the Iranian Government possesses some serious documents on the links of some of the TPI leaders with the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, and due to this reason, it is resisting the Soviet pressure on the issue. In the opinion of these circles, there exists direct connection between the exit of a high-ranking official of the Soviet Embassy from Iran February last, followed by two other members of the Embassy in recent weeks and the arrest of the TPI leaders. Some of the foreign observers even go beyond this and believe that the documents, relating to the links of the Tudeh Party leaders with some of the Soviet officials in Tehran, have been revealed by the Soviet diplomat who sought asylum in Britain. It is rumoured that these documents were put at the disposal of Hojjatol Islam Nategh Nouri, the Interior Minister, during his trip to Pakistan last summer. There is, however, no source available to attest to the veracity or otherwise of these rumours, and one has to wait for the court trial of the Tudeh Party leaders.

CSO: 4600/506

GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL AFFAIRS DISCUSSED

Budget Outline

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 29 Mar 83 p 4

[Text] The budget for 1362 (March 22, 1983 - March 22, 1984) was passed by the Majlis on March 17, 1983.

The total incomes from various sources is estimated to be 5,816,156,938,000 rials and the total expenditures to be 5,816,156,938,000 rials.

The general income of the government is 3,727,943,094,000 rials which is as follows:

- a) General Income: 3,555,108,289,000 rials
- b) Income from Ministries: 172,834,805,000 rials

(full text of the budget will be published in the next issues)

National Growth Product

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 29 Mar 83 p 4

[Text] According to a report published by the Central Bank, the Gross National Product in the country rose by 2.2 percent reaching 2,620 billion rials (\$30 billion), in the year 1360 (March 21, 1980 - March 20, 1981) compared to the previous year. The report said this was the first time that the GNP showed a growth since 1357 (March 1978 - March 1979), the year of the Islamic Revolution. The report also said that the added value of all economic sectors except for those of construction, mining and services, showed a growth in the same year. Also in 1360, the share of the agricultural sector in the GNP continued its growth as of the previous years and reached 15 percent from the previous year's 13.9. The share of the oil, industries and mining did not show any marked change while the share of the services sector dropped from 66.9 in 1359 to 65.3 in 1360. The added value of the agricultural sector showed an unprecedented increase of 10.2 percent in the same year while the industrial sector showed an added value of only 1.5 percent and the water, electricity and natural gas sector showed an added value of 22 percent. The report said the Gross National Income rose 3.7 percent and per capita income rose 1.2 percent in 1360.

Part 10 of Five-Year Plan

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 29 Mar 83 pp 5-8

[Text] The number of housing units (average about 90 sq. meters area under construction) estimated to be built during the first plan is about 1,800,000 including both urban and rural areas. Construction of such number of housing units would require an extensive activity towards removing the obstacles in building the housing units. Such activities should include setting accurate regulation to allocate housing lands, regulations of access to construction materials, and to encourage investments in materials supply fields.

Distribution concentration of urban lands held by the government during the first plan should not stop the growth of housing production, but procedures must be adopted to offer the required lands to house builders at easy conditions. Whereas the emphasis will be on the non-government sector during the first plan to represent empowering the people to provide their own housing, therefore incentive policies should be formulated and facilities offered to public along with controlling the housing market. Such policies should include monetary policies and allocation of banking credits to housing business.

Considering the fact that the government sector's share of housing market activities shall be also increased during the years 1362-66 compared with previous years, it will be necessary to revise the organizations and procedures of government agencies and to make higher and improved utilization of popular procedures, and revolutionary institutions to increase the efficiency and to remove the fundamental insufficiencies and problems. The geographic distribution of buildings and the credits allocated to housing should be made with due attention to government policies to stop the unreasonable growth of large towns and making clear cut regulations not to cause attraction of emigrants and encouragement of rural workers emigration to large towns. Therefore the geographic distribution of housing will not be made necessarily in consideration of the degree of demand pressure, and some towns may receive lower and unproportionate number of housing allocations despite the shortage of housing.

Non-residential constructions will receive between 2.5 to 2.6 percent of total investments and it is estimated that total investment in this field will be 370.2 b. rials. It is essential to point out that constructions to be made in agriculture, industry and other sectors are included in investments of their own sectors and not included in this figure. The figure is substantially covering investments in the required facilities and equipment to build non-residential constructions.

6. 7. Investments in Services:

It is estimated that the total investments in services will be 3832 b. rials during the first five year plan. Such investments will be made in transportation, communications, post, telecommunications, education, health, social security, welfare and other general and private services. The investments in major sub-sectors of services are outlined as follows:

6. 7. 1. Investments in Transportation and Communications:

The Transportation and Communications sector is covering such important sub-sectors as ports, roads networks (principal, feeder, regional, and rural), railways, storage, airports, land, sea, and air transportations.

Iran is one of the poorest countries so far as roads network and transportation is concerned. There is presently some 4 kms. of roads on the average per one hundred square kilometers of area, which is very low compared with other countries. Considering the dispersion of population centers, large mountainous areas, and deserts, it will be difficult and costly to build roads and communications network in the country, therefore it will be impossible to build and provide a full and safe network within a short time, and it should be completed and developed during the coming plans. Considering the government's financial potentials and country's operating powers it is estimated that about 40,000 kilometers of roads will be built during the first plan which will be a considerable amount compared with the present total of 70,000 kilometers. Its achievement requires continuous efforts, planning, and organizing suitable operating groups and institutions as well as to provide sufficient machinery and equipment. It is estimated that the total government investments in road building, improvement and maintenance of existing roads, maintenance and development of ports, railways, airports, commercial shipping fleet, and meteorology will amount to 926.8 billion rials during the first plan. Investments in roads transportation including passenger and cargo will be made mostly by the non-government sector.

The general policies in investments of transportation and communications sector will be as follows:

--Emphasis to complete unfinished projects which are falling within the framework of general objectives of sector's development.

--The investment priority during the first plan will be given to develop the existing network and to raise the density of roads. Service quality and level will be raised gradually during the subsequent plans along with development of network.

--The necessary investments to train the required skilled manpower of the sector coordinated with technical and vocational educational system and the higher education of country.

6. 7. 2. Post and Telecommunications:

Post and Telecommunications is considered one of the most important factors of transmitting information and one of the basic requirements of society's economic, social, and cultural progress. Postal services has long records in Iran, however its present situation regrettably does not meet the society's requirements both quantitative and qualitatively, and so more than half of the country's mail is handled through a parallel system (including both government and non-government mail). A special attention will be devoted to raise the efficiency and development of rural and urban postal network. Telecommunications has a significant role in mass communications and the cultural and

political growth of Islamic people of Iran and other oppressed people of the world (through radio and television) and it supports the information and defense powers of the country. The telecommunications role is important in economic and production development as a fast and inexpensive means. Unfortunately considering the sector's dependence upon foreign sources in equipment and technology, it will not be advisable to make a fast development and it should be developed along with strengthening of country's production and industrial powers. Development investments in post and telecommunications will totally amount to 140 billion rials during the first plan. In view of the fact that there are currently about 400,000 half finished urban telephone lines, and urban housing telecommunications will receive no priority in future a substantial part of telecommunications investments in towns and particularly large towns is required to be made by applicants themselves.

The general policies of post and telecommunications section in investments shall include the following cases:

--To meet the country's telecommunications requirements towards economic, social and cultural development with emphasis on the following priorities:

- a. To meet the requirements of armed forces of Iranian Islamic Republic, Islamic Revolutionary institutions and government organs.
- b. To meet the requirements of agricultural, industrial and services sectors.
- c. To meet public telephone requirements.

--To establish and develop rural post networks, and to develop the urban postal network along with improving the quality of services, and reduction of mailing time.

--To make highest utilization of available investments through completion and commissioning of them.

--To develop the country's telecommunications network as an "integrated" system to make the highest utilization of different installations capacities through coordination between organizations concerned.

--To increase the connection security of national telecommunications network through equipment of frequency control centers.

--To carry out joint projects with industrial sector, universities, and research centers towards researches, self-sufficiency, and to increase the local productions.

--To train skilled manpower in coordination with higher education, technical and vocational education sections.

6. 7. 3. Investments in education, health and social security:

Based upon the guidelines set by the Economic Council; education and training, health, and social security are considered of special importance within the

framework of services. Investments in these fields will receive 5 percent of total investment resources, and the average growth rate in this sub-sector will be 17.8 percent per year.

Investments in these sectors will be substantially made by the government. Development budgets allocated to these sub-sectors during the first plan are as follows: Education and training 407.3, health and medical care 785.5, social security and welfare 32.2 billion rials.

Table No. 9- Share of Economic Sectors Investment Figures
in Total Investments

| | 1362 | 1363 | 1364 | 1365 | 1366 |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1. Agriculture | 13.8 | 14.5 | 15.3 | 16.1 | 16.7 |
| 2. Oil | 4.1 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 5.4 | 6.4 |
| 3. Industries and Mines | 54.7 | 53.7 | 52.6 | 51.5 | 50.3 |
| 3.1. Industries and Mining | (13.0) | (13.4) | (13.8) | (14.2) | (14.4) |
| 3.2. Water, Power, and Gas | (13.1) | (13.1) | (13.1) | (13.3) | (13.5) |
| 3.3. Construction | (28.6) | (27.2) | (25.7) | (24.1) | (22.4) |
| -Residentials | -26.0- | -24.5- | -23.0- | -21.4- | -19.9- |
| -Non-Residentials | -2.6- | -2.7- | -2.7- | -2.6- | -2.5- |
| 4. Services | 27.4 | 27.0 | 27.5 | 27 | 26.6 |
| 4.1. Education, Health, Social Security | (5.3) | (5.3) | (5.1) | (5.1) | (5.0) |
| 4.2. Other Services | (22.1) | (21.7) | (22.4) | (21.9) | (21.6) |
| Total Investments | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table No. 8 - Investments in Major Economic Sectors

(billions of rials in 1361
fixed prices)

| | 1362 b. rials | 1363 b. rls. | 1364 b. rls. | 1365 b. rls. | 1366 b. rls. |
|--|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Agriculture | 265.8 | 333.6 | 418.9 | 526.0 | 660.6 |
| 2. Oil | 80.4 | 111.1 | 124.5 | 178.0 | 253.0 |
| 3. Industries and Mines | 1057.4 | 1232.2 | 1439.4 | 1690.4 | 1988.0 |
| 3.1. Industry and Mining | (250.3) | (307.6) | (377.9) | (464.4) | (570.7) |
| 3.2 Water, Power, and Gas | (254.8) | (300.7) | (358.4) | (436.1) | (532.5) |
| 3.3 Construction | (552.3) | (623.9) | (703.1) | (789.9) | (884.8) |
| -Residentials | -502.1- | -561.9- | -628.8- | -703.6- | -787.4- |
| -Non-Residentials | -50.2- | -62.0- | -74.3- | -86.3- | -97.4- |
| 4. Services | 527.7 | 616.9 | 752.2 | 885.8 | 1049.4 |
| 4.1. Education, Health, Social Security | (102.4) | (119.5) | (140.2) | (165.7) | (197.3) |
| 4.2 Other Services | (425.3) | (497.4) | (612.0) | (720.1) | (852.1) |
| Total Investments | 1931.3 | 2293.8 | 2735.0 | 3280.2 | 3951.0 |

CSO: 4600/507

TIES WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIES BEING UPGRADED

Cooperation with China Hailed

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 26 Mar 83 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The Vice-Chairman of the Rastriya Panchayat, Mr. Gopal Chandra Rajbansi, speaking at a dinner in honour of the Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress of China, Mr. Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, in Kathmandu on Thursday, rightly referred to the close and cordial relations subsisting between the two neighbouring countries, stating that these relations were based on mutual understanding, equality and the principles of peaceful co-existence. Nepal-China relations have indeed proved to be exemplary; they are a model of how two neighbours, one big and the other small, each with different political systems, can live in peace and amity honouring the sovereignty and independence of one another. Moreover, the periodic exchange of visits at the highest levels between the two neighbours has helped to promote mutual appreciation of each other's world views. His Majesty the King's visits to China in general and to Tibet Autonomous Region in particular have helped to further consolidate and expand the friendship and understanding between Nepal and China. That China has appreciated Nepal's peaceful non-aligned foreign policy is amply reflected in the speech of Vice-Chairman Jigme appreciatively stating that the Nepalese Government under the leadership of His Majesty King Birendra has persisted in the policy of independence and self-reliance to overcome various adverse conditions as a developing inland country and achieved gratifying success in its unremitting efforts to develop the national economy and culture and build up the country. The Chinese dignitary's statement that Nepal has made positive contributions to strengthening the unity of Third World countries and in maintaining peace in is thus tantamount to a tribute to the country's foreign policy under the able guidance of His Majesty the King.

This apart, the enduring friendship between Nepal and China also rests on the bedrock of mutual economic cooperation. China has, among other things, been helping this country in the construction of highways as well as in the establishment of industries. There are, however, more areas of future cooperation. It is noteworthy in this respect that the Foreign and Water Resource Minister, Mr. Padma Bahadur Khatri, and Vice-Chairman Jigme held important discussions

towards that very end. Thus, both were agreed on the desirability of developing tourism between Nepal and China, particularly in Tibet. They logically followed this up by emphasising the need to establish an air link between Kathmandu and Lhasa, a move that would help elevate Sino-Nepalese ties to new heights. Interestingly, Nepal and China also agreed to develop pasture lands in the Nepal-China trans-Himalayan region for mutual benefit. This should prove specially helpful not just for raising cattle in the mountain regions but aid in bettering the economy of the peoples there. As for trade between Nepal and Tibet, there has been a small decline due to the washing away of a portion of the Arniko Highway. However, trade is expected to pick up once the highway now being reconstructed under Chinese assistance is completed. In sum, this visit to Nepal of the Chinese leader has not only helped to focus timely attention on the friendly relations subsisting between Nepal and China; it may also pave the way for further exciting developments in Nepal-China cooperation, including that, in particular, between Nepal and the Tibetan region of China.

IPA Launched in Dhaka

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 1 Apr 83 p 2

[Article by Gopal Sharma]

[Text] The foreign ministers of the seven South Asian nations, now seeking to forge a meaningful economic cooperation among themselves, are to meet in New Delhi on August one. The primary task before this meeting is, among others, to give concrete shape and provide a structural framework to a movement which has so far been discussed only at the official level.

They are also to launch the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) of cooperation which was evolved in Dhaka.

NAM Style:

A consensus to this effect was reached at the fourth meeting of the foreign secretaries in Dhaka early this week. The past four meetings at the official level have for sure shown three things.

First, that the decisions to be taken at this forum for regional cooperation should be on the basis of consensus and not on the basis of votes, a non-aligned styles.

Second, they have by consensus again, agreed not to bring any bilateral issues among themselves at this forum. Any such move, they contend, would slacken the pace of development of the movement itself. This, again, is in line with the non-aligned tradition and values to which all the seven countries of the region subscribe.

Third, the foreign secretaries have hitherto managed to avoid inclusion in the jurisdiction of regional cooperation such areas, they are afraid, as might become contentious later.

The proposed New Delhi meeting, therefore, is faced with these difficult tasks. More importantly it is to deliberate on giving a political umbrella to the scheme. The proposed meeting can also perhaps be expected to deal on the necessity or otherwise of a South Asian Summit.

Unlike the foreign secretaries' meetings which have been "slow but steady", foreign ministers cannot afford to be so. The idea of regional cooperation is a long term proposition; it may thus take time to mature from a natural growth. But too long a gestation period will be far from realistic. Therefore, the foreign ministers as they address themselves in New Delhi, have the twin challenge of expediting these on one hand and taking far reaching and lasting decisions on the other.

Institutional Shape:

Now that the scheme of regional cooperation has reached a point for politicians to take up, it can be described as one which is at a "take off" stage. Thus, the first task before the foreign ministers is to give it an institutional shape. Are we planning to develop it along the lines of the European Community or the ASEAN? Should the scheme be allowed to proceed on without any statutory sanctions like NAM? These are some of the questions that demand lasting solutions at this level.

Areas of Cooperation

The official level meetings have identified altogether nine areas of cooperation to begin with. While identifying these areas the official level meetings have taken a rather easy path. These areas vary from agriculture and health care to cultural cooperation and from scientific cooperation to rural development. While such areas as agriculture and health care do fall in the priority list of all the countries of the region in their national plans, official level meetings have not addressed themselves to such burning questions as energy and trade. Lack of energy, which is perhaps the second in the priority list next only to food, shelter and medical care demand an equally expeditious solution. Should it be allowed to remain where it is or paid adequate attention by South Asian ministers is therefore another question that demands prudent decision in New Delhi.

Trade Imbalance

Four of the seven countries in the region--Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Maldives--are categorised by the United Nations as the least developed among developing countries. Two of them--Nepal and Bhutan--are landlocked while still two others--Sri Lanka (though not a LDC) and the Maldives--are sea locked.

Because of this and other reasons, the balance of payments of all the countries of the region in general and the LDCs in particular face an alarmingly adverse situation with other countries and among themselves too. There is therefore, the need to diversify the region's trade industrial products, on one hand, and to pay special attention towards reforming their adverse trade position, on the other.

EDITORIALS URGE ACTION ON VARIOUS ISSUES

Need To Control Indian Migration

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 28 Feb 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Act Now"]

[Text] It will indeed be naive to assume that the government, which is considering a series of measures to support the country's population strategy, is not aware of the pressing need of checking the ever growing migration of people from neighbouring India. The impact of migration is already felt to a certain extent and is likely to grow more serious in the future. Yet nothing is being done. The government's emphasis has instead been all along on curbing the internal growth rate. But there is more to the problem than booming fertility rate.

The government has been gingerly about facing the problem posed by the wide open southern border, out of fears of souring our relations with India. But such fears are out of place. With Nepal and India sympathetic in resolving of each other's problems and the realising of one another's goals, there is no reason why one should take amiss the other's desire to grapple with a vexing issue. We do not say that the border should be sealed off outright. But it should be regulated meaningfully if Nepal's long range population strategy is to get anywhere. No matter how spectacular our success on the family planning front (which in fact leaves much to be desired), they will all be negated by the sheer scale of migration now taking place free and unhindered.

Regulating the border will call for serious efforts and even the dedication of all resources at our disposal. These should not be stinted and the writings on the wall must not go unheeded. Failure to act now may mean compounding the problem for the future, beyond any hope of solution.

Reform of Decentralization Scheme

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 1 Feb 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Decentralisation"]

[Text] The decentralisation scheme now being enacted by the government appears so muddled up that not much can be expected with its implementation, it being a half-hearted thing. However one feels relieved to know in a way that the

government has realized that concentration of power on the hands of the government in the centre can be a serious setback to the formulation and implementation of development plans and programmes. Decentralisation is a democratic process and seems to have come at a time when it is most needed.

But the question is how much power will be delegated by the government in the process? The government being bureaucratic by nature has cherished power all along and to diffuse even a part of it might prove to be a bit unpalatable for it. Even if village and town panchayats do derive power to formulate and implement plans for development at the district level, interference in one form or the other from the centre cannot be ruled out. If by decentralization the government means to produce positive results as expected, it must make doubly sure that it is enacted in the real sense of the term. If the government fails or is unwilling to do this, then decentralisation will only be a convenient means for the centre to pass the blame to the town and village panchayats for the failure of national development plans and programmes in the future.

More Participation for Women

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 11 Feb 83 p 2

[Editorial: "No Consolation"]

[Text] A recent report which says that only about nine per cent of women are officebearers in various tiers of the panchayat in the kingdom can in no way be a consolation in view of the fact that over half of the country's population is composed of women. Of course, there will be no dearth of people who tend to derive some sense of satisfaction from the minimal achievement of the women as well as from the fact that much lies in store for them in the future. While sharing the optimism, it can be stated forthrightly that upliftment of women continues to be elusive as anything.

Women themselves share more blame for this, the educated women in particular. They do not seem to make any effort to improve the lot of their less fortunate sisters. They rest content with slogan mongering and that was the only thing done during the international year for women. It is more than clear that the women are lagging behind for lack of opportunities and little seems to have been done in this regard. Much was indeed expected of the Nepal Women's Organisation, but the expectation has been belied as it has done no more than taking care of one or two isolated measures seemingly designed to promote the cause of women. What has the NWO done except to launch a few literacy classes here and there and setting up skill development centres? Viewed in this context, Her Majesty's recent call to the Organisation to identify the problems of women and work out a programme not only to remedy them but also to promote the overall welfare of women assumes significance.

Better Distribution of Foodgrains

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 14 Mar 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Bad Politics"]

[Text] Unofficial reports have it that the Ministry of Commerce and Supplies is expediting foodgrains supply to Dhanusa and the adjoining districts and in the process is reported to have held a few urgent meetings almost in a dither. This is something which had long been overdue. Similar promptitude is required on the part of the Ministry in the supply of foodgrains to other scarcity hit districts, if we are to stave off problems which have already begun to surface.

Interestingly however, fresh supplies to Janakpurdham is not necessarily motivated by the concern for dealing with the scarcity situation in general. It is clearly designed to take steam out of the pancha rally proposed at the headquarters of the district in the third week of this month by some RP members and politicians whose chagrin about the government's clumsy handling of the food situation is all too well known. The rally is expected to give Prime Minister Thapa poor marks for his failure in being on the top of the situation.

The question is, why does not the government act on its own instead of acting under force like in the case of Dhanusa? Besides, it is not only sad but mischievous as well for the government to use food as a political tool for partisan purposes.

CSO: 4600/479

APPREHENSION VOICED OVER AMERICAN PRESENCE

GF191638 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Mar 83 p 4

[Article by Shah Shamsheer Ali: "The American Presence"]

[Text] The 3.2 billion dollar package deal between the United States and Pakistan has many dimensions; some have been quite obvious from the very outset, others are beginning to unfold now, bit by bit. Since the sale of weapons had to be cleared by U.S. Congress and considerable controversy was generated in the process in Washington, especially over the sale of the F-16, this part of the package had become public knowledge quite early on. The rest of the arrangements have remained mostly a mystery, at least in Pakistan, not necessarily because of a need to mislead and confound, but, apparently, due to a marked caution regarding the restructuring of relations on a new and closer basis.

Although Americans have made references to certain defense understanding of the fifties, the package bears only superficial resemblance to that relationship. Pakistan has to pay now, to point out the most obvious difference, for the weapons. A relationship, involving defence and broader security arrangements, between a superpower and a poor developing state are always of an unequal nature. They are, in actuality, a great deal more unequal today because of Pakistan's own weaknesses, the principal one being its current inability to manoeuvre and deflect excessive demands with the weapon of national public opinion.

Unlike the fifties when there was a good deal of public involvement, the relationship now is confined largely, if not exclusively, to the government-to-government level. Even in the United States, it has been, and continues to remain, a subject of fierce public controversy. And in Pakistan, the people are no longer as naive as they were in the fifties: after all, there is a long, ugly record, since the 1965 war, in their direct knowledge and experience.

One would very much hope that the MRD [Movement for Restoration of Democracy] charges about naval and air bases are false, for otherwise Pakistan would have landed itself into a situation where it can be ground into pulp by the

super-power contention, perhaps confrontation. But one immediate significance of the MRD statement is that the package deal lacks popular support, to put it mildly.

Pakistan's newly-discovered friends and allies are, of course, not poorly informed about the real state of affairs in the country. It is thus not surprising to learn, putting together bits and pieces of information in an almost C.I.A. fashion, that a fair number of Americans--experts, advisers, academics and so on--are arriving in Pakistan as quietly as they can.

One got an inkling of this some months ago when a tender notice appeared in a Pakistani newspaper, asking security services etc., for American expatriates in almost all the major cities and towns. Other advertisements along similar lines have followed. What are these people going to do?

In the absence of any official statement in itself an indication of the somewhat secretive nature of the new relationship, one can only presume that these "experts" are a part of the package. Recent press reports from Washington have emphasised the little-known fact that 882 million dollars, two-thirds of the total economic aid, are in grants. This fund is to be spent on various agricultural schemes, rural works, primary health care.

Going by past experience, these "experts" accompany those grants, otherwise Pakistanis ought to have met the requirement pretty well. So, the American expatriates will have a well-organized network of their own, covering most of the country, giving them maximum access to the affairs of both the urban and rural population.

Keeping all these developments in mind, it should not be too difficult to draw general conclusions regarding the nature and scope of the burgeoning relations. In this, Washington, having to sell the package to its own people over and over again, has been obliging. For example, the C.I.A. chief spoke about four countries, including Pakistan, the other week on which his outfit was keeping a close watch.

The days of Badaber were over, was the official comment in Islamabad. This may well be true. Unfortunately, the C.I.A. boss was not talking of Badaber. He was speaking of monitoring the country's own internal developments.

As already noted, the five-year package deal has been negotiated by the two administrations to meet their own respective requirements in environments which do not seem to be wholly conducive to its full-scale implementation. Nor has the relationship been put, to borrow the pet cliché, on an even keel. If anything, the package may have actually created the potential for a big row in the years ahead.

The package deal is a product essentially of the Reagan administration's ideological precepts and aggressive motivation. It is, therefore, part of a much larger policy and is meant to serve and promote the broader American

interests. This administration can be ousted next year. As it is, Reagan's policy perceptions are beginning to be repudiated in congress. What will happen to the package, especially its defense component, if either Reagan disappears or congress refuses to go along?

On the Pakistan side, the deal has gone through primarily, it would appear, because it brings sophisticated weapons, economic assistance and some political support. But in a worst case scenario, none of this guarantees national security. In the meantime, it tends to pitch the country in the cockpit of super-power contention. What is more, it has found little favour with the people and leaders of the public opinion.

Bearing in mind the limitations and reservations on both sides, the package deal seems like a big gamble. The difference is that whereas a super-power can afford to indulge in such exercises for the smaller partner it can be a back-breaking experience.

CSO: 4600/536

PAKISTAN URGED TO REJOIN COMMONWEALTH

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 Mar 83 p 10

[Article by Jamal Yildiram: "Pakistan's Renewal of Membership in the Commonwealth"]

[Text] The news from Delhi is that Bangladesh will move that Pakistan again be included in the Commonwealth. This news comes from the widely circulated Indian daily paper, the INDIAN EXPRESS. There will be a summit conference of the Commonwealth in New Delhi at the end of this year. According to this news item, on this occasion Bangladesh will formally request the conference to invite Pakistan to rejoin the Commonwealth. This news seems to be correct as Dacca has not so far contradicted it and Islamabad has not criticized it. It seems that there must have been some behind the scenes manoeuvring in this direction during the recent summit conference of non-aligned nations held in Delhi. If Mrs. Gandhi has also made some positive gesture in this regard then the prospects for this proposal are indeed favorable as it is she who until now had opposed Pakistan. If Mrs. Gandhi had not been an obstacle during the September, 1981 Commonwealth summit conference in Melbourne, Australia, Pakistan would have rejoined the Commonwealth at that time. On that occasion the Indian press, doubtless at the instigation of their government, had adopted an attitude of opposition. Their constant refrain was that there was a military dictatorship in Pakistan and therefore Pakistan had no right to take part in the Commonwealth. Another reason they gave was that Burma and Ireland had left this club of their own accord and there had never been even a hint of their rejoining it, so why did Pakistan want to become a member of this club again? Mrs. Gandhi's objection was that it had long been Pakistan's habit to start quarrels on bilateral problems in international gatherings, and she did not want there to be disagreements in the Commonwealth, etc. etc.

In Pakistan itself there has been a small lobby against the Commonwealth. According to this lobby the greatest damage done to Pakistan has been by Britain through Radcliff and Mountbatten. And all the conspiracies against Pakistan (be it the London plan or some other conspiracy) are prepared in Britain. It was Britain which weakened the Islamic world too. If there is anything in common among the countries of the Commonwealth other than Britain it is the former slavery of all of them. And then Britain has maintained its position of power in international politics by means of this

club, etc. etc. All of these objections are undoubtedly based on a feeling of patriotism, but now the time has come for us to be more flexible in our behavior. That "imperialism" which the Commonwealth had before the second world war has been gone for a long time now. The "British crown" is not a shadow cast over this organization onw. The position of Britain now is just that of a member which is most senior and is industrially and technically very advanced and which is in a position to give concrete aid to the developing members and give guidance in various areas on the basis of its wide experience.

The current trend in the world is that every small country wants to become part of a larger brotherhood. All of those countries which became independent after the second world war have been joining organizations or institutions like the Commonwealth, the African OAU, the Organization of American States, the Arab League, the non-aligned countries' movement, the ASEAN, or the Islamic Conference, as well as dignified and splendid organizations like the United Nations. The purpose of this is just to take advantage of mutual advice, help and guidance, and to obtain the security of the protection of a large organization.

Pakistan joined the Commonwealth after Independence. (India was already a member). At that time Pakistan was lagging behind. There was a shortage of senior and experienced officers in the military and civil organizations, so it was necessary to have English generals, English governors and English civil officers for a while in order that they might strengthen and firm the joints of the new nation. India kept on Mountbatten himself as "the foot of the elephant covers more ground than the feet of everyone else put together." Even though Pakistan had suffered unforgivable damage at the hands of Radcliff and Mountbatten, the Quaid-e Azam did not consider it appropriate to sever Pakistan's ties with the Commonwealth for the sake of basic principles. The Quaid-e Azam also knew that the Commonwealth could not settle the internal disputes and problems of its members. He had before him the example of Kashmir. Despite this, he wanted to keep Pakistan a member of the Commonwealth.

Pakistan left the Commonwealth on 30 January, 1972. Its reason for leaving was that Britain, Australia and New Zealand had recognized Bangladesh. Two years later Mr. Bhutto recognized Bangladesh during the summit conference of Islamic countries being held in Lahore but he took no step to rejoin the Commonwealth. Now that same Bangladesh is trying to help Pakistan rejoin the Commonwealth.

It was in October, 1977 that the then leader of the British Muslim League, Mr. Altaf Ahmad, came to Pakistan. While addressing a press conference in lahore he "detailed the suffering which directly affected some 300,000 Pakistanis living or working in Britain and which indirectly affected Pakistan itself after Pakistan's separation from the Commonwelath." Directing the government's attention to this serious problem, NAWA-I-WAQT had written at the time that after having itself recognized "Bangladesh" there was no longer any justification for Pakistan's remaining separate from the Commonwealth. But the Bhutto government had made this a question of

ego, so no importance was given to the helpless suffering of the Pakistanis living in Britain, nor were the indescribable difficulties the wives and children of the Pakistanis living in Britain faced in going there considered worthy of any attention. And neither was the immeasurable financial damage to Pakistan resulting from the restrictions placed on Pakistanis sending back their savings kept in view.

There is no legal obstacle in the way of Pakistan's membership in the Commonwealth. Pakistan was given Dominion status in the British Commonwealth under the "Independence Act" of 1947. The British Parliament has not yet repealed that act, so Pakistan's membership is still in effect. It needs only to be renewed. And renewing it is no Herculean task; the secretary general of the Commonwealth need only write a note of a few lines. The secretary general sends this note to all the members. And affirmative response from the members is no problem, but if one member opposes it the matter stops there. This is because a decision requires a consensus. Since Mrs. Gandhi was determined that Pakistan not be readmitted she kept producing one obstacle after another. Fortunately now that the situation has changed and Delhi and Islamabad are in agreement we should expect that in the summit conference of the Commonwealth to be held in the Indian capital in November this year Pakistan will be made a member of this club again with full honors. Obviously Pakistan will not refuse.

Pakistan has had to undergo a great loss in the fields of economics, education, diplomacy, science, industry and technology after separating from the Commonwealth. It is our good fortune that Britain has maintained bilateral relations with Pakistan and that the British government has continually made an effort that Pakistan again be part of this brotherhood. The list of losses in just the educational field is a very long one. These and other details are not being given in this short article for fear it may grow too long, but this loss may be estimated just from the fact that the fellowships and stipends which the Commonwealth Foundation used to give Pakistani doctors for their higher medical education were completely cut off. Britain is the third largest importer of Pakistani goods and the fourth largest exporter of goods to Pakistan. Keep in mind how much Pakistan has lost after separating from the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth is no imperialist or colonial institution. Free and independent countries join it of their own free will and benefit from each other's expertise and industrial and technical skill. No member imposes its will on any other member. However, if any member country transgresses against its own people or against its neighbor, this organization is authorized to level moral sanctions against it. It was by means of this weapon that the racist South African government was boycotted.

Pakistan is an active member of several subsidiary agencies of the United Nations. After playing an important role in the Islamic Conference, Pakistan has also made a name for itself through its performance in the organization of non-aligned countries. After having rejoined the Commonwealth Pakistan will not only prove an influential member of this brotherhood but will also be able to give concrete aid to its own 80,000,000 countrymen and to the 300,000 Pakistanis living in Britain.

NDP LEADER SAYS ONLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT CAN SOLVE AFGHAN PROBLEM

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 p 10

[Text]

PESHAWAR, March 15: Mr Ghulam Mohammad Bilour, Central General Secretary of the defunct National Democratic Party, has said that it is beyond the capacity of the present regime to solve the Afghanistan problem and only an elected government can deliver the goods. Therefore he demanded holding of immediate elections in the country and handing over power to peoples' representatives.

In a Press statement, Mr Bilour accused the present regime of putting country's security and integrity at stake. He was, however, severely critical of what he called the most devastating role being played by a certain political party under cover of religion in relation to Afghanistan problem.

Referring to what was masterminded by that political party in former East Pakistan in 1971, Mr Bilour accused this party of collect-

ing large funds abroad states in the name Afghan refugees who were getting only one fourth of these collections. Therefore this party was not in favour of solving the Afghan problem, he remarked.

"We are firmly of the view that the Afghan issue should be immediately solved because it is relevant to the security of Pakistan," he said.

He demanded withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and adding that Pakistan Government should not hesitate from negotiating with Karmal regime if the problem could be solved through this method. He called upon the Government not to make it a question of their ego in the larger national interest of Pakistan and peace in this region.

He stressed the need of early elections and return of the armed forces to their barracks.

CSO: 4600/454

ZIA LAUDS AGA KHAN'S SERVICES

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 pp 1, 14

[Text]

President Zia-ul-Haq has praised the 'immense contribution' made by the forefathers of the Aga Khan in the growth of Islamic civilisation spanning the whole gamut of cultural life of Islamic Ummah".

The President was speaking at a banquet he hosted for the Aga Khan and Begum Salimah Aga Khan at the Governor House here last night. The President extended warm and sincere felicitations on the completion of 25 years of the Aga Khan's Imamate during which he guided the destinies of his followers.

Speaking on the occasion Prince Karim Aga Khan said his visit would prove to be a memorable stay and "one which we shall all look back in years to come with the greatest joy and gratitude".

He said: "I am happy to say that during this jubilee tour of your country I shall be either opening or inaugurating the construction of a number of new projects in the educational, health and economic spheres".

President Zia said Prince Karim Aga Khan following in the footsteps of his forefathers had dedicated his life to the promotion of Islamic brotherhood and to the eradication of hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy from the developing world.

President Zia recalled that it was Imam Muiz who founded the first modern Islamic university — Jamia Al-Azhar — which has been a glorious seat of Islamic learning for a thousand years.

Similarly, the late Sir Sultan Mohammad Shah Aga Khan dedicated his entire life to the service of

Islam and Ummah and humanity at large. It was his efforts and valuable contributions which helped in establishing the Aligarh Muslim University as a landmark in the history of the Muslims of the South Asian subcontinent. A large number of Muslims who rose to prominence in the political, economic and educational life of the subcontinent were the products of the Aligarh University, the President added.

The President said Prince Karim Aga Khan's love for Pakistan was well-known. Pakistan occupied a special place in his heart. In the development of social, educational, health and economic fields, Pakistan had consistently received the closest attention of His Highness.

President Zia-ul-Haq said that the establishment of an ultra-modern hospital, medical university and school of nursing was a personal contribution of Prince Karim Aga Khan. The very fact that the biggest undertaking of His Highness anywhere in the world was located in Karachi was a measure of his love and affection for the people of Pakistan.

The President added: "It has been our constant endeavour to strengthen the Islamic character of our society and develop the brotherly relations with other Muslim States. In both these endeavours the new university being set up by you can play a useful role and contribute to the revival of Islamic values and introduction of Islamic themes in the system of education."

President Zia-ul-Haq was confident that the Aga Khan University of medical sciences would become a fountain of learning.

The President said: "The fact that the new university is open to students from other Muslim lands will be a substantial factor in improving our relations with the Muslim nations."

He was confident that the Aga Khan University would become an institution which might compare favourably with the Western universities.

In the end, President Zia-ul-Haq prayed for the long life and happiness of Prince Karim Aga Khan.

Prince Karim Aga Khan thanked the President for referring to efforts made by his grandfather Sir Sultan Mohammad Shah Aga Khan and himself in the service of the under-developed world and of the Umma, as well as to the programmes the Aga Khan institutions are carrying out in Pakistan in various fields.

Prince Karim Aga Khan mentioned other major projects which he would inspect during his current visit to Pakistan. These include a new maternity home in Hyderabad, a medical centre with a maternity wing and child care centre in Singal, Northern Areas.

He added: "In the Northern Areas we are also adding significantly to the capacity of our Aga Khan educational network, which already includes 117 primary and secondary schools, by the opening of a new secondary school for girls at Sherqilla and the construction of an academy for girls at Karimabad.

"Until recently girls have lagged sadly behind boys both in their enthusiasm for education and in the facilities available to them. But this is rapidly changing and we hope to assist the Government in producing more qualified lady teachers, nurses and other professional people who come from the Northern Areas and will stay to serve them.

"The Aga Khan rural support programme is assisting rural development in various ways. These include identifying and promoting income-generating opportunities for the villagers, bringing drinking water and sanitation to 150 more villages over a period of years, training primary health personnel and improving teaching standards. The programmes are of course carried out in co-operation with Gov-

ernment and with such international agencies as UNICEF."

The Aga Khan said: "Finally, during this visit, my brother and I will be inaugurating the construction of two new city centre hotels, at Quetta and Faisalabad as both the cities at present lack sufficient high quality accommodation for visitors and businessmen. These hotels fit into the overall effort which our economic institutions are making to develop investment in Pakistan and in other parts of the Third World".

He concluded: "Your Excellency, I am sure I have said enough to show that our jubilee visit here will be no idle period of celebration, indeed the programme set out for us is one of the busiest I have ever embarked upon, I am sure that

it will also be one of the most fruitful and that the jubilee projects will assist in the attainment of your Government's national objectives. I would like to conclude by reiterating my family's thanks for the welcome you have given us and assuring you that the future of this country is very close to our hearts."

The banquet was attended by Princes Salimah, Prince Amin, Prince Sadruddin and other members of the Aga Khan family.

Also present at the dinner were Begum Zia-ul-Haq, the Governor of Sind, Lt-Gen. S.M. Abbasi, Begum Yasmin Abbasi, Federal Ministers present in Karachi, provincial Ministers, members of the Majlis-i-Shoora and Provincial Council, and high officials and elite of the town and prominent members of the Ismaili community.—PPI/APP

CSO: 4600/454

COMMENTARY ON MINISTERS, EX-MINISTERS

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 10 Mar 83 p 34

[Text]

THINK for yourself. When the head of the army is the President of the country, what will be the position of the Defence Minister? Or, when the Secretary of a particular Ministry is a lieutenant-general in the army, the status of his Minister should be obvious to all. In spite of all this, people do their very best to become Ministers. I will never want to be such a Minister. But pressure from friends is a separate matter. A sensible courtier of our Ministers thinks that people do not become Ministers because they think that the authority of the Ministry they will get will be theirs. They try to become Ministers because they know that he who once becomes a Minister reserves the right to be called an ex-Minister for the rest of his life.... Not even the Chief Martial Law Administrator can wrest this right from him. An ex-Minister is suddenly put on the list of notables in a city and is entitled to preside over all types of

functions organised by the National Centres and he is invited to every major function in town. Under certain conditions, it is profitable to be an ex-Minister. For example, if a lawyer has been a Law Minister, he can secure an automatic rise in his fees when he returns to the profession as an ex-Minister....

Granted that to make or unmake Ministers is the President's own business, but it is a fact that once the President gets back to work after appointing Ministers; these gentlemen get after people like you and I. Therefore, the people should be given the glad tidings in time as to who is becoming a Minister. We can only make a submission the rest depends on the President's sweet will. What goes of us? (As the poet has said):

The party is his and so is the bartender

Only the eyes are mine, the rest is his.—From an article by Mr. Abdul Qadir Hasan, NAWA-I-WAQT, March 5.

CSO: 4600/446

FORMER FEDERAL OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 'HYPOCRITICAL'

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 Mar 83 p 10

[Editorial: "Altaf Gauhar's 'words of wisdom'"]

[Text] Pakistan's former Federal Secretary of Information and Broadcasting and present editor of the London-based magazine THIRD WORLD, Mr. Altaf Gauhar, while tossing a few pearls of wisdom to the BBC, made the accusation that the religious fundamentalists had taken control of Pakistan and now it could not be freed from their clutches. While giving his impressions of his recent visit to Pakistan he said that when some people use the news media in foreign countries to express their opposition they are considered subversives. He said that the decline in Pakistan which is now at its zenith had begun in 1958. Describing the attempts in Pakistan to promulgate an Islamic system as Pakistan's being under the control of the religious fundamentalists is at the very least inappropriate for the man who at one time was so influenced by the head of the Jamaat-e Islami, Maulana Maudoodi, that he had announced that he would translate the Maulana's Quranic exegesis into English. He let his hair grow so long in jail that when he came out he looked like Gauhar the Mendicant. All that was lacking was a beard. And now that he's enjoying himself in London he thinks the efforts to promulgate an Islamic system in Pakistan contemptible: "Revolutions are of the times."

It is no secret that some sons of this beloved country have abandoned their homeland and are making a "London plan" in an alien land. Without any regard to context they are searching through the libraries there, gathering and publishing such materials as disgrace and ideologies of their beloved homeland. Playing into the hands of the country's enemies, they use the news media of unsympathetic countries to pierce the breast of the homeland with arrows of piercing remarks. This is their favorite pastime. Now what do these actions prove about their patriotism? If these people were patriotic, whatever they had to say they would say in their own country to their countrymen. And if they were to suffer problems in regard to their right to speak, they would consider it a holy war and bear it. Mr. Altaf Gauhar ended this interview by saying that the process of decline in Pakistan had already begun by 1958 but he did not see fit to tell us in this interview that in those days he was himself the secretary of a department as important as that of Information and Broadcasting. It seems the decline was started by his hands, progressed for several years, and reached its conclusion under his control.

STEP TOWARD ISLAMIC INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION LAUDED

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 p 11

[Editorial]

[Text] THE follow-up committee of the OIC's Task Force on Industrial Cooperation among Islamic Countries, which met last week in Islamabad, has finalised a well-documented brief for consideration of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference's financial institutions. The speed with which the Task Force completed its job is, indeed, commendable. It was established in February 1982 by the Ministers of Industries of OIC member-countries at a meeting held in Islamabad. The task of identifying and marrying the complementary resources — of countries having diverse economic set-ups and differing levels of economic development for the purpose of establishing joint industrial ventures whose benefits would accrue to the majority of the OIC member-countries is a highly complicated matter. The fact that during the twelve months of its operation the Task Force could consider only 57 projects and prepare feasibility reports for a mere 10 of these is indicative of the complexities involved in the job. However, the absence of the financially rich OIC members from the list of countries which actually sent in their proposals reflects an unexplained lack of enthusiasm on the part of this group. This is rather surprising, for the rich but underdeveloped countries also stand to gain from this enterprise whose aim is to reduce the seemingly

perpetual dependence of developing countries on the developed world. The affluent countries of the West have so far adamantly refused to help correct the gross imbalances in the existing international economic order.

More disturbing is the fact that out of the ten feasibility reports approved by the Task Force, as many as five were prepared by one country — Pakistan. Of the 57 projects considered by the Task Force, 15 cover agriculture-based and agriculture-supported industries, 17 capital goods units, 22 chemical and fertiliser factories and three pertain exclusively to agriculture. Pakistan proposed five projects involving a sum of Rs 200 million, which include a tin plate unit, kraft paper plant, deep-sea fishing, agricultural implements plant and tannery chemical unit. On the face of it, the nature of industries listed here reflects the anxiety of the concerned parties to keep within their own technological capacity. Even the financial involvement appears to have been kept at a very modest level if what is proposed to be spent on the five projects suggested by Pakistan is taken as representative of the level of investment in all the projects submitted to the Task Force.

These are wise and realistic decisions because in view of the

pioneering nature of the exercise, an overambitious approach would have proved too costly and, perhaps, counter-productive. In view of the modest size of the projects as well as their uncomplicated technological nature, the financial institutions of the OIC, when they consider them probably in May this year, will have no difficulty in taking decisions expeditiously.

The work of the Task Force should now be to persuade the financially rich OIC members to participate in the enterprise more meaningfully. It should also find it useful to request member-countries to submit proposals for setting up specialised development financial institutions as joint ventures. These specialised banks would be able to respond more quickly and more intelligently to the changing world economic situation and prepare specific projects aimed at facilitating a continuous flow of new technologies from the North to the South. Three-cornered joint ventures, with the North supplying the technology, should also be studied closely. All in all, a good beginning has been made by the Task Force, and if sustained efforts are mounted with a singleness of purpose, it would only be a matter of time before the goals for which the Task Force was created will begin to materialise.

SUGGESTION TO SOFTEN STAND ON PALESTINIANS DISMISSED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 10 Mar 83 pp 7-8

[From the "Between the Lines" column by Linesman: "Nonsense-Advice"]

[Text] Having seen no denial or clarification in three weeks of the statements attributed to Z.A. Suleri--former editor, now professional adviser--,allegedly made in the sacrosanct and safe precincts of the Islamabad-Rawalpindi National Centre, one is compelled to conclude that he actually did deliver the nonsense-advice reported in an Islamabad daily.

Even allowing for the shabby reporting, there is no doubt left about the main thrust of the refurbished Suleri thesis. He argues--in a string of non sequitars--that Pakistan should go along with US policies, and that, first, "we must stop making a loud noise for the Palestine cause because the Jews are a great power." He tries to buttress his proposition in favour of accepting the Washington line with a number of rather meaningless arguments. He seeks to make the point that if "we could stay put about the Kashmir issue with India, we could also remain quiet about the Palestine issue in relation to the United States." The gentleman cannot have forgotten the unhappy fact that Pakistan and India have fought three indecisive wars over Kashmir in twenty-five years. If this means staying put, one is caught in a semantic bog. Failure to find a military solution ultimately led the warring nations to the sane option that the dispute should be settled through negotiations, because the path of war had done both countries and their peoples a great deal of harm, without bringing a settlement any nearer.

Palestine

Palestine presents a different picture. Every day, Palestinians are being killed, jailed or tortured in Israel and in the Occupied Territories; and they are hounded in neighbouring Arab States and massacred by the Israelis and their paid agents. The Palestinians have suffered a diaspora unprecedented in modern history. They continue to be divested of their lands and homes. They live and work in all parts of the world, but the focus of their attention is their homeland and they will continue to struggle and fight till they have won the freedom to which they are entitled. Their struggle is backed by the OIC, the NAM and, by and large, the United Nations. It is supported by all self-respecting nations, and specially by the people of Pakistan. Many Pakistanis have shed their blood for the Palestine cause. It is, therefore, not just a question of making "a loud noise" for Palestine.

Nor can it be denied that on the Palestine issue hinges the peace of the Middle East, and even the peace of the world. Victory for the people of Palestine will mean defeat of the most diabolic neocolonialist conspiracy, the creation of an imperialist base in the Middle East to control the oil-rich Arab lands and their strategic areas. For any Muslim or Third World country to abandon Palestine is to surrender its dignity and self-respect as a sovereign nation, and to accept subservience to Israel and its chief patron. Only cowardly senility can persuade anyone to advocate the adoption of this posture.

Other Reasons

This is not all. Suleri goes on to say that allegiance to America was essential as the recently established U.S. connection serves our national interest because of the F-16s. The F-16s, he says, have helped "the twin purpose of making us increasingly confident and forcing India to a more reconciling position." The second part of this theory is false and, therefore, meaningless. It would appear that rapprochement with India is likely to be delayed nor expedited because of American arms. Further, it is revealed that the American connection has created a new phase of negotiations in relation to Afghanistan. This is balderdash. Indirect Pak-Afghan negotiations are taking place not because of--but despite--the American connection. Equally puerile is the gentleman's thinking on how the dispute can be settled by bringing about a change of Government in Kabul, and the differences he sees on this subject between Pakistan and America. The question obviously is not that of changing the Government in Kabul but of coming to an agreement with whatever Government controls Afghanistan, so that the problems that plague the region can be eliminated.

Behold the sage continues to pour out words of wisdom. He says that "the danger of Hindus and Russians marching in was, today, enhanced by the power of the Jews, leaving Pakistan no choice but to accept the American help." This type of logic out-Suleris Suleri. Fear of the Jewish power persuades him to go for help to the source of this power--the suppliers of the guns and dollars that make Israel a potent nuisance. A final piece of advice is that "in such a delicately dangerous situation, we could at least help the Government by keeping the internal situation non-chaotic." What is a non-chaotic situation? How is the Government to be helped? Does non-chaos mean normalcy? How is normalcy to be attained? These questions are not asked; therefore, no answers are given.

Doyen of Opportunists

Apart from spouting other exquisite pieces of nonsense, Suleri's main thesis is that "Pakistan should be shrewd enough" to underplay the Palestine issue. This is not the first occasion when this doyen among opportunist Pakistani editors (and this means a great deal) has suggested that Pakistan should bow to the US and kowtow to its regional satrap, forgetting its natural allies in the Third World. Pakistan did precisely this in 1956 over Suez, and it took more than a decade to live down this betrayal of the Arab cause. There have also been other minor occasions, like the invitation of Chiang Kai Shek's representative to visit Pakistan at a time when the question of China's recognition was before the world. It is such acts of myopic stupidity and greed that have over many years

placed Pakistan in a weak position among Third World countries and particularly the Arab nations.

Support for the Palestine cause is not merely endorsement of a fundamental principle of international justice, it is also support for a cause which if accepted by the whole world will guarantee that right and justice prosper, and that is what Pakistan seeks on all international issues including those in which it is directly involved.

CSO: 4600/446

DECLINE IN EDUCATION STANDARDS DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 p 4

[Text] Serious concern was expressed at the "steep decline" in the standard of education in the country and urgent need stressed to arrest the trend by scholars, educationists and experts at a symposium held at the Pakistan National Centre yesterday.

The symposium on "Decline in educational standards, its causes and remedies" was chaired by Prof. Iftekhar Ahmed Ansari, Director of College Education. Prof. Hassan Adil, Prof. Hasnain Kazmi, Mr. Yusuf Qureshi and Syed Mustafa Ali Barelvi participated.

Prof. Ansari said he would not hold students responsible for the decay in educational standards. He listed four major causes for it: Over-experimentation in education policies; (2) total indifference of teachers towards education; (3) indifference of parents; and (4) nationalisation and half-backed measures for implementation of the nationalisation programmes.

Ten years after the nationalisation, even the good private educational institutions were in total disarray, while Government-run institutions had gone worse.

Expressing grave concern at the trend, he called for "full-scale debate at national level" to find out the solutions and save education from "total disaster."

He strongly advocated immediate steps at the primary level, (2) training and education of teachers, (3) selection of teachers, and (4) preparation of text-books.

Syed Mustafa Ali Barelvi, former Assistant Director of School Education, stressed the need to improve primary education; standard text-books and teachers' training, imparting of education in Urdu, keeping a constant watch on educational institutions which had a

mushroom growth.

He lamented that there was no "Code of Education" to provide guidance to educational institutions and promoters of education. Perhaps it is lying somewhere in "cold storage," he said and disclosed that schools had emerged with fees at Rs. 400 and above charging Rs. 1500 as admission fee.

These institutions have no control of the Government over them.

He said the text-books are rotten and sub-standard, printing is hopeless and full of errors; and Geography and Islamiyat books are full of incorrect and misleading information.

Dismal picture

Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, speaking on the facilities in educational institutions, gave a dismal picture of the buildings; environments; facilities like laboratory; library; drinking water; health care etc., and lamented over the present stock of teachers. If need be we must import teachers, he said. If we have to import books, charts, maps, and other teaching aids why not import good teachers.

He gave a catalogue of "model schools" as suggested by UNESCO and recommended that we should have a couple of "model schools" in the country.

Prof. Hasnain Kazmi, Principal, Allama Iqbal Government College, pointed out that there was lack of co-ordination in the framing of educational policies and their implementation. This resulted in failures of many educational policies during the last 35 years, he said.

There is dualism in every aspect of education and there is no harmony between the educational system, text-books and Islamic

ideology. He termed the existing situation as "total chaos." He said education is more important than "defence" and urged for paying full attention to this aspect of our national life.

Prof. Hassan Adil, Founder-Principal of National College gave a detailed background of the causes of decline in educational standards; unrest among students, frustration among teachers, political parties' exploitation of students and supplying them arms and funds.

He regretted that while framing educational policies, educationists, teachers and men in the field were neither consulted nor taken into confidence. Consequently, education policies met with disaster and could not be implemented.

He described the adverse affect and the failure of introducing 3-year degree course, tutorials, tests system, nationalisation, system of rotating chairmen of departments, as examples of such policies.

Prof. Hassan Adil criticised the mushroom growth of "Cambridge-style" schools in Karachi which he said were charging high fees and exorbitant admission fees (Rs. 400, and Rs. 1500 respectively). These institutions were enjoying all facilities and patronage of the Government and were "exempted" from all controls.

Poor quality of books, poor printing, sub-standard contents, and very poor proof-reading backed by poor authorship added to the problem.

"More stress is now given to uniforms (shalwar-kamees) than on the quality of teachers, books, and teaching standards. Non-serious and indifferent attitude of teachers, parents and authorities did the rest, he concluded.

STUDENT PROTESTS DISCUSSED

East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Mar 83 p 9

[Text] Opposition political leaders in Pakistan are now looking to the country's students who, they hope, may be able to generate the mass frenzy against President Zia ul Haq and his military regime that they themselves – and rampant inflation and an energy crisis – have so far failed to spark.

Students are undoubtedly agitated, for various reasons. The issues involved, however, have yet to be aligned with the general uneasiness in the country and developed into a general protest. The politicians, for their part, are trying to arouse public feeling in favour of the students. Jan Muhammad Abbasi, a vice-president of Jamaat-i-Islami, has come out with a strong condemnation of a recent police action at Karachi University and likened it to "tyranny and oppression of the previous (PPP) regime."

MRD leaders, for their part, have criticised the severe punishments handed down by a military court to 33 students of Rawalpindi's Government Polytechnic College for unauthorised possession of firearms and unlawful assembly.

Polytechnic students at some 30 colleges in the country have been demanding that their BTech degree be considered on a par with the BSc (Engineering) degree. The campaign had been going on peacefully for several months, confined to the occasional boycott of classes and campus rallies. A delegation also met with the presidential Advisor for Science and Technology on January 17, who assured them of sympathetic consideration of their demand. With that, the agitation largely cooled down.

However, the Rawalpindi college became big news the next day, when it was closed down after a clash between students and police outside the campus. The trouble started when the students seized a private bus after a quarrel with the conductor.

Police resorted to a baton charge to control the situation, and some students and police were slightly injured.

The college was then closed down by the local administration and students were asked to vacate the hostel. That night, police made a surprise check of the hostel, and discovered a cache of arms. The 33 students arrested were tried by a summary military court, and were sentenced to between one and three years in prison and 5-10 lashes each.

There have been a number of press statements demanding the students' release. But, since all the background details had been reported in the national press, attempts at making a political issue out of the incident – also faithfully reported – appear to be futile at the moment.

The rather more organised student agitation in Karachi, the country's largest city, also had its roots in the abundance of firearms around the academic campuses. There have been a number of armed clashes between rival student groups in recent years. In one last July at Karachi University, a verbal slanging match between the workers of Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba and the United Students Movement (an alliance of the secularists) was going on when some shots were fired into the throng from some distance.

Qadeer Javed, a student belonging to neither group, was killed, and police arrested leaders from both sides pending investigation. The Jamiat protested against the arrest of its leaders, claiming they were innocent, and the protest went on through press statements and campus rallies.

Meanwhile, the university's academic council, following other universities in the country, decided to do away with the semester system and restore the old examination system. At the same time, it recom-

mended that the honours classes at the university be discontinued in order to reduce student numbers to manageable size. The Jamiat combined the two issues to launch a campaign of rallies and demonstrations from January 1, which was continuing in February.

Again, this movement has little chance of gaining public support. For one thing, the arrested Jamiat leaders, who had not been released by early February, have been exonerated of any murder charges by police investigations that were made public. Secondly, student opposition to the abolition of the semester system and the honours classes appears to be motivated more by political expediency than academic interests.

Due to the fact that the student unrest was mainly of an academic nature, and concerned only one university, there was little likelihood of its spreading to other sectors of society or the rest of the country. Indeed, the campaign started by Karachi Jamiat on January 1 was steadily losing momentum.

Suddenly, on January 19, the Karachi police came down heavily on a peaceful rally at the campus. They beat up a number of students mercilessly, misbehaved with girl students and used tear gas indiscriminately.

The unnecessary police operation has not only helped reinvigorate the waning agitation, it has also prompted political leaders to arouse public feeling against police atrocities. But the incident was too obviously stagemanaged by the section of the administration that, as the Jamaat-i-Islami leaders have charged a number of times, is bent on setting General Zia and the Islamists on a collision course.

It therefore looks very unlikely, at least in the near future, that the present student unrest will develop into a countrywide mass agitation.

CAMPUS VIOLENCE INVOLVING GIRL STUDENTS DISCUSSED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 10 Mar 83 p 17

[Text]

NOT that the Campus females had tasted violence for the first time, but the incident that took place at the Old Campus and spilled over to The Mall was evidence of the growing nervousness of the pious lot, because their terror tactics were finally beginning to invite resistance from the other side, particularly from the girls who were under constant verbal fire from the ex-Majlis-i-Shoora member, Dr. Israr Ahmad.

Strange

It is strange that the Vice-Chancellor of the country's oldest University who might have reasons to be overawed by the guns and weapons of prohibited bore, found himself incapable of restraining the pious among girls (of whom only one appeared in 'burqa' at their Press conference) from indulging in violence. That these pious girls had the active support of a small band who are always to be found on such occasions wearing 'lois' is all the more worrying, as the law and order enforcing agencies are stated to be well aware of them and even told the injured girls that they could do nothing about those gentlemen.

The other armed band that made its appearance on the Campus was stated to be one till recently in control of the Davis Road headquarters of the defunct Pagara PML.

Davis Road sanctuary

Now, with the sealing of the Davis

Road headquarters, sanctuaries are left with one of the functional-defuncts and, of course, some hostels and residences where law-and-order enforcing agencies can't peep in.

As one worried father said, there were only a few options left for him since he could not afford to send his sons and daughters to the Campus as he got too nervous on knowing all about the lethal arms in use there to terrorise opponents and quite occasionally to kill as well. These options, as far as girls were concerned, tallied with the objectives of Dr. Israr Ahmad, who would not like girls at the Campus at all. As for the boys, he felt they could better learn some trade or craft. The only other alternative available would be to seek arms licences for all of them so that they could be used by his young wards in self-defence if the occasion arose. Now

he has joined a Shoora members' band so that the administration's objections could be met through the recommendations by the trusted-select selected. He hoped that his wards would be able to get licences for keeping fire-arms which were fast becoming a pre-qualification for getting into the portals of academic institutions.

PLAN TO SET UP CENTER FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 p 9

[Text]

FAISALABAD, March 15: A comprehensive plan for setting up an international centre for genetic engineering is being prepared by the Federal Government. The Federal Ministry of Education is giving final touches to modalities to the plan for submission to UNIDO authorities. A knowledgeable source disclosed this to "Dawn" here on Sunday.

The idea of the establishment of the centre was first mooted by the Minister of Industries in the course of a meeting, held at UNIDO Head Office, Vienna, in May 1982, to deliberate the matter in furtherance of an earlier decision to this effect at Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Guidelines, provided by the Belgrade meeting were:

- To consider offers from Belgium, Canada, Thailand, India, Cuba and Pakistan to host the proposed international centre.

- To extend the UNIDO international programme on genetic engineering with a network of regional and national centres affiliated with the main international centre.

- To form a committee for preparing a working paper for the ministerial level meeting on the subject.

The source said that Pakistan fulfilled all the requirements for the setting up of the international

centre which inter alia include:-

- The host country's strong commitment to promote the new technology.

- Availability of infrastructure for R and D in the host country.

- Strong national programmes for research in genetic engineering.

- Local conditions regarding stable power supply/market for repair and availability of equipment and chemicals etc.

- Efficient telecommunication system.

- Easy air connection and good living conditions to attract first rate foreign scientists.

Pakistan has put up a very strong case for the establishment of international centre in Islamabad pinpointing that all the above said facilities were available locally. It was also pointed out that Islamabad already housed a National Institute of Health, a National Agricultural Research Centre, a National Institute of Electronics, a national university and a Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology all of which could provide close collaboration to the proposed international centre in Islamabad.

There is strong likelihood of Pakistan offer being accepted and the proposed centre being established in Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

CSO: 4600/454

INDIA-PAKISTAN 'DISTRUST SYNDROME' ANALYZED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 p 9

[Article by Iqbal Burney]

[Text] **NEW DELHI:** Pakistan may not have bargained for it, but it managed to stay in the headlines for two consecutive days at a time when the newspapers here were caught up in the summit fever. This, despite the unending torrent of words, resolutions, drafts, amendments, briefing and speeches which keep the typewriters chattering round the clock at the cluttered, bubbling Media Centre, not to mention the more powerful beams flashed out by the electronic crew.

Pakistan's President, General Zia-ul-Haq, had not even pronounced his mild words on Kashmir when the lobbies started buzzing with the news of India's reaction or over-reaction, to put it subjectively. President Zia had started speaking late in the afternoon, much behind schedule — things cannot always be managed according to a strict time schedule at sprawling summits like the one staged here. Within minutes of his taking the mike and at the pre-scheduled daily briefing at 6 p.m., the Indian spokesman was kicking the ball straight into Pakistan's net. The implied message of the reply was as sharp as the instant articulation of the reaction.

Gen. Zia had touched India's raw nerve although, as he explained

next morning, his reference to Kashmir was couched in "inocuous" words. He had mentioned Kashmir in more elaborate terms at the Havana summit and had brought in the relevant UN resolutions and the Simla Agreement as the framework in which the problem was to be resolved. The statement at New Delhi was more flexible in so far as it was preceded by a recall of the "improvement in the climate of relations" as a result of the "auspicious start" provided by his meeting with Mrs Gandhi in November last. While reiterating his commitment to "building bridges of understanding" in order to evolve "new heights of good neighbourly relations", he came to the very brief, mild but fateful words: "in the same spirit we should find a just solution of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir," seventeen words in all. But, as an Indian journalist predicted, the next morning's headlines had been made.

Well prepared

The ~~Indian reaction~~ came swiftly. Apparently, copies of Gen. Zia's speech had been supplied in advance to the summit secretariat and the Indians were well prepared for the counter-assault. The Indian spokesman was generous enough to grant the President of Pakistan the right to raise "issues of concern to him" but for India the issue now was "the return of Indian territory under Pakistani occupation." The familiar Indian interpretation that the Simla accord precluded the raising of bilateral issues at inter-

national forums was also brought in.

It may be of some solace to take into account the fact that India confined itself to a right of reply at a venue outside the conference hall. A rejoinder from the podium could have vitiated the conference atmosphere, a possibility which Gen. Zia did not have in mind and the Indians, being the hosts, could hardly risk. The predicted headlines nevertheless followed in equally predictable unison. The Indian national consensus on Kashmir is not something artificially orchestrated. After three wars it can only be expected to be what it is. That it runs counter to Pakistan's consistent stand or India's international agreements or that it skirts around the wishes of the people of Kashmir is, of course, a different matter. The fact remains that even the not-so-ineffective "pro-normalisation" lobby in India would be hard put to find a member who would advocate a change in the status quo in Kashmir, apart from minor changes, if it all, in the present line of actual control.

The hardliner *Times of India* must be given the cake for its three column heading on Thursday morning, "Zia violates a convention: bilateral issue raised at Non-aligned summit." The follow-up in the form of news was equally evocative. It spoke of Indian delegation's "unpleasant surprise at a time when the movement was regaining some of its original elan" (*sic*) and saw in Pakistan's move a confirmation of "India's misgiving about Pakistan's obsession with looking

at the world in terms of its India policy." It also recalled a similar reference by Agha Hilaly before the Human Rights Commission at Geneva last year — "A Pakistani shenanigan which reversed the process of bilateral negotiations by six months."

Patriot

Patriot, the acknowledged purveyor of the Soviet Russian line, castigated Gen. Zia for bringing in an element of "sourness" at the summit by raising "the so-called Kashmir question." The sudden reference to Kashmir in the midst of a string of homilies on amicable and good neighbourly relations evoked an unhappy but very restrained response from host India," commented *Patriot's* news story displayed in a double column on the front page. Gen. Zia is not *patriot's* only bugbear. For the past couple of days the paper has been reserving its more caustic comments for Dr Mahbubul Haq whom it delights in portraying as an "apologist for IMF" or as a spokesman of the United States determined to sidetrack the summit's economic committee deliberations on to wayward pro-capitalistic pastures. Dr Mahbubul Haq mercifully has not exercised his right to reply.

The front pages of the *Hindustan Times*, *The Statesman* and the relatively moderate *Indian Express* blazed with Kashmir headlines but the treatment was more balanced and Gen. Zia's statement was quoted within the context of the subject. Necessarily, therefore, it did not appear to be as lurid as it appeared in other newspapers. So low-key the reference was that a senior Pakistani journalist, going through the text of the speech, had actually missed the sentence on Kashmir. He re-read the speech and noted the controversial sentence only after the fuss started buzzing over the wires.

There is more to the Indo-Pakistan distrust syndrome than the Kashmir issue. Friday's papers gave prominence to reports from Washington on the US House Committee hearings on the aid-sales-credit package to Pakistan, courtesy Mr Selig Harrison and the Carnegie Endowment, the atmosphere here will reverberate with warnings of deteriorating relations between India and

Pakistan. Further, according to Mr Harrison: "Pakistan is seeking upgraded systems in order to improve its combat capability against India." A vote of thanks to Mr Harrison that he has referred only to Pakistan's combat capability and not its offensive capability. Mr Harrison as an Indian diplomat remarked to me, is more effective than the Indian Ambassador. He even jokingly toyed with the idea of Mr Harrison being appointed the Indian Ambassador to Washington.

On the other side of the coin is the Russian pressure, physically present in Afghanistan and its vast web of political and economic ties with India. The curious contradictions it takes was signified on Thursday at a Press conference by the Afghan Prime Minister, Mr Sultan Ali Keshitmand. He was asked about the consensus draft of the summit's declaration on Afghanistan to which both Pakistan and India had agreed. He implied a rejection of Pakistan's stand and an acceptance of India's.

This twin pressure coming from outside feeds the domestic hardliners in both India and Pakistan and the resulting climate of distrust need hardly take anybody by surprise. Not that the domestic hardliners need any feeding from outside the subcontinent. There is enough raw meat for a feast which has been going on since 1947 and before.

The short-lived row over the Kashmir reference was coming in any case. Wittingly or unwittingly, Kuldip Nayar may have played a small part in setting the ball rolling. His interview with President Zia, published in the *Tribune* of Chandigarh, gave the first warning of the rumblings to come. Gen. Zia had forewarned of a possible reference to Kashmir well within Pakistan's interpretation of bilateralism under the Simla accord. "Zia keeps options — pact or no pact" was the heading of his despatch. Another despatch was published in the *Sunday* of Calcutta under the headline "Zia could allow American bases in Pakistan." Meanwhile, Mrs Gandhi had taken the bit between her teeth and had practically drawn the covers in her interview with the *Financial Times* published on February 25. Using the nuclear issue (Pakistan's modest and faltering programme bears no comparison with India's advanced and self-reliant status) she

had closed the doors on possible negotiations during the summit. Her November parleys with Gen. Zia were a "drawing room" chat. The Opposition in Pakistan would not honour an agreement reached between Gen. Zia and herself. "What can you discuss" anyway? Kuldip Nayar's "pact or no pact" and his persistent references to American bases in Pakistan may have served to queer the pitch.

When Gen. Zia arrived and a meeting with Mrs Gandhi was scheduled in the evening, it had to be postponed. Mrs Gandhi had to, perhaps genuinely perhaps not, leave for the airport to receive the arriving VVIPs. She seems to have remained busy for three days in a row and did not meet Gen. Zia till Thursday morning, half an hour before the Joint Commission agreement between the two countries was due to be signed. The Kashmir "cracker" had meanwhile gone off on Wednesday evening.

Opening remarks

General Zia's opening remarks could hardly be audible over the closed circuit television sets in the Media Centre. Never before had they faulted for a minute. After a few minutes of disturbance the voice came clear and loud through the sets. As Gen. Zia spoke, the Chairman, Mrs Gandhi, could not add up to much. General Zia seemed to take it in his stride. He did not expect to be "craddled" by Mrs. Gandhi, busy as she was in her "36 hours a day" schedule — so the newspapers quoted one of the summiteers.

When the Joint Commission agreement was signed on Thursday morning, the atmosphere visibly warmed up. Mrs Gandhi relented and beamed a Nehru smile — shades of Nehru on a face crowned by an impressive shock of grey hair. "Let us open the doors one by one," she said. The photographs next day, along with headlines again, showed a grave-looking Mrs Gandhi along with a smiling Zia-ul-Haq. In fact both had smiled as had the two foreign ministers. This was perhaps the signal for the ice to melt.

The *Indian Express* called it a "brief but historic" ceremony, a "major step" toward normalisation of relations. In an editorial the

paper rapped india on the knuckles: "It was totally inappropriate for the Indian Government to have reacted in such a prickly manner, almost a conditioned reflex, to President Zia's very innocuous and neutral one-sentence reference to Kashmir.....The statement is unobjectionable. By hastening to proclaim that the Simla Agreement precludes the raising of bilateral issues at international fora, the Indian rejoinder has merely succeeded in creating an issue where there was none. It is extraordinary that India should bristle at the very mention of an admitted problem at a conference where nations are being urged to solve mutual problems amicably. The fetish the Government of India has made of bilateralism goes ill with its urgent plea for multilateral cooperation. One can only hope that Delhi's knee-jerk reaction on Kashmir was only a passing aberration. The present state of Indo-Pakistan relations is anachronistic. The stakes are too high and the opportunities too great for anything less than vision and statesmanship on both sides." The case for a change of heart could not be pleaded more succinctly and more rationally — on either side.

Times of India

Not all the papers seemed to share the view. The *Times of India* called it a step forward but harked back to the Kashmir reference which was done "both tersely and

in an entirely friendly context" by Gen. Zia. With India's rejoinder "this could be the end of the matter", so that attention could be focussed on the constructive task envisioned by the Joint Commission.

The *Statesman* in its news item called the signing event "typical of the on-again-off-again Indo-Pakistan relationship." Editorially, the newspaper was cautious in welcoming the Joint Commission. Because of its limited scope the agreement had a chance of success.... "it might be unrewarding in this context to attach too much significance to the Pakistani leader's mention of Kashmir contrary to Indian suggestions, such bilateral issues are constantly dredged up at international meetings...More to the point is the generally accommodating and constructive tenor of Pakistani utterances."

The *Patriot* confined its reporting to a matter-of-fact account of the signing ceremony and the speeches made on the occasion. The *Hindustan Times* played up the news on its front page but its editorial entitled "A needless irritant" started off with a cutting jibe at Pakistan with its "Pavlovian predilection to raise the Kashmir issue at every imaginable forum." The Simla Agreement, according to the editorial, specifically stipulated that such disputes would be negotiated and settled bilaterally, without "recourse to international washings of dirty linen....We wish president Zia had resisted the urge to turn the clock back."

The shoddily printed *National Herald* welcomed the agreement but commented that the Kashmir reference was a "pointless exercise which has cost the Pakistan President considerable goodwill in the country."

Nearly all the newspapers have taken note of the climate of distrust directly or indirectly. One example of this distrust was exhibited by a reporter of the *Hindustan Times*. On March 10, the Islamic Conference Peace Committee held a luncheon meeting to deliberate on the Iran-Iraq war, an exercise also being carried out by the NAM summit conference through its own committee. Gen Zia is a member of the OIC Peace Committee. But, according to the *Hindustan Times* "General Zia made it a point to attend the lunch. The hush-hush meeting which was closed even to the Indian security personnel, is reported to have decided to form a bloc to condemn the "Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and to try to end the Iran-Iraq war in the interests of the Muslim world."

In what is obviously a two-pronged strategy — to establish Pakistan as the "intellectual leader" of the Islamic world on the basis of its skilled manpower pool and to get a condemnation of the USSR on the Afghanistan issue — President Zia is reported to have been appealing both to Islamic sentiments and the psychosis of fear of the non-aligned 'big brothers' among the smaller countries". The author of the report is Chand Joshi, son of the late and illustrious P.C. Joshi, a former Secretary of the Communist Party of India.

MIGRANT PAKISTANIS IN BELGIUM MAY BE LODGED IN CAMPS

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 p 1

[Article by Shadaba Islam]

[Text] BRUSSELS, March 13: Reports in the Belgian Press indicate that the Belgian Government could be considering lodging about 500 Pakistanis currently seeking political asylum in Belgium in decaying military barracks while their demands are vetted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

A Belgian Sunday paper "Dimanche Press" reports that the barracks in question are "in a sorry state" and were used to house Belgian Jews who were later dispatched to the concentration camps in Germany during the Second World War.

While denying that the specific barracks in Maline, a suburb of Brussels, are under consideration as a temporary shelter for Pakistanis, the Belgian Justice Minister Jean Gol told the Belgian national radio yesterday that the Government was studying the possibility of regrouping Pakistanis in "official buildings" including schools and army barracks.

He also stressed that the Government will ask "military lawyers" to interrogate Pakistanis who have

put in a request for political asylum so that the United Nations can speed up its vetting procedures.

The new measures being planned by the Belgian Government are the first in a series designed to reduce what right-wing parties call the "Afro-Asian" invasion of their country.

Today, however, only 500 Pakistanis, Indians and Ghanians are believed to have entered Belgium with a view to seeking political asylum. Sources stress that the number of the applicants for such refugee status is decreasing.

The Belgian actions also affect the 900,000 foreign migrants in the country, mainly from Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Arab embassies based in Brussels have protested officially against the discriminatory measures being studied by Mr Jean Gol. Further action is expected in the coming weeks as the Arab missions draw up a concerted position on defending the rights of their migrants in Belgium.

The Belgian Government plans to make visas obligatory for practi-

cally all Third World visitors, close down schools where the majority of children come from the country's "migrant population", and make it difficult for foreigners in Belgium to keep children over 16 in the country.

As far as Pakistanis are concerned, the Belgian authorities have asked the Brussels-based office of the UN Commissioner for Refugees to speed up decisions concerning applications for refugee status.

The Belgian communes who are expected to finance refugees while their demands are being vetted have protested at the growing number of Pakistanis in their neighbourhoods and at the "financial burden" these refugees present for their bankrupt coffers.

An appeal for better treatment of the refugees has been made, however, by Mr Ghulam Hussain, a former Pakistani Transport Minister and a member of the defunct Pakistan Peoples Party who is currently a political refugee living in Sweden.

CSO: 4600/452

WALI QUESTIONS GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO MAKE MAJOR DECISIONS

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 pp 1, 12

[Text]

PESHAWAR, March 13: The defunct NDP leader, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, has questioned the present Government's right to take decisions on major national issues and has demanded ascertaining of people's views if such decisions were at all inevitable.

Talking to Pressmen in Peshawar, Abdul Wali Khan warned that in case the people were not taken into confidence then the successor national government would reject them.

Replying to a question relating to the signing of Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission agreement in New Delhi the other day, the defunct NDP leader said, the MRD had already expressed its views in the matter. He, however, regretted that the present regime was taking major decisions without consulting the masses. Only the elected parliament can take important and major decisions on national issues, but since there was no parliament in existence at the moment, the Government could have recourse to ascertaining public opinion and taking the views of political parties and national leaders through the medium of the Press.

"The Press itself is not free in Pakistan and it is highly regrettable that through the media only one side of the picture is shown to the people, while the other side, harbouring dangers, is kept hidden from public view," he said. In this connection he quoted the instance of Kashmir problem about which the impression being given was that the present Government was trying to solve the problem through

negotiations with India so as to secure freedom for the people of Kashmir. "This is not the case and India has even demanded return of Azad Kashmir to her fold," he maintained.

Referring to the question of restoration of the Senate, Khan Abdul Wali Khan contended that Senate was not above the 1973 Constitution and in the event of suspension or abrogation of the Constitution the Senate had also lost its base. Regarding the proposed political structure promised for August this year, the NDP leader questioned the present Government's authority to frame any such structure. "Only an elected parliament enjoyed such an authority and the Government should do the needful to constitute such a parliament through democratic methods laid down in the 1973 Constitution", he demanded.

He made it plain that since the present Government had no right to rule the country it could not exercise any authority to frame a new political structure for the country.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan also severely criticised restrictions on the inter-provincial movement of political leaders which, he said, was fraught with dangerous consequences in so far as unity and integrity of Pakistan were concerned. He said, the Government was deliberately trying to create such conditions as should compel the people to come out on the roads and, may be, they considered it to their advantage in the present circumstances — "but for us it would result in country's destruction," he added.

PAKISTAN-CHINA BODY MEETING NEXT MONTH

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 p 1

[Excerpt]

The Pakistan-China Joint Commission will meet in Islamabad on April 1 next to explore, inter alia, avenues of increased economic collaboration and expanded two-way trade between the two countries, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr Wang Chuanbin, said in Karachi yesterday.

China was sending a high-powered delegation to participate in the Joint Commission's meeting, he said and added that the Chinese team might conclude a trade agreement and a number of protocols during its visit to Pakistan.

Mr Wang was speaking at a luncheon meeting held for him at Sheraton Hotel by the Pakistan-

China Trade and Industry Committee of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

He said China had embarked on a new economic plan whereby it would be possible to have improved trade and economic relations with Pakistan. He commended Pakistan's achievement in the fields of agriculture and industry.

The Chinese envoy invited Pakistani entrepreneurs to set up industrial units in the economic zones established in China under the new economic policy. Such a Pakistani venture, he said, would be most welcome and benefit both the countries.

CSO: 4600/452

NEW DIMENSIONS NOTED IN PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 p 3

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, March 15: The recent official visits to Pakistan of three African Heads of State in a row in a span of about six weeks point to new dimensions in Pakistan's relations with the countries of the African continent, diplomatic observers said here on Tuesday.

First was Shehu Usman Snagari of Nigeria, who came on Jan 28. The second was President Seyne Kountche of Niger, who was in Pakistan from March 4 to 6. The third was President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, who is also the current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity. He left for

Nairobi on Sunday after a two-day State visit to Pakistan.

All these visits resulted in bringing the three important African States closer to Pakistan in political, economic, social and other fields. With Nigeria and Niger, Pakistan signed agreements for stepping up trade and cultural contacts, besides accords for establishment of joint ministerial-level commissions to promote all-round cooperation.

As regards Kenya, besides concluding trade and cultural pacts, a decision to conclude an agreement for establishing ministerial-level commission was agreed in principle.—APP

CSO: 4600/454

KHUNJRAB PASS TO OPEN 15 APRIL

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 pp 1, 14

[Excerpt]

Mr. Wang Chaunbin, Ambassador of People's Republic of China, said in Karachi last evening that the Khunjrab Pass, known as "Friendship Highway," would be opened to travel both ways from April 15.

Speaking at a meeting of the Institute of Foreign Relations at Hotel Sheraton on the "foreign policy of China," he said: "Condition on our side of the highway is not as good as on your side, and about 500 kilometres of the track has not been carpeted."

He said the "Friendship Highway" would be opened to travel with certificates, which he did not elaborate.

About travel facilities by normal international routes, the Chinese Ambassador said there were no problems as visas were issued in Islamabad and Karachi liberally.

"You only have to fix the date of travel and approach for visas," he remarked.

In his hour-long speech, the Ambassador touched on wide-ranging issues such as the Non-Aligned Movement, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the Middle East (with particular reference to the Palestinians), South-South cooperation, Sino-United States relations, Sino-

Soviet relations, Sino-Indian relations, and the "above-board" friendship between Pakistan and China.

On the question of Hong Kong, he reiterated that it was the territory of the People's Republic of China and that the full sovereignty would be regained by 1997.

About the effectiveness of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, he said it had made positive contributions towards peace and economic well-being of the people.

Mr. Wang said Pakistan and China had always helped and supported each other. In the political, economic, technical, commercial and cultural fields, the two countries had been carrying out fruitful and friendly cooperation which enabled the Sino-Pakistan friendship to grow further.

He said the Government and the people of China attached great importance to the friendly relations and cooperation with Pakistan.

The envoy said President Zia-ul-Haq considered the Sino-Pakistan friendship as the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy.

"We consider each other's well-being and strength as our own," he declared.

CSO: 4600/454

CIVIL AVIATION INSTITUTE TO BE EXPANDED

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Mar 83 p 12

[Text]

The Civil Aviation Training Institute at Hyderabad will be expanded with additional UNDP funds of Rs 13 million to cater to the needs of Asia and Pacific region.

The development will take place under a three-year plan beginning August this year. Until then it will fulfil the local needs only.

According to official sources, the approved proposals envisage assistance in the fields of manpower and training, air traffic services, communications and navigational aids, airports management, crash fire and rescue, and aerodrome maintenance engineering organisation.

A team of ICAO specialists arrived in Pakistan recently to discuss the project with the Civil Aviation Authority of which a delayed announcement was made yesterday.

Pakistan's input in the Institute which is located in a desolate place and to be declared a "hardship area" has been estimated at Rs 72.679 million and that of UNDP's assistance at Rs 26.034 million all in the form of buildings, equipment, fellowship, experts etc.

The project is one year behind schedule and the work has been assigned to Airports Development Agency.

CSO: 4600/454

WHEAT, SUGAR DERATIONING: THOROUGH REVIEW SUGGESTED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 p 9

[Editorial]

[Text]

THE Government is reported to be considering derationing of wheat and sugar. The Sind Government has referred the matter to Islamabad, for a decision on the matter has to be taken at the national level. The issue has also been raised before and the main argument in favour of derationing has been that self-sufficiency in wheat and sugar has rendered the continuance of the rationing system unnecessary. But as the Governor of Sind pointed out the other day, the surplus in wheat is marginal and the export of this commodity to Iran has been warranted by special circumstances. The marginal surplus, therefore, should not be the determining factor in taking an important decision like derationing. With Baluchistan and the NWFP being deficit in wheat, the surpluses from Sind and Punjab may not be sufficient to build up adequate reserve stocks for emergencies. Moreover, agricultural production is subject to the vagaries of weather and the favourable weather conditions, which have been officially acknowledged to be an important factor in the successive good wheat harvests in the last few years, cannot be counted on as reliable pointer to the future prospects. Any setback to wheat or sugarcane production would upset the present supply position. Distribution of wheat through ration depots guarantees a minimum level of the availability of this principal food item at a reasonable price. The consumers in the low-income groups are the main beneficiaries. The official distribution channel through ration depots also maintains a healthy pressure on the price level in the open market. If the trends in the open market are any indication, wheat and sugar prices may register an increase if rationing is prematurely discontinued. This will cause hardships to urban industrial workers and others with meagre incomes. Even the nominal element of subsidy present in the price of rationed 'atta' and sugar is justified since the benefit accrues mainly to the poor. This makes it necessary that no decision on derationing is taken in haste — without making sure that such a step is justified by a stable supply position and that it will not cause a major price upset. The production and price of wheat and sugar must be watched for some time before derationing is considered as a practical option.

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PESHAWAR-KARACHI HIGHWAY PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 p 5

[Text]

PESHAWAR, March 13: A dual carriage highway from Peshawar to Karachi would be constructed at a cost of Rs. 750 million during the next six years. The scheme is at present in the planning stages and funds would be generated from private sector to finance the project.

The Federal Government would contribute Rs. 500 million.

This was stated by Mr. Salim Saifullah Khan, Provincial Minister for Finance, Industries and Transport, while inaugurating Roads Safety Seminar in Peshawar on Saturday.

He said that both the provincial and Federal governments are giving top priority to the construction and improvement of roads in the country, so that traffic accidents

could be checked.

He said that the provincial government had earmarked Rs. 239 million in their budgets for the improvement of communication in the province.

The funds were being spent on the widening and improvement of old roads and construction of new roads in the province, he pointed out.

He said that while top priority was given towards road improvement, the main responsibility of controlling road accidents rest with the drivers. He said that the NWFP Government had established a driving school in Peshawar to train the driver not only in safe driving measures but also create in them the importance of road sense and the meaning of traffic signs.—PPI

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BRIEFS

RETIREMENT FOR ZIA SUGGESTED--It is said by the wise that we should let the right man do the right job. It is for the Armed Forces to defend the nation and it is for the politicians to look after affairs of State. If a general wants to enter politics, he should do so after retiring from the army.--
MAGHRABI PAKISTAN, March 5. [Text] [Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 10 Mar 83 p 34]

RASHID'S DETENTION PERIOD EXTENDED--Lahore, March 13: Sheikh Muhammad Rashid, former Health Minister and Senior Vice-Chairman, defunct Pakistan Peoples Party, who has been under house arrest, was today served with another order under CML0-12 extending his detention by another three months. Sheikh Rashid, who has been seriously suffering from asthma, T.B., diabetes and some other diseases for quite sometime, has been under detention for over two years barring a brief interval. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 p 1]

UNESCO-GOVERNMENT LIBRARIES PLANNED--Faisalabad, March 13: A comprehensive plan for the establishment of public libraries at all levels throughout the country has been chalked out by the Federal Government, in collaboration with UNESCO, it is learnt. According to a government source, the Government has appointed a technical group in the Federal Ministry of Education consisting of high-ranking officials, experienced librarians and scientists for preparing a working paper laying down guidelines in the light of a UNESCO programme for extension of libraries. The source said that the moral, spiritual, social and economic life of a society was dependent upon the literary habits and reading behaviour of a nation. Expansion of library facilities were of paramount importance for the country in the perspective of mass literacy programme envisaged in the sixth Five-Year Plan thereby contributing to the overall uplift of the country. [Excerpt] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Mar 83 p 5]

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END